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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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Onward Catholic Soldiers?

Although the debate between Paul J. Griffiths and George Weigel on just war ("Just War: An Exchange," April) was illuminating in many regards, I was rather surprised that Mr. Weigel concentrated his attention on an issue that he admitted was not central to Mr. Griffiths' argument: the confusion between *ius ad bellum* (the reasons justifying a declaration of war) and *ius in bello* (the use of only proportionate violence in the conduct of war).

Now I do not doubt that the confusion between these two issues is widespread. I recall one priest-friend of mine, a very dedicated hospital chaplain who opposed the war in Afghanistan from the beginning, triumphantly brandishing before me accounts of civilian casualties in the bombing campaign, as if that alone rendered the war in retrospect unjust. I asked him to consider the case of World War II, when Britain firebombed Dresden to no military end and when the United States did the same to Tokyo, not to mention the virtually total annihilation of two unsuspecting Japanese cities by atom bombs. Surely, according to the norms of just war teaching, such means are disproportionate.

But, I asked this chaplain, did that render the war itself, in retrospect, unjust? And even if the answer to that question were to be Yes, what would *that* mean: that the Allies should have surrendered then and there to the Axis? Hand back Europe to Nazi rule? Let Japan keep Manchuria? I presume everyone recognizes the absurdity of such an analysis, especially when one considers the *in bello* behavior of Nazi Germany toward Stalingrad, Leningrad, and Rotterdam during the war, the death camps, slave labor, etc.

But this admittedly extreme thought experiment does highlight a category confusion in Mr. Griffiths' analysis: Who then is meant to bear the burden for using disproportionate means in the course of a war? Surely, the only answer can be: *the statesmen or generals* who are conducting the war. Mr. Griffiths seems to labor under the illusion that the termination of moral responsibility for both declaring and waging war is the populace at large, at least in a democracy. I find this a dubious argument even when the issue is whether to go to war; but surely the notion is downright impossible when dealing with strategy and tactics once war has been declared.

Consider this odd but telling example: during the build-up of tensions that eventually led to the Gulf War, one Jesuit opined that a war to liberate Kuwait could not be just because a convention of Catholic moral theologians had recently passed a resolution declaring that the criteria for a *ius ad bellum* were lacking. To my mind at the time, that had no more relevance than would a similarly worded resolution from the American Chemical Society or an oppositely worded resolution from the Veterans of Foreign Wars. To be sure, all such groups are composed of citizens of the United States and certainly have a right to their opinion. But such resolutions alone are irrelevant, for the criteria of a just war developed over the centuries present a moral calculus that was meant to be put into the hands of statesmen and generals, which should be obvious when one realizes the implications of placing such decision making directly into the hands of the people rather than their elected leaders.

For one thing, a democratic form of government is hardly a guarantee

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of just conduct in a war, as can be witnessed as far back as the often bloodthirsty behavior of the Athenian assembly harrowingly described by Thucydides in *The Peloponnesian War.* But what most undermines Mr. Griffiths' argument is what seems to be his underlying assumption, that a default position against going to war will better ensure that a declaration of war will be just, since it will be made only as a last resort. This position, however, forgets the cardinal rule of all versions of game theory: that not to decide is to decide.

Consider the number of Americans who were killed by Islamic terrorists well before September 11, 2001. Even as early as the presidencies of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, American diplomats were murdered in Sudan and Lebanon; under President Jimmy Carter an entire embassy was overtaken and occupied (itself a *casus belli* in international law); the hostages from that flagrantly illegal action were released on the first day in office of President Ronald Reagan, but the world soon learned how mild were *his* reactions when the American embassy in Beirut was car-bombed with 63 dead and 120 wounded, while six months later a Marine barracks was bombed, killing 241 Marines in their sleep; then President George Bush *père* flouted Niccolò Machiavelli's dictum "If thou wouldst strike the prince, thou must kill him as well" by terminating the Gulf War too early (to loud hosannas from press and populace), thus keeping Saddam Hussein in power to work his mischief up to this day; and then under President Bill Clinton the World Trade Center was bombed for the first time, killing six, and a building housing American soldiers in Saudi Arabia was hit by a truck bomb, killing 19 American airmen and wounding 240 others, and finally two American embassies were hit on the same day (August 7, 1998), killing more than 200 people, 12 of whom were American.

During *all* of these outrages and atrocities, the United States resolutely took Mr. Griffiths' default position and did . . . precisely nothing. And the effect of this decision not to decide? Contempt for America only increased, indeed increased exponentially among Islamic extremists. (One should perhaps note here that the professional "peace and justice" wing of the Catholic left has had exactly *nothing* to say about the staggering injustice of these deaths.)

What most seems to be missing from the Griffiths analysis is any recognition that this war, one that he bitterly decries and which he thinks only began the day bombing commenced in Kabul, *has already been going on for some time.* This means that if our statesmen decide—whether for good reasons or bad, and in any case based on the information that by the nature of the situation is available to them alone—not to go to war in a particular case, at the very least that decision should be seen as a strategy (whether effective or ineffective) in achieving the ultimate goal, which must be either defeat of enemies who hate us or a cowing of them into a peace that respects international law. What is quite irrelevant is whether the decision to initiate hostilities is just, since hostilities have obviously already begun, and long ago.

Perhaps Mr. Griffiths will arraign me with those other "chatterers" who advocate a just war theory as traditionally understood whom he derides in his essay; and if that is his preferred mode of argument, he is free to adopt it. But at least he should then recognize that class of men and women who do not spend their lives chattering about the casuistry of just war: our soldiers. I am reminded here of C. S. Lewis' famous lecture "Why I Am Not a Pacifist," which he delivered less than two months after Great Britain declared war on Nazi Germany. Tellingly, Lewis resolutely refuses either to demean the moral stature of pacifists (as the popular press in Britain tended to do at the time) or to attribute courage to himself just because of his defense of just war. But he begs to point out the great moral gulf that separates the *lives,* if not the personal integrity, of soldiers and pacifists:

> All that we fear from all the kinds of adversity, severally, is collected together in the life of a soldier on active service. Like sickness, it threatens pain and death. Like poverty, it threatens ill lodging, cold, heat, thirst, and hunger. Like slavery, it threatens toil, humiliation, injustice, and arbitrary rule. Like exile, it separates you from all you love. Like the galleys, it imprisons you at close quarters with uncongenial companions. It threatens *every* temporal evil—every evil except dishonor and final perdition, and those who bear it like it no better than you would like it. On the other side, though it may not be your fault, it is certainly a fact that pacifism threatens you with almost nothing. Some public opprobrium, yes, from people whose opinion you discount and whose society you do not frequent, soon recompensed by the warm mutual approval which exists, inevitably, in any minority group. For the rest it offers you a continuance of the life you know and love, among the people and in the surroundings you know and love. It offers you time to lay the foundations of a career; for whether you will or no, you can hardly help getting the jobs for which the discharged soldiers will one day look in vain. You do not even have to fear, as pacifists may have had to fear in the last war, that public opinion will punish you when the peace comes. For we have

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learned now that though the world is slow to forgive, it is quick to forget.

In that context I must wonder aloud whether the reason our nation was not roused to war until the outrages of September 11 is because, until then, the victims of Islamic terrorism were for the most part soldiers, whose very existence is a reproach to us who would presume to judge them.

Edward T. Oakes, S.J.
Regis University
Denver, Colorado

Paul J. Griffiths wisely tells us again what the Church has told us for two thousand years: that there will be tension between what we owe to the sacred and what we owe to the secular. I of course agree with him that if and when political and legal demands upon citizens' loyalties replace the claims of supernaturally informed consciences, the state becomes a Leviathan in which profane ideology supersedes and destroys sacred theology. That way lies the Gulag.

With rather less wisdom, however, Mr. Griffiths tells us about a "default position" that, in essence, amounts to this: because there are no reliable sources of information, I sin if I accept the U.S. government's statements about the war on terrorism. (Yet Mr. Griffiths himself apparently knows more than the Catholic hierarchy in the U.S., which supports the war on terrorism. "Epistemic immodesty" indeed!) As our Lord said, we are to render to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's (Matthew 22:21, Mark 12:17, Luke 20:25). It isn't always easy, however, to know which is which.

"Caesar is not 'the Lord'" (*Catechism of the Catholic Church* §450). So the authority of the state—and our loyalty to it—extends only as far as its laws are just and moral (*CCC* §1902). The *Catechism* puts this plainly: "If rulers were to enact unjust laws or take measures contrary to the moral order, such arrangements would not be binding in conscience" (*CCC* §1903).

The best example of such moral judgment is Saint Thomas More, who was beheaded in 1535 following his refusal to acquiesce to the demands of King Henry VIII that the King be recognized as head of the Church in England. "I die the King's good servant," the saint is supposed to have said, "but God's first." *We are to obey the laws of the City of Man until such obedience contradicts the laws of the City of God.* Our political and military duties are tempered, but not eliminated, by our spiritual responsibilities. We recognize such contradictions by educating ourselves about our duties both in time and in eternity, about our responsibilities both to Caesar and to God, but we cannot reasonably expect perfect moral clarity at all times and in all cases, as George Weigel trenchantly observes. My argument, then, is that we owe (imperfect) loyalty to the country unless and until the requirement of (perfect) loyalty to God and the Church supersedes it.

Unlike Jehovah's Witnesses, who refuse loyalty to flag and government, we Catholics proudly proclaim our patriotism and our deep love of country. Indeed, the *Catechism* teaches that "the love and service of one's country follow from the duty of gratitude and belong to the order of charity" (*CCC* §2239). But we remember that we are citizens, first and foremost, of heaven (Philippians 3:20). In the end, Mr. Griffiths and Mr. Weigel may have more in common than in conflict, for I think they agree that our love of flag and country can be good and noble, but that ours is always a higher—and not necessarily conflicting—obligation: keeping God first (cf. Hebrews 13:20-21).

James H. Toner
Ambassador Holland Coors Chair of Character Development
U.S. Air Force Academy
Colorado Springs, Colorado

Paul J. Griffiths concludes that the average American Catholic cannot support the U.S.-led military action in Afghanistan. He asserts that the average American cannot make a factual determination that the war is just because the evidence available to him comes from unreliable sources. His conclusion therefore is based not on an analysis of facts, but rather on a presumption that all war is unjust. Leaving aside the issue of whether there is such a presumption (which George Weigel addresses in his essay), Mr. Griffiths' conclusion is questionable for other reasons.

First, his premise that there is insufficient evidence to rebut the presumption is doubtful. Even if the sources of facts are not wholly reliable, this does not mean that sufficient evidence is unavailable to support a conclusion that the conditions necessary for a just war exist. Using the analogy of a court of law, juries often rule against defendants and in favor of the party having the burden of proof (both in civil and criminal cases) based on evidence which comes from sources that are not wholly reliable. It is the function of the jury to analyze and weigh the evidence. A jury cannot, as one might think from Mr. Griffiths' argument, simply abrogate its responsibility to weigh and analyze the evidence simply because the sources of evidence are not entirely reliable.

Second, Mr. Griffiths ignores the portion of the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* that states: "The evaluation of these conditions for moral legitimacy belongs to the prudential judgment of those who have responsibility for the common good" (§2309). This statement would seem to preclude the reliance by those who do not have responsibility for the common good (i.e., the average American) on any presumption that would lead one to a facile conclusion that his government has acted immorally in conducting an unjust war. Those entrusted with the common good may well have reli-

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able evidence sufficient to rebut any presumption that the war is unjust. According to his own argument, Mr. Griffiths would have no reliable evidence upon which he could question the prudential judgment of those who have responsibility for the common good.

John W. Chambers, Jr.
Atlanta, Georgia

Eavesdropping on a discussion among Catholics on just war doctrine is a good way to learn something, so it was a pleasure to read the exchange between Paul J. Griffiths and George Weigel.

Unfortunately, both Mr. Griffiths and Mr. Weigel make subtle missteps at the very beginning of their arguments that consign each to slipping off the path and bogging down in some of the muddy ground through which we are trying to follow Christ when it comes to war.

Mr. Griffiths starts with a presumption for nonviolence, and follows with some sloppy thinking about where we should get our information in wartime, which leads him to a nasty logical cul-de-sac: "We can only support war when we know it is just, but we can never know it is just because there are no reliable sources of information; thus we can never support war." Mr. Griffiths doesn't quite say we can never support war, but his logic inescapably leads to this conclusion, which is why Mr. Weigel calls it "functional pacifism."

Mr. Weigel rightly decries all this only to get his own feet tangled by putting a presumption for order in place of Mr. Griffiths' presumption for nonviolence.

Mr. Weigel says he is basing his argument on a presumption for justice, but his justice is mostly fleshed out in the preservation of order. He doesn't consider whether justice might require the disruption of order, although the American version of the story of our independence presumes that King George's order was inimical to justice, and deserved to be shattered and replaced by a new, more just, order. Mr. Weigel's identification of order and justice is worrisome, but not the most worrisome aspect of his approach to just war thinking.

Both order and nonviolence are important Christian values. But neither nonviolence nor order are at the heart of the gospel of peace. They are both derivative. Love for neighbors (along with loving God) is the first principle when it comes to human conflict. Order and nonviolence are strategic options for living out that love. But love comes before either of them, and should produce our default position.

Mr. Weigel almost gets it right when he notes how the just war position is an attempt to think through the implications for public policy of the command to love our neighbors. If love for neighbors was all that Jesus taught, we could arrive relatively easily at Mr. Weigel's endorsement of a presumption for violence—that is, a citizen's duty to endorse and comply with his earthly sovereign's decision to go to war unless that decision is somehow demonstrated to be wrongful. But Mr. Weigel skips past the other half of Jesus' command about love.

Jesus expected us to love our enemies, too. And he made it clear, in the story of the Good Samaritan, and in his own death on the cross, that loving enemies is just one form of loving neighbors. We are to love both enemies and neighbors, and love them the same, even to laying down our lives for them.

So we come to what we might call Constantine's Dilemma: How can a ruler, responsible for order (as a result of his command to love his neighbors, and his position as head of a government expected by God to provide for order), reconcile that duty with the equally central command to love his enemies? What is the ruler to do when the two duties seem to conflict, when the only way to secure order seems to be to kill enemies?

Mr. Weigel counsels what I would have to call a "presumption of despair." That is, he encourages us to follow our leaders who declare war, despite the fact that a declaration of war is equivalent to saying, "It is impossible for us to fully obey God in this case. Either we love our neighbors and protect them, or we love our enemies and refuse to kill them. We can't do both."

I would think the Christian position would have to result in a "presumption of hope," at least in the sense that a believer would resist any conclusion that God has given us irreconcilable commands. If we are truly to love both neighbor and enemy, since they are both in God's image and equally objects of our love, shouldn't we carry a very strong presumption that both commands can be obeyed?

The just war doctrine works, if it works, by forcing us to delay killing until there is no other action left that shows love to all our neighbors, friends and foes. Individual believers who have reason to believe their government has short-circuited hope should start by assuming they are called to resist the descent into despair by embodying and modeling persistent, courageous, creative, and practical hope. Their lives, perhaps, should be among the resources they lay on the line to discover and carry out God's alternatives that embody love for everyone, friend and foe. If we start with the proper presumption—the presumption of love—we will refuse to kill until nothing is left to us but despair.

The pacifist, of course, concludes there is always something left to us other than despair. Faith, hope, and love abide for the pacifist, even when other values—such as order, and even human-designed justice—may have to be left to God's providence. This is why I am a pacifist. (Not, mind you, anything like Mr. Griffiths' "functional" pacifism, but hopefully also not "nonfunctional" nor even "dysfunctional," although I

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await Mr. Weigel's judgment on the matter.)

Ron Mock
Director, Center for Peace Learning
George Fox University
Newberg, Oregon

I would like to make two comments on the just war exchange between Paul J. Griffiths and George Weigel. First, I'm confused by the major premise of the exchange. Whereas Mr. Griffiths gives priority to means (viz., "the presumption against violence"), Mr. Weigel gives priority to ends (viz., "the presumption for justice"). Mr. Griffiths' point, if I understand it, is that due to the imperative to avoid "epistemic immodesty" the "presumption against violence" preempts judgment as to the justifiability of violence. Mr. Weigel's point, if I understand it, is that while the "presumption against violence" takes priority for private agents ("the duel"), the "presumption for justice" takes priority for public agents ("the war").

Now as I understand the natural law framework, within which Catholic tradition grounds just war thinking, one cannot properly pit ends and means against one another; instead, ends and means must be fitted together. Although Mr. Weigel is surely correct that one should not confuse means and ends, one should not use ends to trump means either: while the value of life does not necessarily preempt justice where limited information and the ambiguities of action imply potential for unintended consequences, the end of justice cannot by itself ever justify taking life.

The implication is that, because nonviolent means are always in better accord with safeguarding respect for the value of life (which is ever as much the responsibility of government as the pursuit of justice), violence is justifiable only under conditions of necessity. This applies equally to private agents acting for private ends as well as to public agents acting for public ends. That is precisely why even "legitimate authority" must convincingly demonstrate, not presume, "just cause," "right intention," and "last resort" prior to acting: simply being the state in pursuit of justice cannot lift the burden of proof to overcome the "presumption against violence." Mr. Griffiths is thus correct, I think, to point out that the pattern of reasoning required regarding just war is the same as for the death penalty, both of which are forms of state violence undertaken as a last resort for the sake of justice.

By the same token, Mr. Weigel is correct that the "presumption against violence" cannot preempt judgment as to the necessity of force in a particular case. The criteria of "proportionality" and "discrimination," which are motivated by the "presumption against violence" and rooted in respect for the value of life, are intended only to circumscribe any state violence justified by necessity within the bounds of the common good so that means fit ends. It may well be true that all U.S. wars of the twentieth century grossly failed the criteria of "proportionality" and "discrimination" such that no U.S. war in the last century was just in both means and ends. While that inductive evidence, compounded by the ever present conditions of limited information and ambiguity of action, may lead one to infer the unlikelihood of future wars being just and take serious pause for prudential judgment prior to pursuing justice via war, such considerations cannot properly preempt the prior judgment as to the necessity of the use of force under the criteria of "just cause," "right intention," and "last resort."

Second, Mr. Weigel concludes his piece with the following: "The difference between pacifism and the just war tradition is that the latter recognizes that there are circumstances in which the use of proportionate and discriminate armed force is a moral obligation in the pursuit of peace." Mr. Weigel, I think, simply fails to understand pacifism, and this because of his concession to an ethic whose norm is given by what is possible within the present human order rather than what is called for within the Kingdom of God. Where pacifism (in the sense of Christian discipleship) and just war tradition differ is not on the means necessary for seeking peace, but on the very meaning of "peace" itself. Earlier on, Mr. Weigel defines "peace" as "the peace of 'right order,'" an admittedly "humble sort of peace," but one with the "great advantage for moral realists" that it is a "peace that can be achieved in this world."

Any pacifist could agree that in some circumstances limited state violence is necessary to achieve and preserve "right order" among nations. From the perspective of Christian discipleship, however, that is beside the point. The peace Mr. Weigel describes is Pax Romana, not Pax Christi, and the Christian disciple who confesses that Jesus is Lord is called unequivocally to serve Pax Christi. This is the original "humble peace," following the model of servanthood rather than rulership; it, too, coexists with brokenness, hatred, and war. It is neither an abandonment of love of neighbor and social responsibility, nor a failure to reckon the realities. Instead, for the Christian disciple, the most radical responsibility and the profoundest moral realism are articulated in the Sermon on the Mount: one is called to love the neighbor without boundaries, including the enemy, even at risk to one's own life, because that is how God is. The basic difference between pacifism and just war is not over means, but ends: limited violence is rejected by the Christian disciple because even that is incompatible with Kingdom ends. To put it another way, the difference is one not of responsibility, but of eschatology.

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The dialogue between Paul J. Griffiths and George Weigel on just war is the kind of discussion that makes my subscription to FIRST THINGS so enlightening and worthwhile. I now think I understand the nuances of the different theological positions on just war much better than I ever have before. I thank both gentlemen for that increased understanding.

One of the difficulties I have with Mr. Griffiths' position is how impractical it is for real-life situations. The crux of the difficulty is his position that war is not allowable under Catholic tradition until and unless the morality of the decision is proven with absolute logic and without any doubt or reservations of any kind. In fact, he seems to be saying that a decision to go to war should never be made since the information we have from the media and the government is never reliable and is always biased toward warlike activity. He also seems to have serious doubt whether the common man is competent to make such life and death decisions even if the information were more reliable.

I have to plead my own "epistemic immodesty" about how much the common man is incompetent, or to what extent the information we receive from the government and the media is unreliable. But it seems to me that to believe as Mr. Griffiths believes would mean we would do nothing when attacked while we analyze and debate whether the attack was warranted. Consistent with his position, it seems we would never reach a valid decision one way or another because the information would be flawed and the decision-makers ignorant.

Does Mr. Griffiths have a way out of this dilemma and could it be that we should hire experts with more knowledge and competence than ourselves to make our decisions for us? But then where would our democracy be and would we really have fewer unjust wars? The historical evidence seems to suggest otherwise. It looks like we are stuck with freedom and the common man, with all their flaws.

James J. Guthrie
Lowell, Massachusetts

Paul J. Griffiths replies:
I'm grateful for what I've learned from the letters to FIRST THINGS about my exchange with George Weigel on the adventures of the U.S. in Afghanistan. These letters show that the questions raised in that exchange are lively; for that we should all be grateful.

To Father Oakes (whose prose is as elegantly over-excited as always): I'm glad he shares my surprise that Mr. Weigel did not respond to my main point. I'd thought that this was because it's not easily answerable, but Fr. Oakes sets me straight by at least attempting an answer. However, not all that he says makes sense. He asks what it means, in retrospect, that the Allies did not respect the *ius in bello* norms in World War II. Well, it means at least that those who gave the orders for the fire-bombing of German and Japanese cities acted unjustly, and that those who spoke for and with the Church then and after should have said so. Elizabeth Anscombe was one who did: she argued, trenchantly and rightly, that President Truman was a war criminal. Fr. Oakes, by his own lights, should agree, and I hope he does.

But Fr. Oakes appears to think that the American Catholic populace-at-large (including, presumably, him and me) is relieved from having opinions or making judgments about the justness of a particular act of war contemplated by our country because the classical just war theory permits those judgments only to statesmen and generals. This is incoherent. It follows directly from such a position that when two nations with Catholic populations are at (or about to go to) war, the populations of both are justified in judging their cause correct (just), because their statesmen and generals do. Perhaps Fr. Oakes will bite that bullet; I won't.

As for the old accusation, "Not to decide is to decide": well, yes, but the question is, to decide what? Fr. Oakes misconstrues the question I was asking, for that question I did decide. The question was: Did U.S. Catholics have enough information at their disposal in September and October of last year to be able to apply the *ius ad bellum* criteria? I decided this question negatively, and Fr. Oakes does not address my arguments about it. Perhaps they were a bit subtle. I'm impressed, I must say, by Fr. Oakes' blithe confidence in his ability to know the answer to counterfactual conditionals such as "What would have happened if the U.S. had responded bellicosely to the embassy bombings of 1998?" I have no such confidence. Perhaps Fr. Oakes has unusually well-developed predictive powers?

And finally to Fr. Oakes, about pacifism, C. S. Lewis, and soldiers. I'm pleased that Fr. Oakes approves of soldierly self-sacrifice and nobility. So do I. But I prefer these virtues when their exercise doesn't involve killing other people. Does he?

Thanks to Mr. Toner, with most of whose letter I fully agree. I didn't, though, claim to know more than the hierarchy. Rather, I asked them whether they knew more than I, and the answers I've had since the piece appeared suggest that for the most part the answer is no.

To Mr. Chambers: I didn't claim simply that our sources are not wholly reliable; I claimed that they are very largely unreliable, which makes a difference. And the jury analogy is relevant, but not in the way he thinks: U.S. juries do not begin their work from a position of neutrality, but from a presumption of innocence. Similarly, a Catholic thinking about *ius ad bellum* begins from a presumption that a contemplated war is not just—a presumption which Mr. Chambers allows for the sake of the argument, and from

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which the conclusion I argued for does follow. Paragraph 2309 of the *Catechism* is a difficulty, I admit. To it I can only repeat what I said above to Fr. Oakes about statesmen and generals. I ask Mr. Chambers to think (as I continue to do) about the implications of this paragraph in the *Catechism* for the latitude we U.S. Catholics should permit our representatives on questions about the common good. We live, after all, in a nation in which those who have responsibility for the common good have made it illegal to restrict the killing of the unborn.

To Mr. Mock and Mr. Belousek: pacifism is a position I revere but don't share, not, anyway, if it means abjuring all uses of lethal violence as a matter of principle. Mr. Mock accuses me of sloppy thinking, but doesn't say wherein the sloppiness lies. I'd like to know (really!).

Mr. Guthrie's question is important. I do think that the means by which information is disseminated in late-capitalist nations, together with the strong pressures toward mendacity affecting elected representatives in democracies, mean that the common man (and that's me) doesn't have and can't get what he'd need to make reasonable decisions in time of contemplated or active war. And this means that the common Catholic man (and that's me, too) is wrong to throw his support behind his nation when it's contemplating (or has declared) war. This may not be the situation we'd like, but it's no good pretending things are otherwise, is it?

George Weigel replies:
Ron Mock suggests that I confuse justice and order in my rendering of just war theory. Perhaps it would help clarify the point if I noted that, in my 1987 book *Tranquillitas Ordinis*, I "translated" St. Augustine's classic definition of peace as "the peace of dynamic and rightly ordered political community." Which means that justice and freedom are the two crucial components of "order" in *tranquillitas ordinis*. As I hope I've made plain in my just war writing over the last fifteen years, there are certain forms of political "order" that are not "right order" and need not be preserved—indeed, conscience may require that they be resisted, by a variety of means, a point on which Thomas Jefferson and Lech Walesa would have agreed. So I plead not guilty to the charge of identifying "order" and "justice." Ditto to the charge that I am endorsing a "presumption for violence." As I thought I had made reasonably clear in my article, the just war way of thinking about the moral exigencies of world politics begins with a presumption for justice—a presumption that the magistrate has the *moral* obligation to defend the common good, even at the risk of his own life—and then proceeds to a moral analysis of the various means available for securing justice, which can include proportionate and discriminate armed force.

Darrin Belousek's letter reminds me of a *mot* attributed to the late John Courtney Murray, S.J.: "If the end doesn't justify the means, what does?" Mr. Belousek does, however, take us close to the theological heart of the matter, which is indeed one of eschatology. He tells me that I misunderstand pacifism; from my point of view, what I think I understand is that pacifists misunderstand their relationship to the coming Pax Christi. That will be Christ's work, not ours, established in Christ's time, not ours; and because of the very nature of the Pax Christi, which will be the consummation of Christ's salvific work in the final establishment of a Kingdom that is by definition "beyond" history, no work of politics (including nonviolent politics) will advance the establishment of the Pax Christi by one millisecond. Between now and then, the task is not to establish Pax Romana, but . . . *tranquillitas ordinis*, to go back to the beginning (in several senses of the phrase).

Speaking the Truth?

David Novak wonders how a Jew like me can teach at a Christian divinity school in light of my "opposition to the dialogue" of the two communities and my belief that their "relationship necessarily involves mutual repugnance" ("'Instinctive Repugnance,'" May). Let me assure the readers of FIRST THINGS that my involvement in Jewish-Christian dialogue (which began when I was a teenager) and my commitment to it remain alive and well. Professor Novak's error lies in assuming that because I reject "*Dabru Emet*: A Jewish Statement on Christians and Christianity" (which he coauthored), I must reject the dialogue tout court. Nothing in my critique of the statement provides the slightest support for his assumption.

As for his equally unfounded claim that I believe the relationship of Judaism and Christianity to be "necessarily" one of "mutual repugnance," Prof. Novak does attempt to provide textual support. In doing so, however, he doctors my words in a way that inverts their plain and unambiguous meaning. Here is his alleged quotation, exactly as he gives it, brackets and all:

> One need hardly be an advocate of interfaith hostility to observe [that] the two communities . . . feel an instinctive repugnance toward each other.

This must be compared with the passage in which I actually used the term "instinctive repugnance":

> One need hardly be an advocate of interfaith hostility to observe that two communities that feel an instinctive repugnance toward each other are unlikely to form an amalgam, whether through acculturation or intermarriage. By the same token, communities that have largely overcome their animosity and moved to mutual re-

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spect, as Jews and Christians have done to a significant extent in the United States, must look elsewhere for such reinforcements to group identity as existed under the older and more contentious arrangement. Under any conditions, the risks are higher for the smaller community—that is, the Jews. They are especially high if Jews and Christians really do stand in the relationship described by *Dabru Emet.*

Prof. Novak's mischief goes further than his obvious insertion of a definite article and his employment of a tendentiously misleading ellipsis. The passage from which he has lifted the term "instinctive repugnance" makes it crystal clear that the attitude in question is largely a thing of the past, having been replaced by "mutual respect." If Prof. Novak had wanted to give a truthful account of where I think things stand—and of my own personal attitude—he would have quoted those two words as well. That he does not, instead distorting my real words beyond recognition, should give pause to any honest reader.

I am hardly the "eminent Jewish scholar" that Prof. Novak calls me, but I am alert enough to recognize when I have been misquoted, when my meaning has been grossly and prejudicially misrepresented, and when the substantive issues I have raised remain unaddressed.

Jon D. Levenson
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In his article "'Instinctive Repugnance,'" David Novak seizes upon and distorts a single phrase, taken out of context, from Professor Jon D. Levenson's extensive and thoughtful critique of the interfaith document "*Dabru Emet* (Speak the Truth): A Jewish Statement on Christians and Christianity," in order to launch an ad hominem assault on Prof. Levenson's integrity, his attitude to Christianity, and his suitability to be a professor at Harvard's Divinity School. Prof. Levenson was certainly not advocating "mutual repugnance," or any hostility for that matter, between Christians and Jews. He was merely pointing to an undeniable historical reality about the deeply ingrained, almost instinctive, responses of each group to the other's religious rituals and core beliefs, that has largely and thankfully become a thing of the past. This in the context of Levenson's very cogent and realistic critique of *Dabru Emet*'s willful ignorance of historical and theological realities that must frame any honest and fruitful interreligious dialogue.

While it is fine, indeed healthy, for Judaic scholars to engage in a heated exchange about the best way to approach interfaith dialogue, nothing can justify Prof. Novak's truly repugnant accusation that, in not ascribing to *Dabru Emet*, Prof. Levenson is somehow guilty of fostering "self-hatred" among Christians, or his insulting suggestion that Levenson would be better off teaching in an Orthodox yeshiva than at Harvard. It is not without irony that, in the name of promoting an open dialogue between Christians and Jews, Prof. Novak has displayed a imperious intolerance of genuine dialogue within the Jewish scholarly community.

The etiology of this imperiousness is not hard to find in Prof. Novak's article, where he describes *Dabru Emet* as "the first normative text for Jews dealing with the new and better chapter in the relationship between our communities dating from the 1965 statement, *Nostra Aetate,* of the Second Vatican Council." It will no doubt disappoint Prof. Novak to learn that while the Torah, Mishna, Talmud, and Codes of Rabbinic Law may fairly be described as "normative texts for Jews," his own writings in the pages of FIRST THINGS do not quite merit that august designation, even if endorsed by three other Jewish college professors and later published as an advertisement in the *New York Times.*

Prof. Novak's analysis of the widespread Jewish opposition to *Dabru Emet* is equally supercilious. With astonishing self-importance Prof. Novak writes: "As there is still Christian opposition to the Christian document of 1965, so there is now Jewish opposition to *Dabru Emet.*" In comparing the signatories of *Dabru Emet* to the members of the Second Vatican Council, Prof. Novak reflects not only an unwarranted sense of religious authority, he betrays the false reasoning that rendered *Dabru Emet* such a deeply flawed document in the first place. In point of fact, there is no Jewish equivalent to the Vatican, just as there is no parity between Jewish and Christian attitudes toward the other's faith.

The same flawed reasoning led the authors of *Dabru Emet* to obscure the central theological differences between the two faiths, by asserting that Jews and Christians "worship the same God" and find religious authority "in the same book." But, as all moderately educated Jews and Christians know, the God of Israel does not incorporate Jesus of Nazareth or the Holy Spirit, and the Tanakh (Hebrew Scriptures) does not include the New Testament. These are not minor details; they are fundamental differences and only by confronting them in the context of interreligious dialogue can we hope for an honest and productive exchange. How strange it is that Prof. Novak's polemic against dealing openly and honestly about the differences that separate believing Jews and Christians was published in the same issue of FIRST THINGS as Richard John Neuhaus' admirably candid reflections on the Jews.

At the very core of Prof. Levenson's critique of *Dabru Emet* was the fact that this "Jewish Statement on Christians and Christianity" imag-

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ines that, in their historic theological attitudes toward each other, there is somehow a balanced "dialectical" relationship between Christianity and Judaism. In challenging that misconstruction of Jewish history and theology, along with several other deeply problematic aspects of *Dabru Emet*, Prof. Levenson did a great service to furthering open discussion on a topic that is far from resolved in the minds of most rabbis and Jewish thinkers, Prof. Novak's "normative text for Jews" notwithstanding. That Prof. Novak and his coauthors chose to lower the level of discourse not only in FIRST THINGS but in their strident letter in the April 2002 issue of *Commentary*, in which they dismiss the possibility of dialogue with Prof. Levenson "in his present state of mind," is most lamentable.

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Drew University
Madison, New Jersey

I was surprised and dismayed at Professor David Novak's misrepresentation of Prof. Jon D. Levenson's reference to the "instinctive repugnance" between the Jewish and the Christian communities in Prof. Levenson's penetrating and incisive critique of the *Dabru Emet* document. Based upon his obvious (and deliberate?) misconstrual of Prof. Levenson's remarks, Prof. Novak proceeds to challenge the integrity of Prof. Levenson's teaching Christian students at Harvard Divinity School.

As is evident from Prof. Levenson's full (rather than selectively edited) comments, he was referring to the instinctive repugnances of the past, which, at least in the United States, have, over the past few decades, been significantly overcome. The point Prof. Levenson was making was that precisely because of the increased mutual tolerance and respect between Jews and Christians, and between theologians of Judaism and of Christianity, it is important for Jews who want to preserve Jewish identity, Jewish religiosity, and Jewish continuity (as I know that both Prof. Novak and Prof. Levenson do) that the fundamental theological distinctions between Judaism and Christianity not be blurred or glossed over, since such blurring can contribute to the phenomenon of Jewish intermarriage and loss of meaningful Jewish identity. This practical argument against the blurring of theological distinctions, which is what *Dabru Emet* does, is in addition to the basic argument for intellectual and theological honesty and integrity, especially (but not only) when engaging in mutually respectful interreligious discourse. I assume that one of the reasons why students of all faiths flock to Prof. Levenson's courses at Harvard Divinity School is because in addition to appreciating his erudition and brilliance, they respect his intellectual integrity.

Prof. Levenson notes that, among other differences between traditional Judaism and Christianity ignored by *Dabru Emet*, Jewish adherents of Judaism do not consider the New Testament to be their sacred scripture, do not believe that Jesus was either Messiah or God, do not believe in a Trinitarian God, and do not believe that Christianity either supersedes or fulfills Judaism. It would have been much more productive for Prof. Novak to have responded intelligently and directly to these points than for him to falsely attribute to Prof. Levenson the exact opposite of what he actually wrote.

Solomon Schimmel
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Hebrew College
Newton, Massachusetts

In his comments on Professor Jon D. Levenson's article "How Not to Conduct Jewish-Christian Dialogue," Prof. David Novak remarks that "Why Prof. Levenson teaches mostly Christian students in a Christian divinity school is a question he needs to answer, even if only to his Christian students and colleagues at Harvard."

As one of those students, I can only say that during the years before I came to the Divinity School, in which I attended a convent of the Sacred Heart and a Jesuit university, I never heard any professor give a thorough and thoughtful explanation of such doctrines as that of the Real Presence in the Eucharist, or criticize the rampant and inane anti-Catholicism in secular academe. Prof. Levenson has done so consistently. He has been not only respectful but generous in his treatment of Christianity. The respect with which he has treated Christianity demands that he tell the truth about Jewish-Christian dialogue. Parts of that truth are distinctly unpalatable. In seeking to "Speak the Truth" we must first be willing to listen to it. It is to the truth in all of its fullness that we must subject our consciences if we are to be chastened and ultimately renewed by it. Prof. Novak owes not only Prof. Levenson but also the latter's Christian students an unqualified apology.

Suzanne Smith
Cambridge, Massachusetts

David Novak replies:
Of course Professor Levenson is right that his remark about "instinctive repugnance" was specifically employed when speaking about what he claims has been "overcome" and largely replaced by "mutual respect." Nonetheless, since he objects to even our assertion of the *partial* commonality between Judaism and Christianity, how could that "instinctive repugnance" possibly be "overcome"? Since Judaism and Christianity clearly have much historical overlapping, and since Prof. Levenson sees that overlapping to be so negative, what else is left except a continuation of that "instinctive repugnance"? Our historical overlapping makes the only other alternative—indifference—impossible to sustain. Surely, the relation of Christianity to Judaism is different in

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kind from, let us say, the relation of Hinduism to Judaism. That is why I so emphasized that striking phrase. It is the leitmotif of his whole article, including his repugnance for the very idea of *Dabru Emet* as proposed by Jews. His condemnatory article in *Commentary*, unfortunately, did not invite a dialogical response.

Rabbi Nadler's anger is even harsher than that of Prof. Levenson. But let me address at least one of his intellectual points. He confuses my use of the word "normative" and effectively equates it with "authority." Whereas all authoritative texts are normative, not all normative texts are authoritative. A theological text like *Dabru Emet* is normative because it advocates what Jews *ought to affirm* about Christianity. It is not authoritative like the Bible and the Talmud because no one can or should quote it as a statement that makes a prima facie claim on its hearers. In other words, unlike the authoritative statements in the Bible and the Talmud, *Dabru Emet*'s statements require argumentation before one is either persuaded or dissuaded by them. It is theology, not revelation. It thus calls for either acceptance or a theological alternative. It is to be hoped that Prof. Levenson, being as theologically oriented as he is, will provide the latter at some future time. Then there will be a true inter-Jewish dialogue on Christianity.

In response to Prof. Schimmel, and also back to Prof. Levenson, if the preservation of Jewish identity requires that we always have to react against a "negative other," then that diverts us from asserting the universal significance of the whole Jewish tradition. We Jews should be strengthened in our identity by appreciating how much our Torah and tradition have *partially* influenced Christianity, and that many Christians now at long last appreciate that influence, and even want more of it. But one cannot influence someone with whom one has nothing positive in common.

As for Suzanne Smith's defense of her teacher, I am very happy to hear how much some of Prof. Levenson's Christian students appreciate his scholarship and pedagogy, which I appreciate as well. Indeed, that explains much of my keen disappointment in his *Commentary* attack on *Dabru Emet*. However, Ms. Smith might ask Prof. Levenson how "the respect with which he has treated Christianity" is consistent with his negative article about Christianity's relation to Judaism—at least in that article—and his even more negative attitude towards a group of his fellow Jews who are more hopeful about a better relation between our two communities, a relation that is theologically true and not just politically useful. Hence, no apology is required for a response in kind to Prof. Levenson's attack on both *Dabru Emet* and its authors, who, as he concludes, "are whistling in the dark." Ms. Smith should learn from our exchange what a passionate people we Jews are.

Benke Brouhaha

James Nuechterlein's comments ("Let Us Pray," April) on the September 23 Yankee Stadium affair are reminiscent of many other defenses of the event and of "Lutheran participation"—long on personal feelings and cultural sensitivities, short on theology and biblical understanding. If, in his initial paragraph, by calling the LCMS "sectarian" Mr. Nuechterlein meant to disparage its theologically conservative position, he has succeeded only in name calling.

Viewing the Yankee Stadium prayer service twice and reading Dr. David Benke's extensive explanation and defense of his participation have been instructive. Yet, I respectfully register my disagreement with his defense and with Mr. Nuechterlein's characterization of the event. No explanation can deny the (pan)religious character of the affair—from the sincere petitions of the rabbis to the wailing of the imams to the broken English of the Orthodox priest. The service included spiritual songs and mini-homilies as well as prayers—not a full-blown worship service, but religious enough to make it more than merely a civic response to a tragic event. Pastor Benke himself referred to the venue as a "house of prayer."

There are also those who embrace the Madison Avenue cliché, "Any (all) publicity is good publicity." Having a Lutheran "rep" at such events, even in a less than ideal context, instills in attendees and viewers appropriate positive feelings. And it makes Lutherans feel good about themselves: "Look, one of us!" I suspect that such sentiment accounts for much of the theologically naive approval of Dr. Benke's participation within LCMS circles, but it distracts us from the real issues, from the life or death question which we must finally face: How does a Christian presence distinguish itself from the false gods at such an event? For if that distinction is not made, and made clearly and unmistakably, the witness to the non-Christian is ambiguous and uncertain at best, false at worst.

Attempts to redefine syncretism to suit twenty-first-century postmodern sensibilities are futile. In a few short decades we have moved from a nominally Christian public square to one that is increasingly multi-religious, even pagan, and St. Paul's warning against blending in with worshipers of idols is more relevant than ever. Indeed, we need to adjust—not, however, in the direction that Yankee Stadium, September 23, would lead us, but in the direction that God's Word leads us.

David Berger
Olivette, Missouri

I was disappointed by James Nuechterlein's essay on the controversy among Missouri Synod Lutherans over Pastor David Benke's prayer in Yankee Stadium. Mr. Nuechterlein's rhetoric, labeling orthodox

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critics of Benke as "ultraconservatives" with a "sectarian mentality" and a "blinkered preoccupation with unionism," sounded much more like the kind of orthodoxy-bashing one has come to expect from the mainstream media than the thoughtful commentary typical of FIRST THINGS in general and Mr. Nuechterlein's work in particular.

Mr. Nuechterlein sounds uncomfortably like those who attacked Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger for being intolerant of other religions when he affirmed the unique fullness of the Christian revelation in *Dominus Iesus*. As Ratzinger wrote, "The Church's constant missionary proclamation is endangered today by relativistic theories which seek to justify religious pluralism, not only de facto but also de iure (or in principle)." Critics of Pastor Benke like myself believe that his prayer gave aid and succor to just such religious relativism and syncretism.

Mr. Nuechterlein misses entirely what is at issue in the disputes over the Benke prayer. The concern is not whether Dr. Benke should have taken part—nearly everyone agrees that it was fully appropriate for him to use this opportunity to minister to believers and to proclaim the gospel—nor over the kitschy character of the Oprahfest. The controversy has been sparked by what Pastor Benke actually said in his prayer—and here Mr. Nuechterlein does a disservice to his readers by failing to provide a single bit of information about the content of Dr. Benke's prayer. To make a prayer Christian, more is required than attaching the phrase, "In the precious name of Jesus, Amen." The actual content of the prayer should clearly enunciate the hope that we have in the saving work of Christ alone. Here is an unfortunately representative paragraph of the woolly language Pastor Benke chose to use:

> Oh, we're stronger now than we were an hour ago. And you know, my sisters and brothers, we're not nearly as strong as we're going to be. And the strength we have is the strength of love. And the power of love you have received from God, for God is love. So take the hand of the one next to you now and join me in prayer on this "field of dreams" turned into God's house of prayer.

In Pastor Benke's actual prayer (as opposed to the written text from which he departed), he made no mention of Jesus (except in the closing phrase), nor of the significance of Christ's life, death, and resurrection as the unique expression of God's love, nor of the need for repentance and faith in Christ as means of grace. Benke made no effort to distinguish the Christian faith from the rest of the smorgasbord of spiritualities offered to the audience at Yankee Stadium. One doesn't have to be blinkered by a sectarian mentality to be worried that yet another major Protestant denomination may be lost to the relativistic zeitgeist.

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James Nuechterlein portrays the debate within the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod as a political dispute: this is a struggle for power between moderates and "entrenched" hard-line ultraconservatives. A political framework serves his opinion well, because politics allows the debate to be conducted on a subjective plane. I suggest, however, that framing the discussion in this manner fails to portray accurately the situation inside of Missouri. Those nasty hard-liners are so hard-line and ultraconservative because this is a theological crisis in which the objective truth of the gospel is at stake. Those beleaguered moderates are beleaguered because their argument on the matter is reduced to politics; and a purely political matter is, de facto, not a matter of right and wrong, but of differing opinion.

This leads us back to the "moderate" assertion that the service was not syncretistic because the clerics gathered to express moral, not theological, agreement. In that case, syncretism is defined by subjective intent, not objective action. Objectively, however, syncretism is a service in which various religions invoke, pray to, and worship a variety of gods, spirits, or forces. The intent doesn't matter; the action does. At Yankee Stadium, a worship service took place that involved prayers, invocations, readings, and homilies by Jews, Muslims, Hindus, and others. If this is not an example of syncretism, what is?

(The Rev.) Tim Pauls
Good Shepherd Lutheran Church
Boise, Idaho

In his column about the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod and its controversy over a pastor praying publicly at Yankee Stadium with non-Christians, James Nuechterlein quotes me as having sympathy for the LCMS conservatives who are trying to censure Pastor David Benke. A clarification is in order. As a non-Lutheran observer, I personally believe that the anti-Benke camp within the LCMS is overreacting, and that what Dr. Benke did was fine. I did not mention that in my piece. However, with the LCMS conservatives taking such a beating over this issue, I thought it fair and necessary to say they are asking the right questions about religious identity and the limits of ecumenism, even if one might disagree with their answer. I wrote that as a Roman Catholic convert stunned and dismayed by the Holy Father's inclusion of African shamans in his peace summit in Assisi earlier this year. The priest who first did my instruction in the faith was once a missionary in Africa, and told me terrifying stories of having to do spiritual battle as an exorcist with the same sort of "religious lead-

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ers" the pontiff was now welcoming as his honored guests. Hence my concern.

Rod Dreher
Brooklyn, New York

James Nuechterlein replies:
For the record, I am in favor neither of syncretism nor relativism, not to mention idol worship. What is at issue is whether David Benke is guilty of any of these failings because of his participation in the September 23, 2001 event at Yankee Stadium. I do not think he is. To pray in the presence of non-Christians is not the same thing as praying with them. This was not a service of worship in the Lutheran understanding of that term. I agree that Pastor Benke's prayer could have been improved upon as a Christian witness (he has, I believe, indicated as much himself), but I do not see how any non-blinkered observer of the event could see his participation in it as either a threat to or denial of the gospel.

The Trouble with the Jesuits

For the most part, Avery Cardinal Dulles' review (April) engages the ideas laid out in *Passionate Uncertainty* by Eugene C. Bianchi and me rather than bottom-feeding off the methodological flaws that reviewers in *America* and *Commonweal* claim to have found. After commenting on a few of these technical matters, I want to concentrate on the meat of his remarks.

There are at least two signs that our selection of Jesuits and former Jesuits is representative. The geographic and age distributions of the men who took part in the study closely match what is known about these populations. Second, when we compute correlations between, for example, the period of entry into the Society and the social origins of the men, we find that Depression-era entrants came from lower class origins than those who have joined up later. No surprise here, and that's the point. If anything else emerged from the exercise, we would have reason to doubt the validity of the data.

The real difficulty may lie not with our statistical analysis but with our interpretation of the discursive responses supplied by the men. We supplemented the qualitative statements with quantitative measures—with ten-point scales of the sort "How satisfied (10) or dissatisfied (1) are you with the direction the Society of Jesus has taken in the past few years?" We have enough measures of this sort to compare Jesuits and former Jesuits along several dimensions—satisfaction with the Society's performance, with the leadership of the Church, with their own work, etc. The quantitative measures enable us to calculate how, for example, satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the sexual magisterium ties in with satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the institutional Church.

The essential task is to see how Jesuits and former Jesuits tie things together, for it is on these cognitive and emotional patterns that religious cultures and organizational habits are built. One such connection is the bond between attitudes toward what one Jesuit calls "pelvic theology" and attitudes toward institutional authority. Beliefs about the sexual magisterium are bundled with opinions about adherence to hierarchical Catholicism, notably in the requirement of celibacy for priestly ordination.

These connections matter because they condition (though they do not determine) the recommendations for change that readers draw from the study. Consider a mental experiment common in political science. Markets are fundamental to democracy. Without markets, you definitely will not find democracy. With markets, you *may* find democracy. But alongside markets you may also find developmental dictatorships of the sort that flourished in places like Brazil, Spain, South Korea, and Taiwan a few decades ago. Markets are therefore a necessary but not a sufficient condition for democracy.

There is no exactly comparable precondition for hierarchy in religious organizations. But one comes very close, and this is the cluster of doctrines falling under "pelvic theology." By specifying male gender and celibacy as prerequisites for holy orders, canon law makes these properties necessary, though hardly sufficient, conditions for priesthood. Dispense with these rules and the traditional hierarchy collapses.

The logic linking celibacy to hierarchy is at the heart of Cardinal Dulles' strategy—tightening up the ship—for remedying the current crisis. His views cannot be dismissed as wishful thinking, given what we know about the fate of some religious orders that have liberalized themselves into extinction. Still, different recommendations can be drawn from the same evidence. The radical one supposes that "tightening the ship" is a lost cause requiring a futile exercise in surveillance; it also perpetuates an exclusionary hierarchy.

In large measure distinct from fractures in the sexual magisterium, the rise of lay people in positions of ministerial responsibility widens the gap between the apostolic apparatus of Catholicism—schools, retreat houses, even parishes—and its authority structure. Here the problem is less one of doctrine than of doubts about the relevance of a clerical presence in organizations that lay people manage pretty much on their own. Most of their colleagues don't want to get rid of Jesuits, nor do they covet holy orders for themselves. But many are perplexed about what Jesuits are supposed to be doing and who they are. So are many Jesuits.

The reform agenda implicit in the rise-of-the-laity scenario differs, at least partially, from the program behind the crisis-in-the-priesthood/sexuality drama. Calls for consultation between clergy and laity and for accountability of ecclesiastical incumbents are less threatening, because less foundational, than demands to

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rethink inherited connections between priesthood, the sexual teachings of the Church, and its structure of authority.

Peter McDonough
Department of Political Science
Arizona State University
Tempe, Arizona

I read with interest Avery Cardinal Dulles' review of *Passionate Uncertainty*, and although I have found the book helpful, I also very much appreciated the Cardinal's astute observations on the book and on the Society of Jesus. But I think Cardinal Dulles oversimplifies when discussing what the "Jesuit baby boomers" think about the Church and the Society: he correctly catches a mindset shared by some early boomers already in the Society by the end of Vatican Council II, but is less on target in seeming to describe in the same way the middle boomers, those of us who entered in the late 1960s and '70s.

I entered the New York province in 1968, and by that time the Church, the Society, and formation were already in great change, wildly varying opinions were being loudly voiced, many Jesuits were experimenting, and many were leaving. We weren't expecting a revolution, but we had to figure out how to survive and make sense of religious life, drawing on widely conflicting advice from older Jesuits who were arguing among themselves. Whatever our theological leanings, we learned first of all to be individualists in order to survive. If late boomers and possibly Generation X Jesuits are, as Cardinal Dulles suggests, different again, it may be simply that the Society and the culture have settled down considerably and young men are able to make clearer choices about whether to enter the Society or respond to God's call in other ways.

Francis X. Clooney, S.J.
Professor of Theology
Boston College
Cambridge, Massachusetts

In many respects Avery Cardinal Dulles' review of *Passionate Uncertainty* seems more like an article giving the Cardinal's view of the Jesuits, and I will address it as such.

The Cardinal tells us that the Society "has an exciting history" and that its story "exists in the authentic heritage established by St. Ignatius Loyola." "It is indelibly inscribed in the *Spiritual Exercises*" and the Constitutions and "the authentic documents leave no room for the Society to be a church within the Church." No one would dispute that the heritage of the Jesuits is one of saints, martyrs, and a long, distinguished record of collaborating with the Holy See. However, that was then, this is now.

Cardinal Dulles says that the "works of the Jesuit order are prospering because its universities have larger enrollments and more academic prestige than ever before." No doubt this is true. But the Cardinal makes no claim that these same universities are authentically Catholic, providing authentic Catholic teaching. In fact, the Jesuit universities were in the forefront of those opposing *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*, the Pope's attempt to require them to provide Catholic teaching. They are still in opposition. As an editorial in the *Catholic World Report* (April 2002) says, "The leadership of the Jesuit order is working actively against the implementation of the Pope's directives." I am reminded of Bishop Fulton J. Sheen's statement in the 1970s, "I recommend to all my friends and relatives that they send their children to secular colleges and universities where they will be forced to defend their faith, rather than to Catholic ones, where their faith will be taken from them." I am a graduate of a local Jesuit university. If any of my sons had wished to go there, I would have done all that I could to discourage them.

Let's turn our attention for a moment to the elephant in the living room, or should I say the "alleged" elephant, since Cardinal Dulles refers to "the alleged increase of homosexual tendencies among younger members in the Society of Jesus as well as in other religious orders and diocesan seminaries." In the November 2000 issue of the *Catholic World Report*, Father Paul Shaughnessy, S.J., wrote a hard-hitting article titled "The Gay Priest Problem." Although Cardinal Dulles says that "a new generation of seminarians and religious is arising," and that "it consists of young men eager to retrieve the tradition of former centuries and to serve the hierarchical Church," Fr. Shaughnessy notes that "the U.S. Jesuits recently approved guidelines for admitting novices that include this characteristic of the ideal candidate: 'He has the ability to identify and accept his own sexual orientation and to live comfortably with people of different sexual orientations.'" Fr. Shaughnessy argues that this approach will steadily increase the number of gays in the clergy, and that, "quite simply, those entrusted to fix what is broken are broken themselves."

In California, the same Jesuit Provincial, Fr. Smolich, who has effectively exiled Fr. Joseph Fessio, the founder of the St. Ignatius Institute, was reported by the *Los Angeles Times* (March 24, 2002) to have covered up the sexual abuse of two retarded dishwashers by a number of Jesuits at their Los Gatos Jesuit Center.

When I graduated from Xavier University in 1964 I was commissioned an officer in the United States Marine Corps. At that time it was easy to make the comparison that the Jesuits were the Marine Corps of the Church. Can anyone conceive of that comparison being made today?

Cardinal Dulles concludes his review with the comment that, "for some of us, life in the Jesuits is more challenging and more congenial." Well, more congenial it may be, but I would have more admiration for the Cardinal if he would use his consider-

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able prestige to speak out about those who have done so much to damage the Jesuits, and to speak up for those faithful Jesuits who have been treated so shabbily by those in authority.

Allan Smiley
Cold Spring, Kentucky

Avery Cardinal Dulles replies:
I have no difficulty in accepting Father Clooney's description of himself as a member of the second wave of the "baby boomer" generation. His letter confirms the fact that in the early 1970s there was wild experimentation and confusion in the Society of Jesus as well as elsewhere in the Church. He acknowledges, I think, that much of the experimentation has proved to be misguided and that younger Jesuits today seem to have a more settled outlook.

As a former naval officer I can understand Allan Smiley's eagerness to see the Jesuits become the Marine Corps of the Church. But that would be a caricature of the view of St. Ignatius, who wanted men capable of personal discernment and responsible decision. Jesuits have never marched lockstep like soldiers on parade. While bound together by a common faith and aspiration, they seek to develop their personal gifts in the service of Christ and the Church. They can disagree about strategies and sometimes do.

Mr. Smiley falls into the rather unhelpful habit of praising an idealized past and lamenting a demonized present. He gives a slanted picture of current trends. The Jesuits of my acquaintance are uniformly enthusiastic about *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*. Several of them contributed in important ways to the drafting of that admirable document. Some Jesuits in the universities, like other university people, have had reservations about one or more of the general norms appended to that Apostolic Constitution, for example, the *mandatum*. But many bishops shared the same concerns. From the tone of his letter I suspect that Mr. Smiley would not be likely to see the complexities involved.

Mr. Smiley urges me to "speak out" against those whose actions he deplores. Too many people, I believe, are speaking out on issues that they do not fully understand, thereby compounding the confusion. Before reaching a judgment about matters in California I would have to listen to all parties in the dispute, not just to one side. On the matter of "speaking out" we would all do well to listen to the sage counsel of St. Ignatius:

> We should be more ready to approve and praise the orders, recommendations, and way of acting of our superiors than to find fault with them. Though some of the orders, etc., may not have been praiseworthy, yet to speak against them, either when preaching in public or in speaking before the people, would rather be the cause of murmuring and scandal than of profit. As a consequence, the people would become angry with their superiors, whether secular or spiritual. But while it does harm in the absence of our superiors to speak evil of them before the people, it may be profitable to discuss their bad conduct with those who can supply a remedy.

The Provincial of the Jesuits in California is not exactly my superior, but I would not wish to interfere with his government unasked. As a quintessential New Yorker, I would have difficulty understanding what goes on in California.

Peter McDonough is correct in judging that, unlike some other reviewers, I did not choose to dwell extensively on the methodological flaws of *Passionate Uncertainty*. Professor McDonough's strained efforts to defend the methodology are a showcase example of the kind of jargon that makes the book difficult to read.

Prof. McDonough's letter also reveals with startling clarity that the real intent of the authors is to attack the hierarchical structure of the Church and its traditions regarding priesthood. He accuses me of seeking to "tighten the ship." But in face of the present scandals about sexual misconduct in the ranks of the clergy, there is no room for laxity. If the teaching of the hierarchical Church on sexual ethics and priestly conduct had been followed, the scandals would not have arisen.

The Jesuits of the early years were known as *preti reformati*. Not all Jesuits today would qualify for that designation. But in this respect as in others, St. Ignatius and his first companions can continue to inspire their loyal followers, upon whose shoulders rests the future of the Jesuit order.

How to Help the Poor

That the American bishops in the last thirty years have generally offered few creative contributions to economic issues, as William McGurn observes ("The Preacher and the Economist," April), is true. They have not offered ideas; rather they remain in a very dated liberal, statist view concerning economic problems and injustice, following the line of thinking of the late John A. Ryan, "The Right Reverend New Dealer."

Yet, on the other hand, neither have Mr. McGurn and Wall Street offered, or allowed, pace Milton Friedman, any creative ways or thinking to address the glaring and cruel gap in wealth between the few and the many throughout the world. Laissez-faire capitalism is simply that. Those who have get more, those who have a lot, get a lot more, and yes, slowly, ever so slowly, those powerless and without ownership occasionally may get a chance to participate.

There are presently three billion people in the world who live on less than two dollars a day. In the U.S., ac-

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cording to a Congressional Budget Office memorandum (May 1998), the top-earning one percent of Americans have as much combined income as the 100 million citizens with the lowest income. The fact is that globalization is controlled and directed by those who have this concentrated wealth. Both in *Laborem Excercens* (1981) and *Centesimus Annus* (1991), Pope John Paul II has explicitly criticized what he terms "rigid" or "extreme" capitalism.

Some forty years ago, Hannah Arendt, in her *Crises of the Republic*, wrote: "Our problem today is not how to expropriate the expropriators, but, rather, how to arrange matters so that the masses dispossessed by industrial society in capitalist and socialist systems can regain property"—in other words, in the twenty-first century, have access to capital.

The doctrine of the common good and the principle of subsidiarity of Catholic social teaching require as much. Under current structures, monetary and otherwise, these teachings are being violated. Free markets and competition are good. Rigid capitalism is not, however, free. Economic and political freedom require ownership, that is, access to capital. John Paul II and Catholic social teaching recognize this.

Laissez-faire capitalism inhibits this freedom, this ability to participate, from below. Robert McNamara, capitalist par excellence and former head of the World Bank, smugly rejected development from below, maintaining in Poland, for example, after the fall of communism, that only corporate executives knew how to use money and to invest. This was in direct contradiction of the Catholic principles of the Solidarity Movement, the movement that helped bring down the Iron Curtain and end the Cold War. In the meantime, in the U.S., Enron's employees have lost billions of dollars in their savings and investments.

Expanded ownership of capital would begin to rectify these injustices and errors. It would neither require a violent revolution nor cause the plutocrat capitalists to lose their money. In the U.S., Congress could enact laws requiring the Federal Reserve to give credit to those who have no credit or assets. Presently, those who already have capital get loans for more capital. Globally, the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and other organizations could make changes accordingly. John Paul II in *Centisimus Annus* (§16) writes that the state "must contribute . . . by creating favorable conditions for the free exercise of economic activity."

In their book *Binary Economics* (1999), Robert Ashford and Rodney Shakespeare of Syracuse University cogently present the economic viability of such a system. Moreover, for nearly two decades under the leadership of Dr. Norman Kurland, an economist and lawyer, the Center for Economic and Social Justice in Washington, D.C., has advised businesses as well as governments on expanded capital ownership, based on the ideas of Louis Kelso and Mortimer Adler (the latter a Thomist philosopher) in their book *The Capitalist Manifesto* (1958).

Mr. McGurn and the American bishops, "Be Not Afraid."

Geoffrey B. Gneuhs
New York, New York

William McGurn replies:

I do not presume to speak for Milton Friedman. But my best guess is that the Nobel Prize-winning economist would have no problem in principle with the argument that the way to help the poor would be to expand their ownership of, and access to, capital. Unfortunately this one sensible notion comes wrapped up in so many false assumptions and mischaracterizations that I'm not surprised Mr. Gnuehs cannot see that it is in fact the market that is already providing what he says he wants.

Let me suggest that part of the problem here is that his conception of capitalism does not rise above caricature. In the first three paragraphs he cites "laissez-faire" capitalism, "rigid" capitalism and "extreme" capitalism. Likewise he appears earnestly oblivious to the irony of presenting Robert McNamara as the "capitalist par excellence," not least given the general disdain that most free market organs and institutes have for both the World Bank and Mr. McNamara's tenure there. Apropos Mr. Gnuehs' suggestion that the Federal Reserve just issue credit—with no test of credit-worthiness, it appears—it is worth recalling that this is more or less what Mr. McNamara did a generation ago with all his development loans, creating crushing debts that poor nations are still paying off today.

My experience is that much of the error here stems from a failure to make a fundamental distinction between businessmen—and especially pro-business regimes and arrangements, about which Adam Smith was energetically skeptical—and pro-market regimes, which admittedly are far more rare. The difference is critical, because it is often the nation's business leaders who fight off trade and globalization because they threaten a cozy status quo in which businessmen don't have to compete for either customers or labor. For anyone who has trouble distinguishing between the two kinds of regimes, I suggest spending time in both Hong Kong and the Philippines, and then compare which place does better by those at the bottom of society: the so-called dog-eat-dog laissez-faire economy, or Asia's largest Catholic nation.

Three billion people living on less than $2 a day is indeed a scandal—but not the one Mr. Gneuhs thinks it is. For it prompts the question: What about the other three billion? As the OECD has pointed out, most of these people were lifted out of poverty by the globalization and expansion of trade since the end of the Second World War, the largest shift out of

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poverty in human history. Here in the U.S., half the population is now invested in the market, so much so that the AFL-CIO declined to sign onto the post-Enron anti-401(k) campaign because the message from the rank-and-file was loud and clear: they like owning their retirement plans.

In "The Mystery of Capital," Hernando De Soto pointed out that the world's poor have trillions of dollars in assets. What they don't have is a market—i.e., a legal framework—in which those assets can become capital. Globalization and free markets are not without their problems, but they are the only real hope that the laboring poor have of raising themselves out of misery by giving them the opportunity to tap into world markets not only to offer their labor to more bidders but to avail themselves of the goods and services the rest of the world has to offer them.

The Mainline's "Quiet Voice"

I appreciate, and am flattered by, the attention Richard John Neuhaus gave my small essay on the mainline churches and public life ("Mainlining in the Basement," Public Square, April), though unsurprisingly I feel his account unhappily skewed (except on "Christianly indexed"—a palpable hit!). I was especially dismayed by his reading of my assessment of the real contributions of evangelicals and Roman Catholics in U.S. public culture; my point (more an aside, really) was simply that, for various reasons, they cannot replace the kind of service to civil society that the mainline provides—not that they do no service at all. But I am resigned to being unable to change Father Neuhaus' mind regarding my actual arguments, and I would only ask that readers make up their own minds by looking at the essay for themselves.

My essay was prompted by the book *The Quiet Voice of God*, edited by Robert Wuthnow and John Evans. The title of the book is not meant, I think, to suggest that the mainline's "quiet voice" is the sole presence of God in the culture, but rather that the presence of God is manifest quietly through the mainline. Anyone who knows Bob Wuthnow knows how odd it would be to attribute any arrogance or smugness to him at all. Insofar as the book's title is making a point, it is the opposite of the one Fr. Neuhaus drew. I thought I made that clear to a fair reader, and his misinterpretation does not make me doubt that I did.

Charles T. Mathewes
Department of Religious Studies
University of Virginia
Charlottesville, Virginia

RJN replies:
I do know Robert Wuthnow and agree that he is neither arrogant nor smug. Professor Mathewes' "aside," however, suggesting that evangelicals and Catholics cannot provide (not "replace") the civic contribution provided by the mainline remains problematic for the reasons I indicated. I join in recommending a reading of his article in *Theology Today* (January 2002).

On Public Repentance

I was struck by Richard John Neuhaus' declaration that saying who should or should not be a bishop is "way above" his job description ("Scandal Time," Public Square, April). It is certainly outside mine, since I am not a Roman Catholic. I had always understood, however, that Roman Catholics consider their priests and, a fortiori, their bishops to be their "fathers-in-God." Surely a primary obligation of a father is to protect his children. From the outside it appears that the Archbishop of Boston has signally failed to do that. If the Church continues him in his office, this inescapably weakens the credibility among outsiders of the claims the Church makes for its hierarchy. I recognize that the effect on outsiders is not what guides or should guide the Church's decisions. At the same time, no Roman Catholic should be surprised or offended at this reaction.

Daniel C. Reuter
Prospect, Pennsylvania

In the chorus of protest and angst over the recent sex abuse scandals that result from the sins of some few Roman Catholic priests, one hears a few strains that seem to dominate. One is the entirely secular suggestion (although proposed by some within the Church) that Bernard Cardinal Law and others must "resign" the post that has been entrusted to them. They lack, so the argument goes, the necessary support from their constituents to be effective leaders. This, however, is entirely wrongheaded, as Richard John Neuhaus and others have pointed out, since the office of bishop is a sacred trust and obligation—not merely a political position of leadership.

Lamentable, however, is the absence of any discussion, suggestion, or offer of public repentance. As a Protestant in the broadly "Methodist" tradition, I will refrain from casting any stones. Rather, I find myself praying for Cardinal Law and my Roman Catholic brothers and sisters. Yet, I am troubled that no one seems to be willing to counsel Cardinal Law and others that repentance with some acts of penance is profoundly called for. The failure to protect the little ones, perhaps causing some of them to "stumble," is not merely an egregious failing; it is a grievous sin that our Lord decried in the strongest possible terms.

That being the case, perhaps Roman Catholic leaders and clergy can find in this moment the grace to exemplify true repentance. Cardinal Law might find grace to repent and as his penance step aside in acknowledgment that he cannot undo what he has allowed to be done. His stepping aside would not be bowing to political pressure or polling data, but would be bowing to the Lordship of

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Christ and the presence of the Holy Spirit in the Church.

Cardinal Law could, by stepping aside, take up his cross and follow Jesus for the sake of the redemption of Christ's Church. His attempts to fix the problem can never be free of the all-too-human and quite understandable temptation to self-justification. Only God's grace can justify. Only God's grace can rectify. Only God's grace can sanctify. A faithful and courageous act of repentance could be a profound witness to all our Lord's children—Roman Catholic and Protestant.

Steve Blakemore
Assistant Professor of Philosophy
and Pastoral Philosophy
Wesley Biblical Seminary
Jackson, Mississippi

Dinamene

When my fantasies, and these extreme
regrets, shut my eyes in sleep, I discover,
before me, the risen spirit of my lover,
who was, even in life, always a dream.
Then across some desert, where I can barely see
the endlessly distant horizons, I pursue
my love without success. She fades from view,
by some unseen force, and glides away from me.
I cry out, "Spirit, don't run away again!"
But her eyes meet mine, sad and soft and deep,
as if to say, "No. This can never be!"
She starts to leave. I scream: "Dina . . . ," but then,
before I finish her name, I wake from sleep,
as even this brief delusion escapes from me.

Luís de Camões (1524/25-1580)
Translated from the Portuguese by William Baer

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This Time

Dixie, U.S.A.

James Nuechterlein

I went in search of Dixie, and discovered that I could find only traces of it. On a ten-day driving trip in late May with my wife through the lower South—Tennessee, Mississippi, Louisiana, Alabama, the Florida panhandle, Georgia—I encountered little of the Deep South of my cultural imagination.

Much of that, of course, is the inevitable homogenizing result of the interstate highway system. If you drive distances of any length in the U.S. today you are driving in Interstate America, and Interstate America, variations in landscape apart, is pretty much the same wherever you are. A cartoon in the *New Yorker* decades ago captured the point: the sign across an anonymous superhighway announces, "You are now entering Kansas, or a state very much like it."

Interstate America also moves from one urban center to another, skirting the rural. Except for one overnight stay in Evergreen, Ala., and a few minor excursions, we spent our non-driving time in cities: Nashville, Memphis, Jackson, New Orleans, Mobile, Atlanta. (My wife, raised as a country girl, has had her fill of what she wryly calls "rural enchantment.") As a friend who knows the region reminded me, the Deep South I was looking for is not to be found in metropolitan centers. That's the New South, not the Deep South.

I should not exaggerate. Even the limited South we saw is not like everywhere else. As all visitors report, people there are friendlier, more relaxed, and the cuisine retains its distinctive touches (the seafood is remarkable, though I had no difficulty skipping the grits and okra).

And, more substantially, there is religion. Drive through Mississippi on a Sunday, and on the radio you can't escape Jesus. There's black Jesus and white Jesus, but, AM or FM, he's unavoidable. The radio preachers are sometimes more enthusiastic than precise in their piety. One carried on at some length about the curse of "revealing": it finally dawned on us that it was "reveling" he had in mind. At a different level, a friend recently relocated from Connecticut to Alabama finds it striking that at dinner parties, including quite fashionable ones, the host typically begins the meal with prayer. The South may or may not be more religious in measurable terms than the rest of the country, but there can be little doubt that it is more upfront about it.

Yet it is not so much the God-obsessed South I was looking for as the South of the Lost Cause. And that South, for better and worse, seems truly lost. The Confederate flag, to begin with the obvious, is not nearly so ubiquitous as I expected it to be. We saw not a single defiant bumper sticker. There seemed also to be little tourist emphasis on reminders or relics of the Confederacy.

New Orleans was a particular revelation. Our motel in the Garden district, close to downtown, was within walking distance of two featured museums: one devoted to D-Day in World War II, the other to the Confederacy. The D-Day museum, only a few years old, is state of the art. Its name is misleading; it in fact offers a panoramic survey of the entire war experience, taking in both the Atlantic and Pacific theaters of combat as well as life on the home front. It is commanding and compelling, at once historically sophisticated and as up-to-date in entertainment value as could be imagined. We hadn't the time, but I could easily have spent a full day there.

Then, just down the street, there is the Confederate museum. It is neglected and forlorn, a museum of a museum. It opened in the late nineteenth century, and, from the looks of it, has not been updated since. Faded pictures on the wall, cluttered memorabilia in glass cases. It can be got through in an hour, and you bring little of note away from it afterward.

What little it does have of interest it tends to bury. I almost missed, tucked away at floor level in the corner of one of the cases, a framed photograph of Pope Pius IX. Pius, a devoted champion of the Southern cause, sent the photo to Jefferson Davis while the former Confederate President, a Protestant, was languishing in a federal prison just after the war. The picture frame has a peaked top, and wound about it is a crown of thorns that, according to the description I had to stoop to read, was woven by the Pope himself. It's a fascinating item in a museum that seems otherwise almost determinedly drab.

Nor does the museum champion the cause it so languidly records. Its statement of purpose says that it is dedicated to a "nonideological" approach to the Civil War. It in fact displays a number of items relating to the Union side of the struggle. Even the gift shop, also down at the heels, divides its small collection of cheap bric-a-brac equally between the Union and the Confederacy.

Things are both different and the same at the exhibit on the Civil War we strolled through several days later at the Atlanta History Center. It is technologically superb, conceived with verve and intelligence and

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executed with grace and impressive production values. You leave it educated but not pedantically so. If the New Orleans museum embalms the Civil War experience, the Atlanta exhibit brings it to vibrant life. You feel what it all was like, its grandeurs and horrors, and you come away sobered and subdued.

But you don't come away lost in nostalgia for the side that lost. The exhibit notes the disproportionate and quite terrible suffering of the South, both on the battlefield and in civilian life. It records the savagery of General Sherman's march to the sea in late 1864 following the fall of Atlanta, an early exercise in the brutalities of modern total war. But it offsets that with the recognition that for Southern blacks the Civil War was a war of liberation. I taught American history for many years, and I found the exhibit both remarkably true to the historical record and scrupulously even-handed. (And the gift shop, considerably upscale from its New Orleans counterpart, is itself equally balanced between North and South in the wares it displays.) One departs the museum sad for the Confederacy, but not sad that it did not prevail.

I came away from my (probably misguided) search for Dixie more aware than before of the necessity of not allowing nostalgia to lapse into historical sentimentality. It is not wrong to regret much that was lost in the defeat of the Confederacy. One thinks, for example, of the undoubted nobility of a Robert E. Lee, who, though he opposed both slavery and secession, could not bring himself to turn his hand against—and indeed defended with everything he had—the people and culture he loved. The ideal of the Southern gentleman is not simply a fiction born of too many readings of *Gone With the Wind*.

But regret for what was lost must not for a minute forget that the society for which Lee fought was built on human slavery, and that it brought its own destruction in its insistence that the peculiar institution must be preserved whatever the cost. The South had its elements of nobility, but its cause was morally indefensible at the core. And the North, whatever its own flaws, had in its vision of a Union dedicated to freedom and equality a cause very much worth defending.

I returned from my trip with the sense (though I readily concede that my limited experience may have misled me) that most Southerners now intuitively understand all that—which is why they today cultivate not a lost cause but a sturdy American patriotism. Our friend new to Alabama from Connecticut happily reports that the concerts she attends begin with the national anthem. (That didn't happen up North.) It seems that the South, so long accustomed to whistling Dixie, has found a new song. FT

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Opinion

Stem Cells and False Hopes

Maureen L. Condic

We have all witnessed the transforming power of hope—the focus and sustenance hope provides when strength and reason fail to pull us through a difficult situation. Facing tragedy and loss, hope is often the only thing standing between us and the void. Life-threatening illnesses or injuries provide some of the most poignant occasions for hope. We hope that a loved one will survive a critical surgery. We hope that cancer will respond to chemotherapeutic drugs. We hope, often against all odds, that this time, for this one precious and irreplaceable person, death will be thwarted and life will go on.

When medical science offers no legitimate hope for a cure, desperation and grief can drive people to grasp at any straw that might offer hope to them or to their loved ones. For many, herbal medicine or other "alternative" therapies become the vehicle for hope when medical science has done all it can do. For others, hope comes from beyond the realm of medicine. Faith often takes up at the limits of hope, to turn the eyes of the desperate to the source of all life, all hope, and all salvation. Facing death with dignity requires us to accept our mortality and find peace beyond the hope possible in this world.

It is precisely the power of hope, the ability of hope to provide solace and motivation in the most desperate situations, that makes the manipulation of hope such an appalling offense. The selling of false hope is a contemptible exploitation. Whatever comfort a false hope temporarily offers, it is far offset by the damage that is caused when the illusion is crushed by reality. Not only do bitterness and resentment replace the optimism a false belief once supported, but for the terminally ill it is often too late to go beyond bitterness and arrive at any kind of peace. To die an angry death, betrayed by hope and cursing those who have lied to you, is a fate few would wish on even their worst enemies.

It is difficult to imagine anyone so hardened by malice that he would intentionally mislead the desperate merely for the pleasure of watching a false hope deflate when it collides with the truth. Yet desperation is a powerful motivator, and the ranks of the desperate have more than once been exploited for the political, social, and economic gain of the unscrupulous. People with nothing to lose, who view a contest as a matter of life or death, tend to make formidable combatants. Marshaling armies of such "desperados" has been a strategy employed to great effect throughout history. No less so today in some fields of medical science.

Patients suffering from incurable medical conditions have been repeatedly used to influence the public and legislative debate over embryonic stem cell research. Setting aside the significant moral objections to experimenting on human embryos, there are very real problems with embryonic stem cell research on purely scientific grounds. As I recently discussed in these pages (*The Basics About Stem Cells*, January), employing embryonic stem cells as a therapeutic treatment for human illness faces the serious challenge of immune rejection by the patient. One of the proposed resolutions to this problem has been to replace the genetic information of the stem cell with that of the patient to generate a copy or "clone" of the patient that could be used as a source of replacement tissue.

In the face of strong public opposition to human cloning, proponents of embryonic stem cell research have advanced a tried-and-true tactic from the realm of product marketing: when people reject a product, repackage it and sell it under a different name. Thus human cloning has been effectively reborn as "somatic cell nuclear transfer" (SCNT), in the hope of selling a failed product under a different brand name to a public that is understandably hesitant to endorse the cloning of people for spare body parts. The contemptible aspect of this particular marketing scheme is the nature of the target audience and the role of false hope in the sales pitch.

I recently had a series of conversations with a woman dying of multiple sclerosis (MS). MS is a particularly cruel and painful disease that progressively robs a person of the ability to walk, to talk, and eventually even to swallow and breathe. The woman, by all measures a bright and well-educated person, was still in the early stages of her illness and was highly motivated to devote every last shred of her energy to promoting the "cure" offered by embryonic stem cell research. In a very real sense, this was to be her life's work, her legacy. The rage and frustration she expressed at those opposed to human cloning was intense. How, she asked, could people deny her and others in her situation their last, best, and only hope for a cure?

How, indeed. In the face of such an emotional attack, many are driven to accept the imagined "need" for

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human cloning. The tragic irony, of course, is that the cure so many desperately hope for is based on nothing more than bald assertion. Proponents of embryonic stem cell research and human cloning have enlisted the ranks of the terminally ill not only to lend credibility to their claims, but to provide the valuable emotional trump-card of "How can you deny me a cure?" Those opposed to human cloning can be readily vilified as standing in the way of a cure—a cure that exists only in the hopes of the desperate and the speculations of a small number of scientists.

Perhaps the most distressing aspect of the current turn in the embryonic stem cell debate is that there are few constraints on where emotional exploitation can lead us. A year ago, the American public was asked to accept federal funding of research on human embryonic stem cells, based on the unsupported assertion that such research would cure human disease. Less than one year later, we are now being told that generating human clones is required in order for the true therapeutic potential of embryonic stem cells to be realized. At both junctures, patients with debilitating medical conditions were brought before the public to provide highly emotional testimony regarding their hope for a cure, and many Americans, swayed by compassion, reluctantly stomached their reservations.

What will the next twelve months bring? Will we next be asked to accept the need to "culture" therapeutic clones in artificial wombs for a few months until tissue-specific stem cells can be obtained from growing embryos? Perhaps the cloned embryos will need to be grown even longer, until usable organs for transplant can be "harvested." While these scenarios may seem implausible (and would undoubtedly be dismissed as "preposterous" by embryonic stem cell advocates), the generation of human clones in the laboratory appeared to be equally preposterous one short year ago. The point is simply this: in the absence of credible scientific evidence documenting precisely how embryonic stem cells and cloned human embryos will cure disease, one can assert anything one chooses and all things can be equally justified by hope.

Proponents of embryonic stem cell research and human cloning are well aware that the future of this research cannot be debated solely within the realm of science policy. They have not succeeded in garnering public support on the basis of the scientific evidence, largely because there is no compelling evidence in support of their assertions. Even if strong scientific evidence existed, the equally strong moral objections to this research would undoubtedly persist. Advocates have also not succeeded in defining the matter solely in terms of scientific freedom and the pursuit of knowledge; the history of the last century amply illustrates the need to restrict scientific inquiry in some circumstances. In the face of these failures to recruit the public to their cause, advocates of human cloning and embryonic stem cell research have attempted to recast the issue as one of compassion and hope by marshaling the ranks of the desperate. The strategy appears to be: when you can't win on legitimate grounds, win by any means possible. Such a strategy does not preclude outright deceit and emotional manipulation, all in the name of "hope."

To offer false hope to the desperate as a means of advancing a political, social, or economic agenda is worse than merely cruel, it is objectively evil. Valuable resources are being diverted from other, perhaps more promising, areas of research, and, in the meantime, patients and their families are serving as pawns in a political arena. People facing the prospect of suffering and death deserve better than this. As patients, they deserve the best that science and medicine can offer. As human beings, they deserve honesty. No amount of false hope can alter the fact that after more than twenty years of unrestricted research on animal embryonic stem cells, this field has *failed to yield a single cure for any human illness.*

Embryonic stem cell research and human cloning go to the heart of how we view human life, both at its earliest and its final stages. As is the case for all matters of life and death, this research raises issues that are both painful and profound. Resolution of these issues should certainly *not* be based on unfounded speculation and emotional exploitation of those desperately hoping for a cure.

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Listening to Pacifists

Darrell Cole

In the FIRST THINGS editorial "In a Time of War" (December 2001), the Editors argued that pacifists have no legitimate part in the discussion about whether the U.S. is engaging in a just war against terrorism. It seemed "frivolous" to the Editors that people who believe war is ruled out in principle, as pacifists do, still want a say in how it is conducted. Pacifist theologian Stanley Hauerwas took exception to that claim and

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many others made by the Editors (Correspondence, February 2002). Of course, that a pacifist would want to discuss any war at all may seem strange, but many pacifists believe that they have a useful contribution to make to just war thinking despite their opposition to all war in principle, and many American church leaders—especially in the Catholic Church and Protestant mainline denominations—have sought to exercise a pacifist or neo-pacifist influence.

Pacifism comes in many shapes and forms, but I am primarily concerned with the sort of pacifism espoused by John Howard Yoder and Hauerwas: the pacifism of the "Messianic Community." Messianic pacifism is so pervasive today because it builds on the liberal-humanistic pacifism that is already widespread. However, unlike liberal-humanistic pacifism, messianic pacifism offers no strategy for making the world more peaceful; instead, as faithful followers of Jesus Christ, such pacifists cannot "imagine being other than nonviolent." Messianic pacifists thus cannot imagine using force against a nation no matter what that nation has done, is doing, or will do to another nation.

There are two ways for Christians to look at the just war doctrine. One is to treat just war as a limited exception to general pacifism, which would allow the pacifist a meaningful voice, since the pacifist represents the authentically Christian way of life from which we make an exception in deciding to fight a war. This way of looking at the just war doctrine was unheard of before the twentieth century. The second way for believers to conceive of just war is to view it as an attempt to control the way wars are entered into and fought based on the sad fact that Christians are always going to have to use violence. Such a view of war hearkens back to Ambrose's idea that Christians are responsible to their neighbors and therefore must be willing to use force to protect them. If we hold this view, then pacifists are going to have a hard time convincing traditional just war defenders that they have anything meaningful to say about just war.

Christian pacifists, of course, think that just war theory developed precisely because early Christians had to figure out a way to harmonize their nonviolent assumptions with the desire to aid their neighbors with acts of force. This is factually wrong. Pacifists cannot point to a single Church Father who helped develop the Christian just war doctrine out of "nonviolent assumptions." On the contrary, just war theory arose out of assumptions of justice and the virtue of charity. Assumptions of nonviolence had nothing to do with the genesis of Christian just war theory.

The main obstacle for Christian pacifists who wish to contribute something uniquely pacifist to just war thinking is that it is hard to find a complementary relationship between classical Christian just war theory and pacifism apart from the insistence by both that we never do evil that good might come. In other words, just warriors and pacifists are one in denying that we should ever get our hands dirty in a just cause. But the complementary relationship ends here. Just warriors hold that we can use force justly and well in a good cause and that such acts bear no stain of evil. Pacifists, on the other hand, hold that there is something inherently wrong in using force. For pacifists, this is enough to preclude any act of force, but for the pacifist-influenced, this only means that such evil acts (sometimes called "prima facie" evils) have to pass a test (the just war criteria) that will tell them if they are permissible.

Classical just war advocates (those who rely upon the tradition as formulated by the likes of Ambrose, Augustine, Aquinas, and Calvin) deny that the just war criteria allow us to do evil—even prima facie evil—that good might come. They hold in fact that the just war criteria rule out evil altogether and help us determine when we must refrain from certain proposed acts of force. Just warriors refuse to restrain evil with evil. If we cannot prevent an evil without doing evil ourselves, then we throw ourselves on God's mercy and trust in His will for us, even if it means dying; for such dying is a noble death, and noble dying always beats ignoble living.

The idea that Christians ought to play the lesser-evil game is the product of Christian Realism. Reinhold Niebuhr is the most famous and compelling of the Christian realists and is often referred to as the "father" of the movement. Christian messianic pacifists such as Yoder and Hauerwas have rightly attacked Niebuhr for transforming Jesus' teaching into an "otherworldly" ethic. By contrast, the sort of theology we see at work in figures such as Aquinas and Calvin insists that Jesus' ethic be harmonized with God's "this-worldly" ethic as revealed in the Old Testament. Those adhering to classical just war doctrine should, I suggest, make common cause with Hauerwas and Yoder in rejecting Niebuhr's position. But they part company on how to remedy the mistake.

Oddly enough, it is usually Christian pacifists, and not those influenced by such traditional just war thinkers as Aquinas and Calvin, who approach just war thinking through Niebuhr. It is easy to see why: Christian pacifists and Niebuhr look at Jesus in the same way. For both, Jesus provides an ethical standard that Christians cannot follow while remaining "responsible" citizens (with "responsible" meaning involvement with acts of force). Certainly if we follow pacifists and Niebuhr, then we ought to wring our hands every time we use force, for we have done something evil (even if necessary).

But as I have argued above, just warriors do not play the dirty-hands game of morality that Christian pacifists

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suggest Christians ought to play (and must play) if they are going to commit themselves to practices such as fighting wars. In sharp contrast, according to Aquinas and Calvin, when Christians commit themselves to a just war they do so not out of sin but out of justice and charity. When soldiers kill justly, they may feel sorrow for the fact that they must kill in order to bring justice, but they will not be doing anything evil when they kill justly in a just cause, for they know that God has called fallen human beings to establish justice in this way when no other way is possible.

Roman Catholic theologian Charles Curran, in *Directions of Catholic Social Ethics*, nevertheless insists that "pacifism and just war are distinct but interdependent methods of evaluating warfare, with each contributing to the full moral vision we need in pursuit of human peace." Again, from the just warrior's point of view, this is simply wrong. Pacifism considers all bloodshed as evil, while just warriors consider just bloodshed to be good and unjust bloodshed to be evil. The two are at fundamental moral odds. This does not mean that a pacifist cannot think about just war nor that a just warrior cannot think about pacifism. It only means that each must suspend his moral vision of the world in order to think like the other.

The general inability of pacifists to suspend their moral vision of the world when they get involved in just war debates usually leads them to make some remarkably bad criticisms of just war thinking. One thinks particularly of the common pacifist charge that just war doctrine is ahistorical, as well as the assertion that the show of patriotism following the recent terrorist attacks reveals that Americans (and American Christians) get their moral purpose from war.

To take the first of these, the ahistorical nature of just war doctrine is not necessarily a bad thing. The Decalogue, for example, is God's moral law for all people at all times, and that can hardly be thought of as a handicap. Just war as a Christian practice has certain permanent elements that define it as a practice, and these elements hold for all people, at all times, and in all places. We call these defining elements the *ius ad bellum* (proper authority, right intent, just cause). Yet Christians admit that the just war doctrine possesses certain culture-dependent elements that demand a great deal of leeway in interpretation and practice in order to make room for virtuous acts in war—acts in which virtue is tied to a particular place, a particular people, and a particular time. We call these partly culture-dependent elements the *ius in bello* (discrimination and proportion). To a certain degree, restrictions on combat behavior are universal as well. We may never target innocent people directly, nor may we act in such a way that we expect more evil than good to come from our acts. But what counts as innocence in war, just as what counts as a proportionate act, will tend to vary from place to place and from time to time.

Pacifists also complain that a citizenry educated into thinking that wars may be just will acquire its moral sustenance from war. The recent show of national solidarity in our efforts to root out terrorists in Afghanistan is said to be proof of this phenomenon. I cannot speak for the nation, but it should be obvious that Christians, at least those shaped by classical Christian morality, do not rely on war for a sense of moral purpose and destiny. Instead, Christians rely on the risen Christ, who gives them their history, their moral purpose, and their destiny. Such Christians insist that just use of force is compatible with God's kingdom in this world, and in fact, is demanded by the work of the risen Christ. Christians tutored by the likes of Aquinas and Calvin do not think that Jesus' command to "take up your cross and follow me" means that you must become a pacifist. Rather, they interpret these words to mean that we ought to give up our own safety in order to help those who need our help. Thus war, far from being motivated by a desire to be rid of God, can be, for just warriors, engaged in out of a desire to please God. Just war, far from being a way to claim for ourselves the power to determine our own meaning and destiny, is an act of willing obedience to give up one's own comfortable, peaceful, and protected way of existence in order to play our part in following Christ and replicating God's moral order for earthly life after the fall. Hence, participating in just war is a manifestation of the love of God and neighbor. It, in some carefully defined circumstances, is what Christians do out of loving obedience to God.

Nevertheless, Christian pacifists may yet have something meaningful to contribute to Christian just war thinking, primarily when they point out how hard it is for the just warrior to sustain the presumption in favor of losing rather than doing injustice. As the late Paul Ramsey so often pointed out, Americans have a hard time fighting limited wars. When we think our cause just, our instinct is to obliterate the enemy. As Hauerwas notes, the habits of a people require "great drafts of courage and sacrifice not unlike that of nonviolence" in order to conduct a justifiable war. Exactly. And this brings us back to that small space pacifists and just war defenders share. Pacifists and just war defenders agree that it is better to die than to do evil. This is a point largely lost among modern just war defenders. (Its absence is especially noticeable in Michael Walzer's ethic of "supreme emergency," which allows a nation, if threatened with total defeat, to do any evil believed necessary in order to preserve itself.) A crusade mentality and the kind of fighting that goes with it are disturbingly common in the history of American wars. Certainly

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this was true for the two World Wars, and, to a lesser degree, for the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam.

Americans, we must say, and say gladly, have been demonstrating much better combat behavior of late. The Gulf War and the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan have shown that American soldiers are quite capable of fighting justly (i.e., with discrimination and proportion). Nevertheless, we must caution that what was on display in the Gulf War and Afghanistan may be less a show of virtue than technological and tactical prowess. Our technological superiority in particular has allowed us to overwhelm our enemies in the recent past. Will we be able to demonstrate the same level of self-control when we meet a more formidable foe? This is a question we need to ask. For if President Bush is serious in pursuing terrorists into whatever countries they may hide, we may very well find ourselves in a much more difficult fight before too long. And it takes a lot of blood (along with sweat and tears) to defeat a formidable foe.

Christian pacifists, then, are right to remind Christian just war advocates that Christian just war demands definite, limited goals and a limited, controlled use of force. President Bush tells us that the U.S. is going to aim at destroying "every terrorist group of global reach." Does he really mean that the U.S. is going to use military force against every significant terrorist group, no matter how marginal their danger to us, and no matter where they are found? President Bush may simply be preparing American citizens for a lengthy struggle by employing dramatic rhetoric. One can only hope, and pray, that this is so. For actual war planning, if it is to be just, must have limited aims. President Bush owes it to the American people to spell out those aims as soon as possible and to the fullest possible degree.

Unlimited war has, in the past, led to unlimited, uncontrolled uses of force. Christians cannot say "yes" to that kind of fighting. What if we reach a time when we have to make a choice between terminating a war and resorting to combat practices that are out of bounds according to just war doctrine, such as intentionally targeting the innocent in order to get to the guilty or using disproportionate force? Surely all Christian just war defenders, at least those who pay any attention to traditional just war doctrine, will say that we must accept defeat, at least for the moment, rather than prosecute a war unjustly. If the just war doctrine is to possess any sort of integrity, it must be able to say "no" to some wars and "no" to some actions in war. This is how the Church maintains its independence from the state even in those times that the Church says "yes" to wars.

The Church can do even better than say "no" to some wars and some acts in war; it can demand penance from its members who participate in unjust wars or do unjust things in war. Penance is the practice that enables the Church to show the world that it takes just war-making seriously. Aquinas and Calvin insist that, at the very least, the Eucharist be withheld from anyone suspected of unjust acts. Thus any ecclesiastical official (bishop, priest, or pastor) who knows or has good reason to believe that someone under his care has done injustice in war should withhold the Eucharist until either the suspicions are allayed or penance imposed. Notorious offenders should of course have to undergo public penance, since the Church must show itself to be a place where sin is not taken lightly. Protestants especially should be wary of ignoring penance as some sort of strange "Roman rite" that they rightly did away with during the Reformation. Calvin was adamant that Christians do penance for unjust acts, as was the Puritan Richard Baxter. Thus penance in wartime serves two purposes: it protects the integrity of the Church (and thus Christ) and restores the soldier and political leader to the body of Christ. Such ecclesial practices should allay any fears that the Church cannot maintain its independence while saying "yes" to particular conflicts.

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A New Religious America

Philip Jenkins

In recent years, the decade of the 1960s has become a popular subject for courses in university history departments. Since humanities professors tilt well to the left, it is scarcely surprising that they generally focus on a familiar range of iconic events and individuals associated with progressive social reform—the stories of civil rights, the antiwar movement, feminism, and so on. As we gain greater distance from the era, though, the events of the 1960s that have the most enduring consequences are rather to be located on the other end of the political and cultural spectrum. Arguably, the most important single piece of legislation of these years involved neither civil rights nor women's rights, but was rather the Immigration Reform Act of 1965, which opened the country to a massive wave of newcomers from Latin America, Africa, and Asia. And however little anyone recognized this fact at the time, the 1965 Act also prepared the way for a far-reaching restructuring of American religious life, in directions that were distinctly conservative and traditionalist.

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The notion that immigration is transforming American religion may not sound too startling, since the media have of late been trumpeting the country's new religious diversity, its hospitality to Muslims, Buddhists, Sikhs, and adherents of other faiths. Last year, religious studies scholar Diana Eck published an influential book entitled *A New Religious America: How a Christian Country Has Now Become the World's Most Religiously Diverse Nation.* The only problem with this title—and the underlying thesis—is that it is flat wrong (see "One Nation Under Many Gods," Public Square, October 2001). While mass immigration is indeed having an enormous religious impact, the main beneficiary of the process is unquestionably Christianity. Far more than most secular observers yet appreciate, the vast majority of new immigrants are Christian or become so after their arrival on these shores. More catastrophic still, from the point of view of our secular elites, the Christianity that these newcomers espouse is commonly fideistic, charismatic, otherworldly, and (nightmare of nightmares) fundamentalist. In a wonderful illustration of the phenomenon of unintended consequences, the radical social policy of color-blind open immigration is producing rich benefits for religion of a powerfully traditional bent.

The sheer numbers involved in the recent immigration to the United States beggar belief. If we combine the foreign born and their children, then the immigrant community has grown from thirty-four million in 1970 to fifty-six million in 2000, around a fifth of the whole population. Incredibly, almost five percent of the country's current residents have arrived within the past decade. Such an influx has obvious ethnic consequences, as American society moves steadily from a black and white affair to a multicolored reality. In 2000, thirty-five million Americans were counted as Hispanic, almost 60 percent of them of Mexican ancestry. Nearly twelve million more Americans come from East or Southeast Asia. Asians and Hispanics combined make up 15 percent of the population today, but this share is projected to grow to almost a quarter by 2025, and to a third by 2050. By mid-century, 100 million Americans will claim Latino origin. They will then constitute one of the world's largest Latino societies, more populous than any actual Hispanic nation with the exceptions of Mexico and Brazil. By that point, fifty or sixty million Americans will claim Mexican descent.

The religious consequences will also be far-reaching, and in most cases, it is the Christian churches that will benefit from demographic change. The vast majority of Latin Americans come from Christian cultures, either Catholic or Pentecostal. And although not every one is equally pious—or even notionally a believer—they have all been formed in a cultural matrix that is clearly Christian. I look forward with fascination to the day in December 2031 when millions of Mexicans and other Latinos celebrate the five hundredth anniversary of the appearance of Our Lady of Guadeloupe to the peasant Juan Diego. Within the U.S., as much as across the southern border, the event should mark a triumphant expression of Latino pride and self-assertion, a visible symbol of one of the dominant faces of American Christianity.

The effects of immigration can be witnessed across the denominational spectrum. Just to look at the Catholic impact, Mass is presently celebrated in Spanish in over 3,500 parishes nationwide. A further 20 percent of Latinos are Protestant or Pentecostal, commonly members of enthusiastic denominations such as the Assemblies of God. To try to reduce the continuing hemorrhage of believers, Latino Catholics in the U.S. have tried to import such Pentecostal customs as traditional music and instruments during services, and to encourage emotional expressions of spontaneous praise and thanksgiving. It is anyone's guess which tradition will succeed in the long term, but in any case, we are clearly looking at a continuing growth in Latino Christianity within the United States.

It should surprise nobody that Latino immigrants are usually Christian, but so too are many Asian-Americans. Though some Asians follow traditional religions such as Buddhism, many others are Christian. Some immigrant communities derive from strongly Christian homelands, like the Philippines, or from countries with large Christian minorities, like Vietnam and South Korea. Other Asian migrants are recent converts. Among Korean-Americans, for example, Christians presently outnumber Buddhists by more than ten to one. In addition to strengthening Christian numbers in the U.S., such migrant communities transmit American ideas to home countries, because of the constant interchange between Asian-American communities and their ancestral nations. Family and social links thus help promote Pentecostalism in Korea or the Philippines. There already exist global evangelistic networks like the Filipino-based *El Shaddai*, a Catholic charismatic group that operates in over twenty-five nations, including the U.S. and Canada, and which already claims eight million members. For all the writing over the last decade on the enormous cultural and economic significance of the Pacific Rim nations, few observers predicted that this region would increasingly become a Christian Arc.

Many African immigrants, meanwhile, come from nations in which Christianity is enjoying an upsurge of passionate enthusiasm scarcely precedented in the whole history of the religion. Independent and prophetic African churches are now firmly rooted in

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American cities, from which they plan ambitious evangelistic expansion. To take one critical example that has attracted next to no media attention, consider the thriving Nigerian churches based in Houston, many of which stem from the prophetic healing tradition known as *Aladura.* Conceivably, these African-derived churches could soon represent a significant new phase in the history of American urban revivalism.

Is all this really "diversity"? If we combine the plausible estimates for the numbers of American Jews, Buddhists, Muslims, Sikhs, and Hindus, we are speaking at most of about four or five percent of the total population. According to the *World Christian Encyclopedia,* the combined strength of the non-Christian religions will have reached only about seven percent by 2025. This makes the U.S. about as religiously diverse as most West European nations. Adherents of non-Christian religions presently make up ten percent of the population of France, five percent for Germany and the Netherlands, four percent for Great Britain. And America is not nearly as diverse as many lands in the Middle East or Far East, where religious minorities commonly make up 10 or 20 percent of the population, or even more. Why, then, do we so often read about the wonders of American diversity, the spiritual melting pot?

Part of the reason, I suspect, is that Americans have simply grown used to the idea of proclaiming their unparalleled ethnic diversity, a fact that did indeed distinguish their country from other leading Western nations in bygone years. So ingrained is this perception that Americans continued to believe it long after mass immigration had made cities like London and Paris quite as polyglot as New York. They thus need little convincing when observers try to translate claims about ethnicity into religious terms.

But the myth of American religious diversity must also be explained in terms of political rhetoric, since liberals and the liberal media have a potent vested interest in exaggerating the strength and significance of minority faiths. An upsurge of non-Christian believers would be an enormous boon for liberals who wish to deny that America is a Christian nation in which it is proper for government to use Christian symbolism or terminology. This attitude helps explain the rapturous reception accorded Eck's recent book, as reviewers proclaimed the glories of the new "pluralism" that was sweeping away Christian "fundamentalism." The more pluralistic the nation, the less plausible it would be for any single faith tradition to claim hegemony, so that the only sane religious policy would be one of complete official neutrality.

The argument follows quite logically. That is why so many cultural debates in contemporary America are framed in terms of the separation between church and state, as it is manifested in (for instance) school prayers, prayers at graduation, or the display of religious objects or mottoes on public grounds. Underlying these symbolic expressions of faith is the broader question of the relationship between secular and religious authority, or so liberals would have us believe. Once it is granted that schools or courts can display Christian symbols, why should legislation not include explicitly Christian thought or language, and why should the government not fund "faith-based" organizations? After all, every conceivable measure of belief and attendance shows that Americans are an overwhelmingly religious people who are quite comfortable with the language of faith. But, liberals argue, would those Christians who want school prayer or public displays of religion really make the same demands if they were forced to listen to Muslim prayers, to see Asian Buddhist shrines on public grounds? Do Christians want to see tax monies flowing to faith-based charitable organizations if the faiths in question are Muslim or Buddhist? If you allow a pastor to lead graduation prayers now, the next thing you know, he'll be succeeded by an imam. Best, then, to preserve public secularism.

Largely to advance this political agenda, liberals offer unrealistically high projections of Muslim or Buddhist numbers in the United States, and these optimistic figures are echoed by activists from those religions themselves. Islam is a case in point. Over the past decade, we have often heard that Islam is the fastest growing religion in the United States, as well as in the world at large. Actually it is neither, but let us concentrate on American realities. How many American Muslims are there? Just a few years ago, the figure was commonly given as eight million, a number that was often "rounded up" to ten or twelve million. Even more conservative guesses placed the figure at six million, so that already there would be more American Muslims than Jews. This suggests another policy angle in the debate over religious diversity. If Islam is so strong in this country, one might ask, why does the U.S. policy so often favor Israel? The only explanation must lie in sinister Zionist influence in the corridors of power, funded by Jewish money.

In truth, no one until recently had a terribly good idea of the number of Muslims in the U.S., and the guesses that were made had wildly unreliable foundations. Counting Arab immigrants, for instance, contributes little to our knowledge, since so many Arab-Americans are themselves Christians, usually migrants from the ancient communities of Syria, Palestine, and Egypt. Observing mosque attendance suggests a figure of around two million active Muslims, with two million more nonpracticing believers, perhaps four million in

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total; but a study recently presented by the American Jewish Committee places the number even lower, at only two or three million in all. Clearly, the AJC might have as much reason to understate the numbers as Muslim organizations do in overstating them, but combining the various figures allows us to move towards some kind of consensus. In sum, we can confidently place the number of American Muslims at around three or four million, a little over one percent of the population, far less than earlier estimates. And while this number should rise somewhat in coming decades, Muslim numbers will continue to be dwarfed by Christian adherents, particularly in the booming new churches rooted in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Perhaps sensing the demographic realities, some liberal commentators have begun grasping at straws, suggesting that the Christian credentials of the new immigrants might be weaker than we imagine. This seems the only explanation for an odd series of articles that appeared in the *New York Times* this past December and January, under such headlines as "Ranks of Latinos Turning to Islam Are Increasing" (January 2, 2002). Though a quote in the story suggested that the number of Latino defections from Catholicism was running at hundreds of thousands each year, one would have to read carefully to realize that this figure mainly referred to conversions to Protestantism, not Islam. The total number of Latino Muslims is minuscule, perhaps ten or twenty thousand at most.

Quite unconsciously, the United States has long since committed itself to an immigration policy that will inexorably make the country a far more solidly Christian nation than would have been dreamed of in the 1960s. We must be struck by the stark contrast between conditions in the United States and Europe, where old colonial ties have ensured that new migrants have been more heavily drawn from non-Christian faiths, particularly Islam. Many Europeans have become increasingly alarmed at the Muslim presence in their lands. Some conservative Europeans have even argued that governments should deliberately promote Christian immigration, as a means of reducing Islamic influence. In Italy in 2000, Bologna's Giacomo Cardinal Biffi made the controversial suggestion that while immigrants were definitely needed, preference should be given to people of Catholic background, perhaps Latin Americans or Filipinos. Though Biffi's ideas were far removed from any traditional racist rhetoric, they were fiercely denounced as an atavistic expression of "Islamophobia" (a popular buzzword in Europe right now). Imagine that: a modern Westerner advocating an explicitly Christian immigration policy. What an outrageous suggestion for a modern liberal democracy. What country did the good Cardinal think he was living in? The United States?

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From Jewish Street to Public Square

Alan Mittleman

In 1950, during the great surge of Jewish migration to the newer suburbs, the rabbis of the Conservative movement, then as now the largest movement of synagogue-affiliated American Jews, gave permission to use the automobile for travel to the synagogue on the Sabbath. Their ruling, which was opposed by a sizable minority of their fellow Conservative rabbis, broke with historic Jewish tradition. In ancient times, the Talmud proscribed vehicular travel on the Sabbath because the traveler would likely have to violate Sabbath work prohibitions. The actual example given in the Talmud refers to a traveler who, in need of a switch to prod or guide his animal, would cut a branch from a tree, thereby violating the prohibition against cutting, a fundamental form of labor. The Conservative rabbis reasoned that such concerns are far-fetched today.

However, equally grave violations, such as the prohibition against lighting fires, which occurs during ignition within the internal combustion engine of a car, would also take place. The rabbis found themselves between a rock and a hard place. They reconciled themselves to the inevitability of Sabbath violations on the part of their congregants with the judgment that it would be better for them to be in synagogue and engage in public worship than not to be able to reach the synagogue because, in suburbia, it would be too far to walk. To make their decision even more palatable, they hedged their permission with cautious prohibitions: driving could be used only to attend synagogue and not for secular purposes; one should drive only if walking proved impossible; one must avoid violating other prohibitions such as using money to purchase gasoline, and so forth. Theirs was a reluctant and prudential decision. In their minds, the good of Sabbath worship outweighed the historic breach of Sabbath practice.

The decisions of rabbis in the liberal Jewish community do not have the authority or weight that truly traditional Jews ascribe to the decisions of their rabbis. One should not imagine that tens of thousands of congregants suddenly breathed a collective sigh of relief and began driving to synagogue back in 1950. Most likely they were already driving on the Sabbath; they were just not driving to the synagogue. The broad middle of American Jewry, then as now, is quite laissez-faire when it comes to regular attendance at synagogue services.* The rabbis were not so much making bold innovations as putting a brave face on defeat. They recognized and tried to co-opt the cultural reality of the American Jewish suburban frontier. Other decisions that succumbed to the status quo shortly followed. The rabbis approved the use of electricity on the Sabbath and welcomed

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* Marshall Sklare cites a study of Conservative Jews in Providence, Rhode Island, that was published in 1968. Only 12 percent of self-described Conservative Jews attended services weekly. Among first generation Jews, the figure was 21 percent. Among third generation Jews, 2 percent. See Sklare, *Observing America's Jews* (1993). More current figures give similar results. According to a survey of Conservative Jews published in 2000, 29 percent of Conservative Jews attend synagogue several times per month, 15 percent attend once per month, while 35 percent attend a few times per year. See Jack Wertheimer, ed., *Jews in the Center* (2000). Among "moderately affiliated" American Jews of all denominations, 16 percent attend several times per month, 10 percent attend once per month, and 26 percent attend a few times per year. See Steven Cohen and Arnold Eisen, *The Jew Within* (2000). These figures are dramatically lower than church attendance figures among Protestants and Catholics. One significant change from the 1960s to the present, however, is that attendance rates have gone up among younger age cohorts.

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women to receive the honor of reading from the Torah, a practice that, for two millennia, was open only to men. In these decisions, majorities of Conservative rabbis decided for modernity over tradition, for acculturation to American norms over static adherence to the European, indeed, to the talmudic past. They felt that the future belonged to them, not to the backward-looking Orthodox remaining in the cities. The future belonged to the Jews of suburbia; it was to them that religion had to speak.

After World War II, Jews such as my father and mother were abandoning the urban areas of first and second settlement in which they had been raised. Although Jews had long been attracted to city life, young couples like my parents were buying their first cars and their first homes in the mushrooming suburbs. Fresh from the war and newly married, such couples sensed an unprecedented world of opportunity before them. They associated the urban environments of their youth with ethnic stratification and cultural exclusion. They sensed that the anti-Semitism that had hounded them in their childhood and early adulthood was now in decline, discredited in part by the all too vivid revelations of Nazi barbarism. The suburbs offered the promise of a more inclusive, more accepting America. The new homes of the subdivisions had neither history nor memory. Here one could make a new start on a new frontier. Architectural sameness implied or anticipated the possibility of equal treatment. Religious difference could be confined to the private realm behind the identical facades.

Jews such as my father were emboldened to strike out from their familiar urban enclaves in part because of the acculturation that they experienced in the army. My father was raised in a predominantly Jewish neighborhood in Providence, Rhode Island. My grandparents, immigrants from Czarist Russia, settled there before World War I. My father grew up in a Yiddish-speaking kosher home in the shadow of an Orthodox synagogue that my grandfather helped to build. Although he went to public school and acquired the cultural and civic tools of Americanism, he felt himself marginal to a world dominated by the WASP elite. Overt laws and covert customs kept neighborhoods segregated, private colleges closed to all but a few Jews, whole sectors of the economy such as commercial banking off limits for Jewish job seekers. Persistent anti-Semitism from the 1920s into the 1940s kept Jews in their place.

All of this began to break down during the war. For the first time, my father met young men from Tennessee or Georgia, and they met him. Cultures mixed together and barriers weakened as all were involved in a common task. Non-Jews could see that Jewish differences were non-invidious. Jews learned that non-Jews could lose or at least mitigate their prejudices. All could feel a connection to shared ideals, for all were defending democracy and its fundamental freedoms. Jews such as my father felt that they had earned their equality in service to their country. There would be no shrinking back to the ethnic ghettoes.

The regimentation of military life produced an affinity for conformity. Settling into the suburbs meant settling into a style of life that stressed adaptation over difference, fitting in rather than sticking out. Jews from traditional backgrounds such as my father opted for Conservative Judaism, a moderate traditionalism that reconciled ancient customs with modern norms. For them, the Orthodoxy of their youth was imprisoned in the immigrant past, practiced only by elderly Yiddish-speaking men in the synagogues of their childhood neighborhoods. It, like them, was doomed to pass away. Although affirming the tenets and practices of traditional Judaism in theory, Conservative Judaism as lived by its adherents deferred to progressive American values and tastes. Gender-segregated worship, for example, for millennia a feature of Judaism, quickly gave way to Protestant-derived mixed pews. Indeed, the entire building boom in postwar synagogue construction was fueled not so much by an explosion of piety as by a desire to fit in. Suburbanites were expected to be churchgoers and Jews happily complied. The congregations that had been formed in second settlement areas before the Depression moved out to the suburbs, trading their stately neoclassical synagogues for modernist sanctuaries surrounded by parking lots to which no one would ever have to walk.

By the early 1960s, according to some observers, the majority of American Jews were suburbanites. Although the story that I have just told partly explains that passage, it is still somewhat surprising. The Jews have been called the most enthusiastic city dwellers among American ethnic groups, so why did they abandon the cities more quickly than other communities? Other questions arise. What did Jews lose when they shifted from urban ethnic enclaves to suburban mixed neighborhoods? To what extent did they try to recreate the urban "Jewish street," with its density of Jewish population and institutions, in suburbia? What was the impact of this new world on Jewish identity, religious practice, and thought? Could the experience of the suburbs have influenced Jewish involvement, through the activism of national Jewish agencies, in removing the last vestiges of Christianity from American public life? Is it a coincidence that the period of heightened church-state legal activity among Jews corresponds with the move to suburbia?

The Jewish move to the suburbs requires further explanation. The preeminent sociologist of American Jewry, the late Marshall Sklare, argued that "Jews,

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more than any other group, have been among America's most enthusiastic city dwellers, regarding the urban environment not as a problem or a source of pain, but as an opportunity and a place of pleasure." This observation is, in a way, unsurprising for a people who, for the past two thousand years, have prayed daily for the welfare and the rebuilding of a city, who have imagined the messianic age as a restoration of a holy, urban civilization. Nonetheless, it is true that most Jews, whose ancestors arrived here between 1880 and 1924, came from villages—the fabled Russian shtetl—rather than cities. Jews, like other European immigrants, were predominantly rural folk. Although they were urbanites in the Middle Ages, they were expelled from cities—a few ghettoes such as Frankfurt and Rome notwithstanding—in the late Middle Ages and settled in villages in Eastern Europe or in rural Germany. Their recent urban experience dates only from the nineteenth century. At the same time that some Jews were moving to America, others were moving into the great cities of Eastern and Western Europe.

Why then did Sklare say that Jews had a peculiar affinity for the city? Unlike other immigrant groups that had abandoned ancestral villages, the Jews did not idealize their village culture. They interpreted it as an anomalous condition. Although a later generation could romanticize the shtetl in works of popular culture such as *Fiddler on the Roof*, Jews who were raised in those poor, downtrodden communities simply wanted to flee and not look back. They associated the village with grinding poverty and violent pogroms. Between 1880 and 1924, over three million Jews emigrated from the shtetlach of Eastern Europe, with 2.5 million of them coming here. This was the largest movement of Jewish population in three millennia of Jewish history. Unlike other ethnic groups, only a minuscule number returned to Europe, mostly committed Jewish Communists who hoped to find utopia in the nascent Soviet Union.

When Jews moved to the U.S. they clustered in cities, despite well meaning but feckless schemes on the part of Jewish philanthropists to encourage agricultural colonization. Jews swelled such neighborhoods as the Lower East Side of New York. In all, three-quarters of American Jewry lived in New York City at the turn of the century. The culture of the Lower East Side, of Williamsburg on the other side of the bridge, and of other predominantly Jewish neighborhoods mimicked the culture of the densely traditional Jewish villages of Czarist Russia. There were kosher butcher shops and bakeries, dozens of small traditional synagogues grouped by the town or region from which their members came, charitable societies of all sorts, Yiddish newspapers expressing a vast range of political ideologies, Yiddish theater, and religious schools for children. The sheer density of Jewish population replicated the atmosphere of the Russian "pale of settlement," as did the overcrowding, filth, and poverty.

This situation, however, was transitional. While other immigrant groups, such as the Italians, wanted to replicate their village culture in urban enclaves—the "Little Italy" sections of Manhattan, Philadelphia, or Boston, for example—Jews, lacking real nostalgia for their Eastern European hamlets, wanted to Americanize and acculturate quickly. When the opportunity presented itself, they vacated the areas of first settlement and moved uptown into "elevator buildings" or, outside of New York, into those streetcar suburbs that did not discriminate against them. Unlike WASPs, Jews did not treat the city—with its density of population and social ecology of interdependence—with disdain. Jews believed, as a 1950s work on Jewish life by two cultural anthropologists proclaimed in its title, "life is with people." If their ideal was not a permanent Lower East Side, neither was it what James Howard Kunstler derisively refers to as the "little cabin in the woods" or the "manor in the park." Rugged individualists, such as the self-sufficient farmer or frontiersman, were not objects of Jewish aspiration. While Protestantism placed man in his abject inwardness alone before God, Judaism posited the community, *klal yisrael*, as God's covenant partner. The Jew met God as a member of a nation, a chosen people, seeking holiness in a collective, comprehensive, intensively ritualized way of life.

Classical Judaism, the Judaism of the Talmud and the medieval codes, pictured normative Jewish life as a balance between privacy and public engagement, between a sphere of personal freedom and a large domain of public duties. One tractate of the Talmud, for example, focuses on the question of how city dwellers who share a courtyard can preserve their privacy while using a common space to carry on everyday tasks. The tractate is concerned with how the level of noise produced by an artisan, who lives and works in a single apartment, will affect his neighbor's quality of life. It is concerned with balancing what people must give up for the advantages of living together with the privacy and freedom that they have a right to retain. Another tractate explores how individual homes and apartments can be symbolically merged into a common dwelling so as to enable carrying objects on the Sabbath from building to building.

Although much of Judaism takes place in the home, much of it is also enacted in the marketplace, the study hall, the school, the courtyard, and the synagogue. Judaism is intensely communal; Jews need one another to lead Jewish lives. Even though we know that it was the least religious, most adventuresome Jews who moved to the United States, the habits of two millennia were not

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easily abandoned. By remaining in or close to cities, Jews wanted to live in proximity to one another. They wanted both the freedom to pursue their own dreams and the opportunity to bond on a voluntary basis with other Jews.

Just as Jews abandoned the Lower East Side and its counterparts when they were able to, their children and grandchildren were no less mobile, flocking to the new suburbs after World War II. The latter move resulted from a confluence of factors, not the least of which was the availability of new, inexpensive housing. While many older suburbs had been closed to Jews before the war, the new suburbs, lacking traditions of ethnic or religious exclusivity, presented no barriers. Most Jews wanted to remain close to cities for vocational and cultural reasons. They clustered in suburbs with easy access to metropolitan centers such as Levittown, which was developed by the Jewish builder William Levitt. Although some suburbs were able to maintain a high density of Jewish population, this was largely not the case. Suburbanization meant diffusion of Jewish population and, as an inevitable consequence, the dilution of Jewish identity. As the historian Edward Shapiro puts it in *A Time for Healing* (1990):

> In the compacted Jewish neighborhoods of the cities, Jewish identity was absorbed through osmosis. In suburbia, it had to be nurtured. Jewish suburbanites lived in localities where, in contrast to the city, most of the people were not Jews, the local store did not sell Jewish newspapers, there were no kosher butchers, synagogues were not numerous, and corned beef sandwiches were not readily available.

If modernity, as Peter Berger has described it, is a movement from fate to choice, Jewish modernity is a movement from compulsion to consent. Lacking the support of a comprehensive Jewish environment in which Jewishness could be taken for granted, Jews had to create spaces where Jewishness could be nurtured. On the suburban frontier, the way to do this was to build and join synagogues. The 1950s were the high-water mark of American Jewish synagogue construction. It is estimated that between 1945 and 1952, Jews spent up to $60 million on building synagogues. This figure doubled in the next decade. By 1960, 60 percent of American Jews were members of synagogues. In 1930, the affiliation rate had been a mere 20 percent. The will to belong, to enact Jewishness in community, was strong. But what did synagogue membership actually mean?

The 1950s was an age of acculturation, not assimilation. Jews who had been raised in urban enclaves and had fought a war against Hitler did not want to abandon their Jewishness or reduce it to insignificance. Intermarriage, a ready indicator of assimilationist tendencies, remained low. Before 1965, only about nine percent of Jewish marriage partners were non-Jewish.* Jews wanted not to assimilate, to dissolve their Jewishness, but rather to acculturate, to take on the cultural patterns of the gentile majority while retaining to the greatest practicable extent their own cultural traits. The synagogue construction boom paralleled a similar boom in church construction. Religion was key to the organization of suburban social life. Faith was in vogue as a mark of Americanism. As President Eisenhower famously put it: "Our form of government has no sense unless it is founded on a deeply felt religious faith, and I don't care what it is."

Religious pluralism was more acceptable than ethnic pluralism, more compatible with the suburban way of life and its limited tolerance of difference. For Jews, unlike Christians, the religious dimension was something of a pretext. Jews used their synagogues primarily as community centers, as outposts of ethnic solidarity rather than as houses of prayer. The historian Hasia Diner writes of the numerous activities that characterized suburban, unlike urban, synagogues: nursery schools, women's clubs, afternoon religious school, men's clubs, Scout troops, committee meetings, theatrical performances. "The activity with the lowest turnout and the least scheduled time," she writes, "was religious worship. Jews in the suburbs attended synagogue significantly less often than their Christian neighbors attended church. A 1958 survey found that 18 percent of Jews attended weekly services, as opposed to 76 percent of Catholics and 40 percent of Protestants."

By saying that the religious dimension was more of a pretext than an end in itself, I do not mean to suggest that Jews approached their religion cynically or insincerely. Jews constructed a version of modern Judaism adapted to the suburban milieu and took it with the same seriousness or indifference characteristic of any complex group. Their religion selectively appropriated elements of tradition and assembled those rituals and beliefs most compatible with their continuing acculturation and upward economic mobility.

Perhaps the most popular holiday in this milieu was Hanukkah, with Passover a close second. Hanukkah, a minor festival for traditional Jews, became elevated to a major holiday, a great Jewish alternative to Christmas. Hanukkah lent itself to sweeping redefinition: it became a quintessential American holiday—a triumph of religious liberty. Whereas traditional Judaism commemorated Hanukkah because of the miracle of

* In the next decade, however, the rate almost tripled (26 percent). For the period between 1985 and 1990, 52 percent of marriage partners were non-Jews.

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the long-burning oil, modern American Jews suppressed the supernatural and celebrated the political—Hanukkah as a festival of freedom. What better way to proclaim Jewish belonging: the Jews were the first Americans, the first people to fight for freedom of conscience!

Nor did Hanukkah make inconvenient lifestyle demands. It occurred but once a year and provided a dignified and serviceable alternative to Christmas. In Europe, the holiday had very little to do with children. There was a custom of giving children coins, Hanukkah *gelt*. As an alternative to Christmas, however, it became radically child-centered. Hanukkah grew into a lavish orgy of gift giving. Far from feeling cheated, Jewish children could feel pampered. They got gifts for eight nights; their Christian friends only got presents for one day. (In my youth, however, Hanukkah had not yet blossomed into a full-fledged materialistic competitor with Christmas. My parents still showed some Old World restraint. Consequently, I always felt bad in December, envious of my Christian friends and excluded from the much vaunted joy of the season.)

Did suburban Jewry try to replicate the Jewish street, the urban ethnic enclave in its new environment? Yes and no. In creating synagogues and Jewish community centers it gave physical expression to the recognition that Jews need a supportive community of other Jews to achieve meaningful Jewish identity and continuity. Jews acknowledged that Judaism and Jewishness would not take care of themselves in suburbia. They required cultivation and conservation, deliberation and choice. On the other hand, Jews did not desire the encompassing Jewish world of their urban parents and grandparents. They did not want a 24-7 or even a nine-to-five Judaism. They wanted a drive-through Judaism. If religion became a commodity in late-twentieth-century America, the suburban synagogue became a convenience store. Its Jews wanted to pass something on to their children, but not so much as would impede their absorption into American normality. It was this minimal, respectable, bourgeois, and sanitized faith that their children, in the 1960s, would deride, scorn, reject, and mock.

When I was in third grade I was chosen to play the part of Joseph in my public school's Christmas play in Cranston, Rhode Island. I remember feeling both slightly unsettled, sensing that acting in a Christmas pageant was vaguely taboo for a Jewish boy, but also rather proud since my father's name was Joseph. Although we had a Christmas play, we did not have public prayer or Bible reading in my school. This was true even before the *Engel* and *Schempp* decisions rendered these practices unconstitutional in 1962 and 1963. The absence of prayer and Bible reading, I suspect, was not due to a surplus of progressive educators and legislators in Rhode Island but to a deficit of Protestants. Rhode Island was and is the most Catholic state in the union—51 percent at last count. I imagine that the sheer heft of the Catholic presence militated against consensual Christian practices in the public schools, with the exception of our play. From whose Bible would the Bible readings be taken?

I do not know what my parents thought about the play or about my acting in it. I'm sure that for them, as for many Jewish parents in those days, this was one of the reminders that Jews did not quite fit in. They probably never thought to challenge the practice. They didn't want to make waves, to stir up the sleeping beast of anti-Semitism. My parents' generation had experienced ferocious anti-Semitism, by American standards, from the 1920s to the 1940s. In 1942, the year that Auschwitz became operational, 15 percent of Americans, asked to name the racial or religious group that presented the most serious menace to America, named the Jews. Eighteen percent chose the Germans. In 1944, 24 percent named the Jews as the greatest menace. Six percent chose the Germans. Prior to the war, many Americans sympathized with Nazi racialism and anti-Semitism. Quotas, in place since the 1920s, kept Jewish refugees out of the country. The extent to which the upper echelons of the federal government had accurate information about what came to be known as the Holocaust are now quite clear. At the time, however, serious initiatives to help European Jewry were politically suicidal. The Roosevelt Administration could not afford to risk its political capital on one of America's most unpopular ethnic groups.

By the 1950s, however, all this began to change. Rising prosperity, a sense of optimism, and perhaps, as I have suggested, a positive experience of cultural intermingling in the army all played a role. While Jews moved to the suburbs and asserted their right to belong, Jewish organizations set out to diminish lingering prejudice. The three main Jewish organizations—the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish Congress, and the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith (ADL)—had all been founded in the first part of the century to secure greater acceptance for Jews at home and abroad. The organizations had different styles. In the words of Gregg Ivers, the Committee began as a group of "benevolent patricians." It favored high-level contacts behind closed doors. It commissioned and promoted social science research into the sources and expressions of prejudice. Its métier was public education. Some of its founders, such as attorney John Marshall, engaged in litigation on behalf of the NAACP but would not do so on Jewish issues. Quiet diplomacy was thought to be more effective.

By contrast, the Congress, originally a populist counterweight to the elite Committee, specialized in legal

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remedies to anti-Jewish discrimination. It was from the Congress, and particularly from its lead attorney, Leo Pfeffer, that a stream of test cases and friend of the court briefs on crucial church-state cases would issue. The Congress learned from the NAACP and the ACLU that the courts could effect radical changes more swiftly and elegantly than legislatures. At first the Congress cooperated with the NAACP and the ACLU in the fight against public and private discrimination. In time, it ceded those areas to the other groups and focused its resources on church-state issues. It is no exaggeration to say that the shaping of the church-state separation regime of the postwar period cannot be understood without reference to Leo Pfeffer's activism.

All three agencies, rather like my parents, were at first quite wary of challenging Christmas plays, Bible reading, school prayer, released and dismissed time, and religious displays in the public square. Jewish defense agencies worried that litigation on behalf of a more secular society would stir up Christian resentment, reawaken anti-Semitism, and undo the gains in acceptance to which their programs of public education and interfaith dialogue had, in their eyes, contributed. The Congress, with legal experience in anti-discrimination cases, was the first to overcome its inhibitions. It took the lead, with a reluctant Committee and ADL signing on only so as to slow Pfeffer down, in drafting an amicus curiae brief in the case of *McCollum v. Board of Education*. The Supreme Court had agreed to hear a challenge to Illinois' long-standing policy of offering religious instruction by volunteer clergy on public school grounds in a classroom set aside for that purpose. This practice, utilized by both Protestants and Catholics, had long disturbed the Jewish agencies, but they had believed that the social costs of fighting it far outweighed the benefits.

The Court agreed in 1948 to hear the case of Vashti McCollum, an avowed atheist, who claimed that the practice violated the Establishment Clause. The Committee and the ADL did not want the Jewish community associated with a militant secularist who referred to religion as "the opiate of the masses." The Congress, however, thought *McCollum* the ideal test case. Emboldened by the *Everson* decision the year before, Pfeffer felt the time was right to overcome *Everson*'s ambiguities. The Court decided in favor of McCollum, outraging Catholics and Protestants alike. The Congress was exuberant, while the Committee was worried lest carefully nurtured relations with Christian leaders decline. Friction between these Jewish groups over the wisdom of litigation persisted throughout the 1950s.

There was also friction between Jews in local communities who did not wish to challenge the public presence of Christianity and agency leaders from New York who did want to challenge it. With the successful *Engel* and *Schempp* cases in the early 1960s, however, all of the Jewish defense agencies committed themselves full-bore to an uncompromising strategy of absolute separation of church and state. Except for the Orthodox community, Jewish agencies and American Jews as a whole have not, to this day, deviated from this approach. As a staff professional of a Jewish organization once told me, "Jews love the naked public square."

Although Jewish agencies from the late 1950s on framed their Establishment Clause-oriented activism in the language of "religious liberty," their conceptual framework was not free exercise but anti-discrimination. Jews spoke as if the religious free-exercise rights of their children, who might have to hear a statutory prayer in public school, were violated. But the real issue was that school prayer made them aware that they were not like everyone else. Had free exercise actually been at stake, Jews would have been protective of their difference, accentuating the ways that they did not fit in, as did the Jehovah's Witnesses. Just the opposite was the case, however. Jews wanted to fundamentally reshape American civic culture so that all public differences between Christians and Jews would cease to be relevant. Jews associated practices like school prayer with invidious practices such as housing and employment discrimination or admissions quotas at private colleges. They viewed them as symbols of an exclusionary Christian society. While Christians viewed generic, vaguely Christian public rituals as insuring a moral and healthy civil society, Jews could not help but contextualize them against a background of overt discrimination. (Indeed, even today when overt discrimination no longer exists and public religious practices have all but vanished, Jews are still far more suspicious of the Tocquevillian proposition that religion is necessary for a healthy civil society than are non-Jews. A recent survey asks whether "democracy in the U.S. works better if Americans are religious." While 42 percent of non-Jews agree with this proposition, only 11 percent of Jews do.)

Overt forms of discrimination were initially the prime targets of Jewish concern. The Jewish organizations set about to dismantle all of these restrictions in the 1950s and 1960s, and were quite successful in doing so. Although they were concerned about overt discrimination before the war, the climate was conducive to neither litigation nor education. After the war, the Jewish organizations sensed a new opportunity. As the civil rights movement picked up steam after the *Brown* decision in 1954, many Americans came to feel that institutionalized prejudice was wrong. Restrictive housing covenants and gentlemen's agreements had fewer and fewer advocates, as did quotas at universities. The shift

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toward a more open, meritocratic, and democratic society was a move in the right direction as far as many Americans were concerned. It is doubtful that Jewish defense agencies could have made much headway had the society not been ripe for their activism.

This was not the case, however, with the move toward the naked public square. Banning school prayer and Bible reading was hugely unpopular in their time—except in the liberal quarters of the Jewish community and among secularists—and remains unpopular today. Majorities of Americans still endorse school prayer and all of the ingenious and quite unsuccessful devices that have been invented to circumvent the ban on it. (Fifty-nine percent of non-Jewish Americans, for example, favor nondenominational prayers in the public school classroom. Only 20 percent of Jews approve, however.) The Jewish agencies did not have the support of public opinion. They did, however, sense that the Supreme Court, after the *Everson* decision of 1947, was open to their point of view. Jews prodded the Court to strengthen and consolidate the wall of separation and found, until recently, a receptive audience for strict separationism. In cases like last year's *Good News Club v. Milford School District*, in which the Court ruled that a religious club must have equal access to school facilities after hours, the Court further eroded the strict separationist approach advanced by Pfeffer and the Jewish agencies. The owl of Minerva, it appears, has taken flight. An age appears to be coming to an end.

Did this new wave of Jewish activism have anything to do with the Jewish move to the suburbs? Certainly suburbanization did not cause Jewish activism. The same rising affluence, lowered anti-Semitism, and the intuition of optimism and social progress that led Jews to the suburbs also led their leaders to seize the opportunity to accelerate the de-Christianization of public institutions. Nonetheless, it seems to me that a closer relationship between the move to suburbia and increased activism on behalf of the naked public square might be found in what Peter Berger has called a "plausibility structure." By plausibility structure, Berger refers to social arrangements—norms, values, institutions, and practices—that lend credence to some ideas and diminish the credibility of others. In his example, the Incan religious cosmos only made sense, had plausibility, while Incan society existed. With the shattering of that social world, the religious cosmos also fell apart. The experience of the suburbs, I suggest, made plausible the prospect of a world made new, a world purged of its history and its memory. The city dweller encountered others as encumbered people, people belonging to groups, to races, to ethnicities, to religions, each one bearing a long past. The city dweller accepted these facts of social reality as the hard furniture of the human cosmos. For Jews in their urban phase, the reality of difference, indeed of difference as a criterion of status, was massive.

Suburbia, however, made plausible the idea of a truly neutral space, a free and secure domain in which differences were left to the private sphere. The public sphere should take no account of the baggage of one's past. While the urban space was organized by ethnicity—Ukrainian blocks, Irish blocks, and Jewish blocks, each with its well-defined boundaries—the suburban space was organized by class. There were elite, upper-middle-class, middle-class, and working-class suburbs. Economic status assimilated and neutralized ethnic and religious distinctions, making plausible a worldview where differences based on factors other than class receded in importance. Jews wanted to guard their status in this new order. To do so, they needed not only to extirpate gentile-imposed reminders of difference, but Jewish intrusions as well. As Philip Roth's 1957 story "Eli the Fanatic" illustrated, reminders of a more overtly Jewish past were deeply disquieting.

From the vantage point of the 1950s—witness for example Nathan Glazer's classic 1957 study, *American Judaism*—the religion of the center, Conservative Judaism, was destined to prevail. Orthodoxy was relegated to the immigrant generations and thought to be doomed. Sociologists, following secularization theory, wrote off Orthodoxy, as did Conservative rabbis and many of the Orthodox themselves. In his classic 1955 study of the movement, Marshall Sklare also upheld the claim of Conservative Judaism to represent traditional Judaism and to dominate the American Jewish future.

By 1972, however, when Sklare published a revision of his book, Conservative Judaism faced a formidable and unexpected challenge. Sklare noted that Orthodoxy was resurgent. Orthodox Jews had also moved to the suburbs and gained affluence. Their young—highly observant, motivated, and educated in Orthodoxy's network of day schools—went to the finest colleges. They pursued the liberal professions rather than business, combining high secular education and achievement with a highly traditional way of life. Secularization theory proved wrong. Baby-boomer Orthodox did not acculturate into Conservative Judaism. They created their own institutions and adapted them, without losing distinctive markers of religious observance, into the suburban milieu. Enabled by ever-expanding American religious tolerance and pluralism, they felt no need to mask their Jewish traditionalism. As anyone who lives in a major urban area today knows, an entire subculture of well-to-do modern Orthodox Jews exists in the upscale suburbs, complete with kosher pizzerias, Chinese restaurants, and high-quality private schools. The Orthodox resurgence is a leading cause of the felt malaise within Conservative Judaism.

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And with the new Orthodoxy has come a tradition of dissent on church-state matters. From the 1960s on, Orthodox Jews became convinced that the rest of the Jewish community was pursuing an extreme and utopian agenda of church-state separation. The Orthodox, who early on had a network of private full-day religious schools, were not averse to the idea of federal aid for their institutions. They have been steadfast supporters of tuition voucher plans and charitable-choice provisions. (For many ultra-Orthodox Jews, who for the most part are not affluent and remain in the cities, these policies are doubly attractive.)

These dissents are not only for purely self-interested reasons. Orthodoxy fundamentally disagrees with liberal Jewry over the nature of American society. Liberal Jews, as we have seen, want to believe that religion is or should be an entirely private affair and that the public square should be maximally free of religious influence. Orthodox Jews, whose own lives are to a very great extent impregnated by religion, accept the reality of Christianity in American life. While the Jewish agencies, for example, sought to ban holiday displays on public property in *Lynch v. Donnelly* (1984) and were aggrieved when the Court decided to permit them, many Orthodox delighted in the possibility. Massive Hanukkah candelabra are now erected by the Lubavitcher Hasidim on public squares from Independence Hall in Philadelphia to the White House lawn. In so doing, the Orthodox may show a finer sense of the possibilities for religious liberty in a pluralistic society than the Jewish majority.

As I noted above, the Conservative rabbinate coped with the move to the suburbs by permitting Conservative Jews to drive on the Sabbath. Orthodoxy took a different tack and in this example we may learn something about the possibilities for renewing community in the era of "bowling alone." When Conservative Judaism approved of driving, it not only stretched the boundaries of observance, it diluted the ambiance of the Sabbath. Integral to the traditional ambiance is the walk to synagogue, with its slow and contemplative pace. The walk instantiates a total break with the car and all that it represents and evokes. Traditional Jews live within walking distance of a synagogue. They reclaim suburban streets for walking and, on the way home, for socializing. By noontime on any given Saturday, the streets around a synagogue are full of women and men, baby strollers, groups of boys and girls. Cars have to slow down and navigate around groups of walkers, often to the annoyance of drivers. Because Orthodox Jews walk they must live within a reasonable radius from the synagogue, say one-and-a-half to two miles. Because lavish meals are also a part of the celebration of the Sabbath, they join together at one another's homes for the afternoon meal. Groups of people may be found walking to and from lunch; children go to visit their friends in one another's houses. Despite the idea that the Sabbath is a day of rest, Orthodox neighborhoods are alive with social activity on Saturdays.

Wherever a sufficient density of Orthodox Jews exists in a neighborhood, they work with the municipality to enclose their area symbolically with a wire. This device, known as an *eruv*, harks back to the enclosure of ancient and medieval cities behind walls. Carrying in the public domain is a fundamental violation of the laws of the Sabbath in traditional Judaism, since carrying is an obvious form of work. Yet within a given enclosure, say one's house or fenced yard, carrying is permissible. Jewish law therefore developed various devices to link private domains to form an extended public-private space. The community works with local government and the phone or power company to string wires around an entire area, rendering it equivalent to an ancient walled city. Without an *eruv*, pushing a baby carriage and carrying a prayer book or a prayer shawl would not be permitted. The *eruv* enhances *oneg Shabbat*, the joy of the Sabbath.

Over the past decade there have been numerous attempts, often spearheaded by non-Orthodox Jews in Jewishly dense suburbs, to defeat Orthodox attempts to erect an *eruv*. Recently, a U.S. District Court judge in New Jersey overruled a lower court and ordered that an *eruv* in Tenafly must come down. Liberal Jews often fear that their neighborhoods will be overrun by Orthodox Jews. Years ago, as in "Eli the Fanatic," or in the films of Woody Allen, liberal Jews worried that overtly Orthodox people would cause offense to non-Jews and make their own, carefully acculturated lives more difficult. That is not the case today. Anti-Orthodox hostility is based on repugnance for the presumed triumphalism and judgmentalism of the Orthodox. Conservative, Reform, and secular Jews driving in their cars do not want to feel like second-class Jews. They sense that, against all expectations, Orthodoxy is thriving, assertive, and buoyant about its future. Liberal Jews do not share this optimism. The opponents of *eruvin* often frame their arguments in terms of the Establishment Clause: local governments are supporting and becoming excessively entangled in religion by facilitating an *eruv*. Here, sadly, the strict separationist tradition of mainline Jewish Establishment Clause jurisprudence directly undermines a legitimate free exercise claim. But whatever the merits of such legal arguments, a darker motive, a species of Judeophobia—fear of traditional Jews and Judaism—is usually at work.

In one encouraging sign, the Religious Action Center (RAC) of Reform Judaism, a bastion of liberal, strict church-state separationism, sided with the Orthodox *eruv* association in Tenafly. The RAC's intervention on behalf of the Orthodox surprised and angered some of

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the liberal Jews in the New Jersey town. Perhaps the Reform leadership sensed not only the justice of the Orthodox case with respect to their free exercise claim but also the desirability of an *eruv* for enhancing Jewish community life. This rare moment of intra-Jewish ecumenism is very much welcome. If suburban communities are to be humanized and renewed they must become places where religiously serious people can live, where religious differences can be affirmed in a civil and welcoming manner, and where religious communities make essential contributions to the common good. The public square must not remain a sanitized and artificial space where an illusion of social homogeneity dominates. Rather, the authentic diversity of the city should be mirrored. The public square should acknowledge the many groups who make the town their home.

An American Jewish community that is secure in its achievement and acceptance in America should, I believe, welcome this prospect. It should not constantly fret about being pitched back to marginality by resurgent anti-Semitism or aggressive Christianity. Rather, it should see itself as a partner with other religious communities trying to bring light and hope to an increasingly secular society. FT

Epitaph

for Dom Henrique de Meneses

His formidable strength of will conforms
to his noble intellect; his ideals confirm
themselves in action, always bold and firm
even in life's tumultuous winds and storms:
unmoved by greed or vulgar riches; the most
remarkable exemplar of the truly
dignified state; and the scourge of all those unruly,
bloodthirsty peoples on the Malabar Coast.
Handsome in form and face, and pure before
the entire world, and chaste; an excellence
of noble attributes which seldom occur
in nature. All these virtues and many more,
worthy of Homer's highest eloquence,
are laid to rest beneath this sepulcher.

Luís de Camões (1524/25-1580)
Translated from the Portuguese by William Baer

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Your Word Is Truth

In the spring of 1994, a group of Roman Catholics and evangelical Protestants issued a much-discussed statement, "Evangelicals and Catholics Together: The Christian Mission in the Third Millennium" (FT, May 1994). That statement, commonly referred to as "ECT," noted a growing "convergence and cooperation" between Evangelicals and Catholics in many public tasks, and affirmed agreement in basic articles of Christian faith while also underscoring the continuing existence of important differences. The signers promised to engage those differences in continuing conversations, and this has been done in meetings of noted theologians convened by Mr. Charles Colson and Father Richard John Neuhaus. At a meeting in the fall of 1996, it was determined that further progress depended upon firm agreement on the meaning of salvation, and especially the doctrine of justification. After much discussion, study, and prayer over the course of a year, the statement "The Gift of Salvation" was agreed to at a meeting in New York City in October 1997, and published in the January 1998 issue of this journal. The next question taken up by ECT participants was the relationship between Scripture and tradition. The following statement, "Your Word Is Truth," is the product of intense and extended deliberation and was first published this summer by Eerdmans in a book by the same title. The participants express the hope that those responding with critical evaluations of the statement will consult the scholarly papers prepared for their deliberation and to be found in the book. The ECT project continues and is currently studying Roman Catholic and evangelical Protestant understandings of "the communion of saints" (communio sanctorum).

— The Editors

Our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ prayed for his disciples: "Sanctify them in the truth; your word is truth. . . . I do not pray for these only, but also for those who believe in me through their word, that they may all be one; even as you, Father, are in me, and I in you, that they also may be in us, so that the world may believe that you have sent me" (John 17:17,20-21).

We thank God for the years of prayer, study, and conversation in the project known as "Evangelicals and Catholics Together." Among the many blessings resulting from this cooperative effort, we note especially our common affirmation of the most central truths of Christian faith, including justification by faith, in the 1997 statement, "The Gift of Salvation." From the beginning of this venture, and at each step along the way, we have insisted that the only unity among Christians that can be pleasing to God is unity in truth. Therefore, we have understood it to be our duty to note, carefully and clearly, matters both of agreement and of disagreement between Evangelicals and Catholics.

Among matters of utmost importance, and involving both agreements and disagreements, is the question traditionally framed as the relationship between Scripture and tradition. As we have together explored this question, we have prayed for the guidance of the Holy Spirit, and we believe that prayer has been answered. We respectfully submit the following considerations and conclusions to the ecclesial communities and trans-

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denominational fellowships of which we are part, with the hope that they will be received and examined as possible contributions to our better understanding of one another and our greater unity in Christ's truth.

From before the foundation of the world, God has desired a people to share forever in His life and love (Ephesians 1:4). To that end, God disclosed Himself and His loving intention by a sequence of revelatory and redemptive acts that involved the uttering of verbal messages and the producing of written records (Hebrews 1:1). He created a world that bears witness to His glory (Psalm 19:1-6), and when humanity sinfully rebelled against His purpose, He chose Israel to be instructed by word and deed in the ways of covenant fidelity in order to become a light to all the nations (Genesis 12:1-3, Deuteronomy 4:1-8). To this people He promised a Savior, who is Jesus the Christ, the very Word of God who was in the beginning with God, and who is to be recognized and confessed as the Son of God (John 1:1-14). The God of Israel is the One whom Jesus calls Father and teaches us to call Father (John 17:1-5, Matthew 6:6-13). To Jesus' disciples, and to those who would become disciples through their word, he promised the Spirit to guide them into all truth. Thus the new Israel worshiped, obeyed, and proclaimed the one true God—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—in faith-filled anticipation of participating in the divine life forever (Hebrews 12:18-24, John 16:3, Acts 1:8). Already now, God's promised redemption is fulfilled in the mediatorial ministry of Jesus Christ that is centered in his cross, resurrection, ascension, present reign, and assured return in glory to establish his eternal kingdom (2 Corinthians 1:19-20).

God gives His people full and final knowledge of His plan of salvation through Jesus Christ. "In many and various ways God spoke of old to our fathers by the prophets; but in these last days He has spoken to us by a Son, whom He appointed the heir of all things, through whom also He created the world" (Hebrews 1:1-2). The Son sent and sends the Holy Spirit who, bestowing the gift of faith, creates the community of faith for whose unity Jesus prayed. Christ himself is the head and cornerstone of his Church, which is built on the foundation of apostles and prophets. In its understanding, believing, celebrating, living, and proclaiming the gospel of Jesus Christ, the Church is guided by the Holy Spirit (Ephesians 2:19-22).

Both Evangelicals and Catholics affirm the one, holy, catholic, and apostolic Church, as set forth in the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed, but they define the Church and its attributes in distinctive ways. Evangelicals stress the priority of the gospel over the Church whose primary mission is to herald the good news of God's salvation in Christ. For Evangelicals, the Church as the one body of Christ extending through space and time includes all the redeemed of all the ages and all on earth in every era who have come to living faith in the body's living Head. Everyone who is personally united to Christ, having been justified by faith alone through his atoning death, belongs to his body and by the Spirit is united with every other true believer in Jesus. Evangelicals maintain that the one Church becomes visible on earth in all local congregations that meet to do together the things that, according to Scripture, the Church does.

Catholics hold that the Church is the body of Christ, a sacramental and mystical communion in which Christ is truly and effectually present and through which his justifying and sanctifying grace is mediated. While Christ is the unique mediator of salvation for all humanity, the Church of Jesus Christ "subsists in" and is most fully and rightly ordered in the Catholic Church, meaning the Church governed by the bishops in communion with the Bishop of Rome, the successor of Peter. Although there have been variations through history in the exercise of that governance, and may be further variations in order to accommodate a fuller expression of Christian unity, Catholics believe that Christ has endowed the Church with a permanent apostolic structure and an infallible teaching office that will remain until the Kingdom is fully consummated.

While Catholics and Evangelicals have not been able to reconcile these different views of the Church, with both communities finding serious aberrations in the ecclesial understanding of the other, as individual believers we do recognize in one another, when and where God so permits it, the evident reality of God's grace expressed by our trust in Jesus himself as Master and divine Savior. All who truly believe in Jesus Christ as Savior and Lord are brothers and sisters in the Lord even though they are not in full ecclesial fellowship.

In communion with the body of faithful Christians through the ages, we also affirm together that the entire teaching, worship, ministry, life, and mission of Christ's Church is to be held accountable to the final authority of Holy Scripture, which, for Evangelicals and Catholics alike, constitutes the word of God in written form (2 Timothy 3:15-17; 2 Peter 1:21). We agree that the phrase "word of God" refers preeminently to Jesus Christ (John 1:1,14). It is also rightly said that the gospel of Jesus Christ is the word of God, as is the faithful preaching of the gospel (Acts 6:7; 8:4). Then the canon, the listed set of writings making up the Bible, is recognized by the community of faith as the written word of God, possessing final authority for faith and life. On the extent of the canon we do not entirely agree, though the sixty-six books of the Protestant canon are not in dispute. In every form—the gospel, the preaching of the gospel, and the Scriptures of the Old and New Testa-

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ments—the word of God is in service to Jesus Christ, the Word of God preeminent.

The divinely inspired writings of the New Testament convey the apostolic teaching, which is the authoritative interpretation of God's revelation in Christ. The early Christian community recognized the authority of the first apostles who planted local churches and urged them to be faithful to the teaching they had received. Still today we possess that apostolic teaching in the New Testament, which, together with the Old Testament of which the New is the authoritative interpretation, is the written word of God. This entire process of the reception and transmission of God's revelation is the work of the Holy Spirit (John 14:26, 2 Timothy 3:15-17, 2 Peter 1:20-21).

Evangelicals and Catholics alike recognize the promised guidance of the Spirit in the elucidation and unfolding of apostolic teaching that took place as historic Christian orthodoxy emerged. This continuing work of the Spirit is evident in, for instance, the formulation of the Apostles', Nicene, and Athanasian creeds, and in the conciliar resolution of disputes regarding the two natures of Christ and the triune life of God. Such development of doctrine, typically in response to grave error and deviant traditions built upon such error, is to be understood not as an addition to the apostolic teaching contained in Holy Scripture but as Spirit-guided insight into the fullness of that teaching. In this way, the Lord has enabled faithful believers both to counter error and to make explicit what is implicit in the written Word of God.

In the course of that same history, and in the context of crises posed by philosophical and cultural changes as well as manifest ecclesiastical corruptions, the question of how to determine authentic apostolic teaching came into intense dispute. The mainline Reformers of the sixteenth century posited what is called the "formal principle," which holds that the Scriptures are (in the words of the 2000 Amsterdam Declaration) "the inspired revelation of God . . . totally true and trustworthy, and the only infallible rule of faith and practice." The Reformers vigorously protested what they viewed as deviations from biblical teaching, but they never used Scripture to undermine the Trinitarian and Christological consensus of the early Church embodied in the historic creeds that had come down from patristic times. The Reformers stoutly resisted the charge of innovation: they did not seek to found new churches but sought simply to reform the one, holy, catholic, and apostolic Church on the basis of the word of God.

We who are Evangelicals recognize the need to address the widespread misunderstanding in our community that *sola scriptura* (Scripture alone) means *nuda scriptura* (literally, Scripture unclothed; i.e., denuded of and abstracted from its churchly context). The phrase *sola scriptura* refers to the primacy and sufficiency of Scripture as the theological norm—the only infallible rule of faith and practice—over all tradition rather than the mere rejection of tradition itself. The isolation of Scripture study from the believing community of faith (*nuda scriptura*) disregards the Holy Spirit's work in guiding the witness of the people of God to scriptural truths, and leaves the interpretation of that truth vulnerable to unfettered subjectivism. At the same time, we insist that all Christians should have open access to the Bible, and should be encouraged to read and study the Scriptures, for in them all that is necessary for salvation is set forth so clearly that the simplest believer, no less than the wisest theologian, may arrive at a sufficient understanding of them.

We who are Catholics must likewise address the widespread misunderstanding in our community that tradition is an addition to Holy Scripture or a parallel and independent source of authoritative teaching. When Catholics say "Scripture and tradition," they intend to affirm that the lived experience (tradition) of the community of faith through time includes the ministry of faithful interpreters guided by the Holy Spirit in discerning and explicating the revealed truth contained in the written Word of God, namely, Holy Scripture.

Together we affirm that Scripture is the divinely inspired and uniquely authoritative written revelation of God; as such it is normative for the teaching and life of the Church. We also affirm that tradition, rightly understood as the proper reflection of biblical teaching, is the faithful transmission of the truth of the gospel from generation to generation through the power of the Holy Spirit. As Evangelicals and Catholics fully committed to our respective heritages, we affirm together the coinherence of Scripture and tradition: tradition is not a second source of revelation alongside the Bible but must ever be corrected and informed by it, and Scripture itself is not understood in a vacuum apart from the historical existence and life of the community of faith. Faithful believers in every generation live by the memories and hopes of the *actus tradendi* of the Holy Spirit: this is true whenever and wherever the word of God is faithfully translated, sincerely believed, and truly preached.

We recognize that confessing a high doctrine of the nature and place of Scripture is insufficient without a firm commitment to the intense devotional, disciplined, and prayerful engagement with Scripture. We rejoice to note that in our communities, and in joint study involving people from both communities, such engagement is increasingly common. In this engagement with Scripture, Evangelicals and Catholics are learning from one another: Catholics from the Evangelical emphasis on group Bible study and commitment to the majestic and

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final authority of the written word of God; and Evangelicals from the Catholic emphasis on Scripture in the liturgical and devotional life, informed by the lived experience of Christ's Church through the ages.

There always have been, and likely will be until our Lord returns in glory, disputes and disagreements about how rightly to discern the teaching of the Word of God in Holy Scripture. We affirm that Scripture is to be read in company with the community of faith past and present. Individual ideas of what the Bible means must be brought to the bar of discussion and assessment by the wider fellowship.

"The church of the living God is the pillar and bulwark of the truth" (1 Timothy 3:15). Because Christ's Church is the pillar and bulwark of truth, in disputes over conflicting interpretations of the Word of God the Church must be capable of discerning true teaching and setting it forth with clarity. This is necessary both in order to identify and reject heretical deviations from the truth of the gospel and also to provide sound instruction for passing on the faith intact to the rising generation.

Evangelicals and Catholics alike are concerned with these questions—What does the Bible authoritatively teach? And how does Christ's Church apply this teaching authoritatively today? Catholics believe that this teaching authority is invested in the Magisterium, namely, the Bishop of Rome, who is the successor of Peter, and the bishops in communion with him. Some Evangelicals see the communal office of discerning and teaching the truth in the covenanted congregation of baptized believers, while others see it in a wider synodical or episcopal connection. In either case, however, Evangelicals believe that a true understanding of the Bible is achieved only through the illuminating action of the Holy Spirit. For this reason, all attempts at discernment and teaching must rely on prayerful attentiveness to the guidance of the Spirit in the study of Scripture.

While Catholics agree that the entire community of the faithful is engaged in the discernment of the truth (*sensus fidelium*), they also believe that Evangelicals have an inadequate appreciation of certain elements of truth that, from the earliest centuries, Christians have understood Christ to have intended for his Church; in particular, the Petrine and other apostolic ministries. While Evangelicals greatly respect the way in which the Catholic Church has defended many historic Christian teachings against relativizing and secularizing trends, and recognize the role of the present pontiff in that important task today, they believe that some aspects of Catholic doctrine are not biblically warranted, and they do not accept any claims of infallibility made for the magisterial teachings of popes or church councils.

With specific reference to the subject of the present statement, we are not agreed on the exercise of teaching authority in the life of Christ's Church. To Evangelicals it appears that, in practice if not in theory, the Catholic understanding of Magisterium, including infallibility, results in the Roman Catholic Church standing in judgment over Scripture, instead of vice versa. Catholics, in turn, teach that the Magisterium exercised by the successors of the apostles—which they believe is intended by Christ, is guided by the Holy Spirit, and is in clear continuity with the orthodox tradition—enables the Church to explicate the truth of Holy Scripture obediently and accurately. We both recognize that judgments must be made in the life of Christ's Church as to what is and what is not scriptural truth. We are not agreed on how such judgments are to be made, nor can either group accept all the decisions that have resulted from what they regard as a flawed way of deciding.

Among the Catholic teachings that Evangelicals believe are not biblically warranted are the eucharistic sacrifice and transubstantiation of the elements, the doctrine of purgatory, the immaculate conception and bodily assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary, and the claimed authority of the Magisterium, including papal infallibility. Catholics, on the other hand, believe that Evangelicals are deficient in their understanding of, for instance, apostolically ordered ministry, the number and nature of the sacraments, the company and intercession of the saints, the Spirit-guided development of doctrine, and the continuing ministry of the Petrine office in the life of the Church. On these and other questions of great importance, we are not agreed. Nor do we agree on how we view our differences. Catholics view Evangelicalism as an ecclesially deficient community that needs to be strengthened by the full complement of gifts that they believe Christ intends for his Church. Evangelicals see Catholicism as centering upon an idea of the Church that clouds the New Testament gospel, and so needs to be brought into greater conformity with biblical teaching. The contrast here is far-reaching, and goes deep.

At the same time, we recognize that, during the past five hundred years, the Holy Spirit, the Supreme Magisterium of God, has been faithfully at work among theologians and exegetes in both Catholic and Evangelical communities, bringing to light and enriching our understanding of important biblical truths in such matters as individual spiritual growth and development, the mission of Christ's Church, Christian worldview thinking, and moral and social issues in today's world. We praise God for His faithful work within each community as He has provided instruction and guidance in these and other important areas of Christian faith and life.

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As Evangelicals and Catholics we are agreed on what we have said together in the statement "The Gift of Salvation" and on what we have been able to say together in the present statement on Scripture and tradition. The theological disagreements that still separate us are serious and require prayerful reflection and sustained mutual engagement. But in the face of a society marked by unbelieving ideologies and the culture of death, we deem it all the more important to affirm together those foundational truths of historic Christian orthodoxy that we do hold in common.

We are confident that the Lord is watching over His gospel and over those who have been called by the gospel, and we are sure that the forces of hell will not be able to thwart His divine purpose. By God's grace, we will continue to pray for one another, to seek greater mutual understanding in continuing conversations, and, in accordance with our deeply held convictions, to work together to bring the love and light of Christ to all persons everywhere. We earnestly invoke the Holy Spirit's continuing guidance in further establishing and making manifest our unity in the truth of Jesus Christ, so that the world may come to believe (John 17:21). In union with our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ, we together pray, "Sanctify us in the truth; Your word is truth" (John 17:17). FT

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Newman on the Personal

John F. Crosby

In an early sermon, "Personal Influence, the Means of Propagating the Truth," John Henry Newman (1801-1890) asks how revealed truth has made its way and held its ground in the world. He answers that its chief strength has not been in rational arguments, and in fact he goes surprisingly far in granting the advantages that unbelievers have over believers on the level of "garrulous reason." Then he gives what he takes to be the true answer: revelation "has been upheld in the world not as a system, not by books, not by arguments, nor by temporal power, but by the personal influence of such men as have already been described, who are at once the teachers and the patterns of it." And he explains: "Men persuade themselves, with little difficulty, to scoff at principles, to ridicule books, to make sport of the names of good men; but they cannot bear their presence: it is holiness embodied in personal form which they cannot steadily confront and bear down."

Years later Newman had occasion to refer back to his sermon on personal influence. It was 1850, and he was dealing with an outburst of anti-Catholic agitation set off by the act of Pope Pius IX restoring the Catholic hierarchy in England. In one lecture Newman was discussing with a Catholic audience in Birmingham the many absurd stereotypes that controlled the thinking of English Protestants about Catholics, and was advising his fellow Catholics on how to deal with these stereotypes. He distinguished between "metropolitan opinion" about Catholics, centered in London, and "local opinion" about Catholics, centered in the neighborhoods where they live. He admonished his listeners to forget about the former, and give great care about the latter.

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> You cannot make an impression on such an ocean of units; it [metropolitan opinion] has no disposition, no connection of parts. The great instrument of propagating moral truth is personal knowledge. A man finds himself in a definite place; he grows up in it and into it; he draws persons around him; they know him, he knows them; thus it is that ideas are born which are to live, that works begin which are to last. It is this personal knowledge of each other which is true public opinion; local opinion is real public opinion; but there is not, there cannot be, such in London.

There immediately follows a piece of vintage Newmanian satire. He imagines the division of mind that is bound to arise in Protestants who have become personally acquainted with individual Catholics but who have not yet given up their anti-Catholic stereotypes.

> The Birmingham people will say, "Catholics are, doubtless, an infamous set, and not to be trusted, for the *Times* says so, and Exeter Hall, and the Prime Minister, and the Bishops of the Establishment; and such good authorities cannot be wrong; but somehow an exception must certainly be made for the Catholics of Birmingham. . . . Priests in general are perfect monsters; but here they are certainly unblemished in their lives, and take great pains with their people. Bishops are tyrants, and, as Maria Monk says, cutthroats, always excepting the Bishop of Birmingham, who affects no state or pomp, is simple and unassuming, and always in his work."

Of course, Newman hopes that the personal influence exercised by Catholics will eliminate this situation by diminishing the Protestant stereotypes; then the divid-

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edness of the Protestant mind would give way to an understanding of Catholicism based on the personal influence of individual Catholics.

Newman himself exercised powerfully the personal influence of which he speaks. At his death in 1890 the *Times* of London said, speaking in the vein in which so many Protestants spoke as they took leave of Newman, "Of one thing we may be sure, that the memory of his pure and noble life, untouched by worldliness, unsoured by any trace of fanaticism, will endure, and that whether Rome canonizes him or not he will be canonized in the thoughts of pious people of many creeds in England." The writer of these lines is remembering not Newman's arguments, not his accomplishments, not the institutions he founded, but rather the purity of his personality, which is the main thing that undermines the writer's anti-Catholic prejudices. One might object that the *Times* was expressing not local opinion but metropolitan opinion. But when the one exercising personal influence is a personality of Newman's proportions, metropolitan opinion and local opinion coincide. Newman's neighborhood had become the whole nation.

Newman's writings on education show us another aspect of his teaching on personal influence. They also show us personal influence as it exists among friends and not simply as it overcomes enemies. In a paper titled "What Is a University?" Newman discusses the *litera scripta*, or written word, which has become available in unprecedented abundance in the modern world. He acknowledges that "the inestimable benefit of the *litera scripta* is that of being a record of truth, and an authority of appeal and an instrument of teaching in the hands of a teacher." He then continues: "But . . . if we wish to become exact and fully furnished in any branch of knowledge which is diversified and complicated, we must consult the living man and listen to his living voice." He says that people who are serious about education "avail themselves . . . of the rival method [rival to reading the printed word], the ancient method of oral instruction, of present communication between man and man . . . of the personal influence of a master, and the humble initiation of a disciple."

In fact, real education is possible without the support of books at all. In a paper on Athens in the age of Plato, Newman writes, "I doubt whether Athens had a library till the reign of Hadrian. It was what the student gazed on, what he heard, what he caught by the magic of sympathy, not what he read, which was the education furnished by Athens."

We might think that when it comes to religious education, Newman would make more of the *litera scripta*, which for him is nothing less than the Bible. But consider what he says of religious education:

> Its great instrument, or rather organ, has ever been that which nature prescribes in all education, the personal presence of a teacher, or, in theological language, Oral Tradition. It is the living voice, the breathing form, the expressive countenance, which preaches, which catechizes. Truth, a subtle, invisible, manifold spirit, is poured into the mind of the scholar by his eyes and ears, through his affections, imagination, and reason. . . .

This is said by someone who lived deeply immersed in the Scriptures and whose sermons are full of deep and original meditations on them.

Newman contrasts his ideal of personal influence, not only with the written word and the reading of books, but also with the organization and juridical structure of a university. In another paper, "Discipline and Influence," he constructs a dialogue with a critic who asserts, "I cannot help thinking that [you] make more of *persons* than is just, and do not lay stress enough upon order, system, and rule, in conducting a university." In response Newman acknowledges that order, system, and rule are indeed indispensable for the *integrity* of a university, but he says that teaching and learning by way of personal influence constitutes the *essence* of the life of a university, and in this way he asserts the primacy of personal influence.

Some years ago I became embroiled in a debate at my university about a proposal to offer university degrees by means of "distance education." Courses were to be put on audiotape, and some limited e-mail contact between teacher and student was envisioned. It was only when I went back to these papers of Newman that I realized why I was against the proposal. Distance education in the form proposed would largely block the flow of personal influence. The living presence of a teacher as well as the interpersonal medium constituted by a community of learners would be filtered out; little more than information would pass from the teacher to the student through the audiotapes. The electronically facilitated transmission of information is not education, at least not in the same sense in which teaching and learning on the basis of personal influence is education; it can never enable influence to flow between persons as it does when teachers and learners see each other in the flesh and live in community with each other. Newman would have deplored the proposal on the grounds that it would make for depersonalized, disembodied education.

After being received into the Catholic Church in 1845 Newman surveyed the various religious communities in the Church, looking for the one in which he would feel most at home. He eventually joined the Oratory of St. Philip Neri, and in fact brought the Oratory

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to England for the first time. In talks given to his brother Oratorians Newman tried to articulate the genius of religious community as lived in the spirit of St. Philip. In one of these Newman goes back to the funeral oration of Pericles, as reported in Thucydides, and in particular to the famous passage in which Pericles contrasts the Athenian and the Spartan. Newman wants to say that the genius of Athens, once it is baptized and made the principle of a religious community, yields the spirit of the Oratory. "The point of the Orator's [Pericles'] praise of the Athenians is this, that they, unlike the Spartans, have no need of laws, but perform from the force of inward character those great actions which others do from compulsion. Here the Oratorian stands for the Athenian, and the Spartan for the Jesuit."

This means for Newman that in the Oratory, as in Athens, personal influence has a natural home. As he writes, the "Jesuit fathers are part of a whole, but each Oratorian stands by himself and is a whole, promoting and effecting by his own proper acts the wellbeing of the community." Newman goes on to explain what he means by "his own proper acts": "It is the common sense, the delicacy, the sharp observation, the tact of each which keeps the whole in harmony. It is a living principle, call it (in human language) judgment or wisdom or discretion or sense of propriety or moral perception, which takes the place of formal enactment" and of commands and prohibitions.

We find everywhere in Newman this aversion to the Spartan spirit, as found in those who slavishly follow and apply rules that remain external to them, and everywhere this admiration for the Athenian spirit, as found in those who have so internalized rules and laws as to be eminently free in living by them and imaginative and resourceful in connecting them with concrete situations. These latter are alive as persons, they engage others as persons, they give and receive personal influence, while the former act in a passive and mechanical way.

In his great work in religious epistemology, *The Grammar of Assent*, Newman contrasts formal inference, as found in a demonstration in geometry, with informal inference, as found in discerning the upshot of a complex body of concrete evidence. As an example of the latter, he mentions the way in which someone who really knows the Latin classics and the culture out of which they grew also knows that they could not have been forgeries of the medieval monks who copied them. No demonstration *more geometrico* is available to this person; he cannot force his reasoning on some willful colleague who insists on the hypothesis of forgeries; he cannot prove deductively the absolute impossibility of a medieval monk composing the *Aeneid*. And yet he reasons no less than the geometrician does, and no less successfully, even if in his own nondeductive, informal way.

What particularly fascinates Newman about informal reasoning is the highly personal way in which one reasons. In reasoning formally I tend to disappear behind some structure of argument, which even has a certain existence outside of my reasoning and which in a way does the work of reasoning for me, whereas in reasoning informally it is preeminently I who reason. I take responsibility for my informal reasoning in a way that is not necessary when I rely on forms of deductive proof. Reasoning informally "is a personal gift, and not a mere method or calculus. . . . It is seated in the mind of the individual, who is thus his own law, his own teacher, and his own judge in those special cases of duty which are personal to him." It follows that "the personality of the parties reasoning is an important element in proving propositions in concrete matter." What Newman wants to defend is simply the Athenian principle of spontaneity as transferred from the conduct of social life to the activity of reasoning. What he objects to is the Spartan principle of compulsion that appears in the intellectual life as an over-reliance on formal demonstration.

Consider how the master of informal inference will address others. I who reason in this personal way also challenge my interlocutor to the same personal engagement. If the other is going to agree with me, he will not be "indolently borne along" to the conclusion that I argue for, he will not be effortlessly transported to the conclusion *ex opere operato*; no, he will have to stir up all the resourcefulness in himself of which he is capable and make the same investment of himself in the reasons that I have made.

Shortly after Newman entered the Catholic Church, he was asked by someone to give a brief account of his reasons for taking this step; he responded in a memorable letter with well-founded impatience:

> I do not know how to do justice to my reasons for becoming a Catholic in ever so many words—but if I attempted to do so in few, and that in print, I should wantonly expose myself and my cause to the hasty and prejudiced criticisms of opponents. This I will not do. People shall not say, "We have now got his reasons, and know their worth." No, you have not got them, you cannot get them, except at the cost of some portion of the trouble I have been at myself. You cannot buy them for a crown piece. . . . You must consent to *think*. . . . Moral proofs are grown into, not learned by heart.

Newman here challenges his critics to exert themselves as persons and not to hide behind a show of reasons and arguments that is really an escape from thinking. Those who rise to Newman's challenge and really

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think with him about the Catholic claims are liable not only to contract an intellectual debt to him but also to be personally influenced by him.

Informal reasoning is so connected with the individual that each person will do it differently, even as each is a different person. Here is a well-known passage in which Newman strives to harmonize the universal validity of all truth with the highly personal path to truth that persons take when they reason informally.

> I begin with expressing a sentiment, which is habitually in my thoughts whenever they are turned to the subject of mental or moral science . . . viz., that in these provinces of inquiry egotism is true modesty. In religious inquiry each of us can speak only for himself, and for himself he has a right to speak. His own experiences are enough for himself, but he cannot speak for others: he cannot lay down the law. . . .

He proceeds to acknowledge the unicity and universality of truth, saying, "He knows what has satisfied and satisfies himself; if it satisfies him, it is likely to satisfy others; if, as he believes and is sure, it is true, it will approve itself to others also, for there is but one truth." But then he reaffirms the "egotism" that he takes to be true modesty, saying, "However, his own business is to speak for himself."

Newman's practice illustrates his personalist ideal of modesty. In his many writings he never claims for his conclusions "an acceptance or a scientific approval which is not to be found anywhere," but he prefers to state "what are personally his own grounds for his belief." This is part of the reason why Newman is so present in all that he writes. Our natural interest in the personal and the autobiographical makes us take a particular interest in his writings. Of course, it is not that Newman thinks his teachings are mere opinions, or that they are only "true for him"; nor is it that he is content to let mere autobiography substitute for real arguments. No, he thinks that every right-thinking person will agree with him. But he does not want to coerce you into agreeing with him; he wants to draw you in by personal influence.

Let us examine more closely Newman's power of making himself present in his writings. Whoever reads Newman with sympathy and understanding cannot fail to be fascinated by the way he lives in his writings and speaks to his readers through them. If we think of St. Thomas Aquinas we right away notice the contrast to Newman. St. Thomas remains hidden behind the issues of which he treats; he practices a sober objectivity whereby he keeps his person out of his discourse; he wants to yield entirely to the truth that he serves and to let it speak for itself after he has presented it. But Newman serves truth in a different way; in addition to speaking the truth, Newman is also present in his words as a witness to truth. The reader not only finds penetrating arguments and telling rebuttals, he also finds Newman solemnly bearing witness. And if the reader is deeply influenced by Newman, the experience of Newman's witness is always a large factor in that influence.

Now there are many different ways of departing from the sobriety and objectivity of a St. Thomas. Many people do not let their reasons simply speak for themselves but they put themselves into their discourse in all kinds of often disagreeable ways. But Newman's witnessing is authentic, real, and utterly convincing. Perhaps this is because it is free of any "bad faith." That is, Newman never suppresses the difficulties he feels in making his commitments, he never pretends that it is easier to believe than it is, he never "makes a case" that he is not himself willing to live by. He never shuts his eyes to the scandal of unavenged evil in the world, to signs of historical conditioning in the Church, to awkward gaps in the evidence for Church claims, to ambiguities in the character of some saint. Julian Huxley once said he could produce a primer of unbelief out of the writings of Newman. He is referring to all the passages in which Newman expresses empathetic understanding for unbelievers and for their view of the world. Of course these passages never stand alone, apart from Newman's response to unbelief and his own ardent affirmation of faith. If Newman lives personally in his writings in an exceptional way, it is in part because of this unconditional truthfulness.

In mentioning Newman's unusual capacity for understanding unbelievers we touch upon another aspect of his power of exercising personal influence. I refer to his almost preternatural capacity for sympathy with other persons. I will let a Protestant contemporary of Newman who heard him preach describe this power:

> A sermon of Mr. Newman's enters into all our feelings, ideas, modes of viewing things. He wonderfully realizes a state of mind, enters into a difficulty, a temptation, a disappointment, a grief. . . . To take the first instance that happens to occur to us . . . we have often been struck by the keen way in which he enters into a regular tradesman's vice—avarice. . . . This is not a temper to which we can imagine Mr. Newman ever having felt in his own mind even the temptation; but he understands it, and the temptation to it, as perfectly as any merchant could. Nay, he enters deeply into what even skepticism has to say for itself; he puts himself into the infidel's state of mind, in which the world, as a great fact, seems to give the lie to all religions . . . and he

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> goes down into that lowest abyss and bottom of things, at which the intellect undercuts spiritual truth altogether. He sets before persons their own feelings with such truth of detail, such natural expressive touches, that they seem not to be ordinary states of mind which everybody has, but very peculiar ones; for he and the reader seem to be the only two persons in the world that have them in common. Here is the point. Persons look into Mr. Newman's sermons and see their own thoughts in them.

Perhaps we can explain this sympathetic power of Newman's like this. It is possible to write about avarice and infidelity in an "objective" way, characterizing the essence of these vices, bringing in their opposites for contrast, and so forth. When this objective approach is successful, the reader says, "Yes, that's just the way it is with these vices, congratulations to the author for getting them right. Now I can think more clearly about them." But the reader feels no particular bond of sympathy between himself and such an author. Yet Newman's talk about the same vices has a "subjective" ring, for he is trying to understand these vices *in himself*, to understand how he himself has these vices, or vices similar to them, or at least has the full potential for having them, and so to understand what it is like to be subject to them. This is what creates the bond of sympathy with the readers who are struggling with these vices. They receive from Newman not only intellectual clarification about their sin but also the immeasurable personal benefit of being visited in their solitude by Newman, who shares with them his secret and thereby reveals to them their own secret.

In a sermon Newman ascribes to St. Paul just this "gift of sympathy." Newman writes, "Human nature, the common nature of the whole race of Adam, spoke in him, acted in him, with an energetical presence, with a sort of bodily fulness. . . . And the consequence is that, having the nature of man so strong within him, he is able to enter into human nature, and to sympathize with it, with a gift peculiarly his own." This is also the way it is with Newman; for all the solitariness of his inner life, he too possessed the capacity to associate himself with others to the point of speaking of them and himself as one. Sometimes Newman acknowledged his gift of sympathy, as when he chose for his cardinal's motto *cor ad cor loquitur*, heart speaks to heart.

We can enter more deeply into Newman's theory and practice of personal influence if we consider his power of realizing the concrete and of awakening in others what he called a *real assent*. Newman loved the specific individual and in fact he sometimes verges on extreme nominalism in his affirmation of the individual. He is always warning against universals and their tendency to drain the concreteness out of things. He is always leading his readers and listeners beyond mere *notional* assent, or purely intellectual assent, and towards *real* assent, which he also called *imaginative* assent, and sometimes also *experiential* assent—an assent born of the encounter with the world in all its concrete reality.

Newman had a definite pastoral reason for his fascination with real assent. He realized that we human beings are so constituted as to be moved to action much more through the imagination than through the intellect. If our apprehension of the world is mediated too much by universals and general notions, we are left in the position of spectators. But the more we apprehend the world and other persons in their concreteness, the more engaged we become with them, the more capable of acting towards them, and so the more we live as persons. Thus in one well-known passage he says that

> deductions have no power of persuasion. The heart is commonly reached, not through the reason, but through the imagination, by means of direct impressions, by the testimony of facts and events, by history, by description. Persons influence us, voices melt us, looks subdue us, deeds inflame us. Many a man will live and die upon a dogma: no man will be a martyr for a conclusion.

Take the fact that I will one day die. I can assent to this either notionally or really. If notionally, then I assent above all to the fact that everyone dies, and I include myself in the mortality of all human beings. But if I give a real assent to my death, then I experience myself not just as a logical part of "everyone" but almost as if I were the only human being; I experience my death as something of supreme concern to me personally. Then my assent shakes me to the roots of my being, "piercing the heart" and raising my personal existence to an intense pitch, whereas, in contrast, the notional assent leaves me unmoved, almost as if I were just a spectator of my own future death.

We have here, then, another reason for Newman's uncanny power of exercising personal influence in his sermons. If he had spoken more abstractly and had aimed mainly at mediating universal knowledge, he would disappear from his words, and his influence on us would be only intellectual, not personal. In fact, his influence is highly personal because he has this rare gift of affecting us with the concrete reality of God and the soul. As we realize truth in a new way under his influence, we come alive as persons in a new way.

Newman could never warm to the God of the philosophers. He kept his distance from the traditional cosmo-

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logical arguments for the existence of God. He did not deny their validity or their legitimate place in the Church, but he said that they "do not warm me and enlighten me; they do not take away the winter of my desolation, or make the buds unfold and the leaves grow within me, and my moral being rejoice." He was instead at home with the God of religious men and women, the living God, the God who calls you and me by name, who reveals Himself, who acts unpredictably. And the reason is clear: the living God affected Newman's imagination and touched his heart and in this way elicited from him a profound real assent.

The metaphysical necessities of the natural theologian tend to block the view of the living, personal God, who reveals Himself not just in what He necessarily is but also in what He unpredictably does. In one early sermon Newman exults in the fact that Christianity discloses to us not a divine principle but a Divine Agent. "Here, then, Revelation meets us with simple and distinct *facts* and *actions*, not with painful inductions from existing phenomena, not with generalized laws or metaphysical conjectures, but with *Jesus and the Resurrection*." These are just the kinds of facts and actions that awaken a real assent and affect the imagination. By eliciting the sight and sound of them in us readers Newman can do what he could never do with rational proofs—namely, take away the winter of our desolation and make our moral being rejoice.

At this point some readers who had begun with some sympathy for Newman's personalism may object that Newman is guilty of subjectivism, of making too much of religious feeling and experience. By putting himself into his discourse and declining to make strong universal claims, he ends being more concerned with religious experience than with the truth about God. Education needs more law and order than Newman allows, so does religious life, and so does our activity of reasoning. Newman seems to assert the personal at the expense of organization, authority, objectivity, universality.

To this line of criticism, one can only respond: everything the critic is looking for can be found in abundance in Newman. Newman makes as strong an argument for authority and objectivity in religion as he does for the principle of personality. In fact, the first thing I grasped years ago about Newman was his opposition to religious subjectivism and to theological liberalism; only much later did I begin to do justice to his principle of personality. Indeed, many admirers of Newman think of him mainly in terms of his antiliberalism.

Newman was passionately committed to what he called "the dogmatical principle," which he memorably expresses in the following:

> That there is a truth then; that there is one truth; that religious error is in itself of an immoral nature . . . that it is to be dreaded; that the search for truth is not the gratification of curiosity; that its attainment has nothing of the excitement of a discovery; that the mind is below truth, not above it, and is bound, not to descant upon it, but to venerate it; that truth and falsehood are set before us for the trial of our hearts; that our choice is an awful giving forth of lots on which salvation or rejection is inscribed—this is the dogmatical princple.

Here Newman is concerned not with our imaginative grasp of truth, not with the barrenness of a merely notional grasp of it, but with truth's sovereignty.

One cannot even begin to understand Newman without grasping the depth of his commitment to this principle, which was absolutely central to all of his thought and to his whole life's work. Consider its place in his conversion, which he underwent at the age of fifteen. He tells us that he was drifting towards unbelief, when a powerful experience of God overcame him, which he describes in the following terms: "I fell under the influences of a definite Creed, and received into my intellect impressions of dogma, which, through God's mercy, have never been effaced or obscured." Newman almost describes his conversion as his discovery of the dogmatical principle.

This attachment to dogmatic truth continued through his early thirties, when he began to lead the Oxford Movement of reform in the Church of England. In the *Apologia*, in the course of explaining the three foundational commitments of the movement, he writes, "First was the principle of dogma: my battle was with liberalism; by liberalism I meant the antidogmatic principle and its developments. This was the first point on which I was certain." In another place he explains more fully the liberalism that he so abominated. Liberalism teaches

> that truth and falsehood in religion are but matters of opinion; that one doctrine is as good as another; that the Governor of the world does not intend that we should gain the truth; that there is no truth; that we are not more acceptable to God by believing this than by believing that; that no one is answerable for his opinions; that they are a matter of necessity or accident; that it is enough if we sincerely hold what we profess; that our merit lies in seeking, not in possessing. . . .

And when towards the end of his career he surveyed his life's work he frequently explained its unity in terms of the defense of the dogmatical principle. In 1879, for

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instance, he said in Rome on the occasion of his being elevated to the cardinalate: "For thirty, forty, fifty years I have resisted to the best of my powers the spirit of liberalism in religion."

There are also other principles of Newman's religion that protect him from subjectivism. From the beginning of the Oxford Movement he was wedded with his whole being to the idea of a visible church with its divinely ordained structures; he laid particular stress on the "sacramental system" and on "episcopal authority." To see just how seriously Newman took these matters one has only to recall the years of intellectual and spiritual agony that preceded his reception into the Catholic Church. Newman never had anything to do with that religious inwardness that would escape from history and dwell alone with God. Nor was his love of the Athenian spirit ever developed in an antiauthoritarian way.

Thus the turn to the personal and the subjective in Newman had nothing to do with subjectivism. Newman's "principle of personality" coheres entirely with his "dogmatical principle." In fact, these two principles enrich and perfect each other. As we have seen, Newman gives witness by the way he personally lives in his writings; this belongs to the subjective side of Newman. But what he witnesses to is nothing other than the dogmatical principle and the whole creed of the Church. We have seen as well that he leads us to *realize* concretely revealed truth, and this too belongs to his subjective side. But in doing this he leads us to venerate truth better by the very fact of apprehending it, not only in a purely intellectual way, but with the full engagement of the whole person.

Edward Sillem, editor of *The Philosophical Notebook of John Henry Newman* (1970), aptly summarized the man and his significance when he concluded that Newman "stands at the threshold of the new age as a Christian Socrates, the pioneer of a new philosophy of the individual person and personal life." FT

Natércia

The flaming sun rises high, to the peak
of its ascent in the sky. The goat herds shrink
away from their sweltering fields to drink
the cool refreshing waters from the creek.
The birds, burning in the scorching glare,
find shelter beneath the leaves, within the shade,
but, still, their lovely songs begin to fade,
and only the chirps of crickets fill the air.
As Liso searches for the nymph, although
he always fails, no matter how he tries,
and with a thousand sighs, bemoans his lot:
"*Why* do you leave the one who loves you so,
for one who loves you not?" young Liso cries,
and Echo answers softly: " . . . loves you not."

Luís de Camões (1524/25-1580)
Translated from the Portuguese by William Baer

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Nietzsche's Truth

Damon Linker

In the months before his final descent into madness, Friedrich Nietzsche made the following declaration and prediction: "I know my destiny. Someday my name will be associated with the memory of something tremendous, a crisis like no other on earth, the profoundest collision of conscience, a decision conjured up against everything that had been believed, required, and held sacred up to that time. I am not a man; I am dynamite."

And so he was. The man who practiced and perfected the art of "philosophizing with a hammer," who pronounced that "God is dead," who called on his readers to follow him in exploring regions "beyond good and evil," who gleefully declared himself the Antichrist, who unconditionally denounced human equality and democracy, who claimed that "a great war hallows any cause," who praised the "blond beast" who "might come away from a revolting succession of murder, arson, rape, [and] torture with a sense of exhilaration and emotional equilibrium, as if it were nothing but a student prank"—this man was indeed explosive. One might even say that today, over one hundred years after his work was discovered by European intellectuals, Western culture has yet to come to terms with the fallout produced by the detonation of his most volatile ideas.

In the epilogue to his *Nietzsche: A Philosophical Biography*, Rüdiger Safranski catalogues the philosopher's influence, and it reads like a comprehensive intellectual history of the twentieth century. The irrationalist vitalism that helped to inspire fascism; artistic movements from symbolism to art nouveau, expressionism, and Dada; Ernst Jünger's ecstatic militarism; Heideggerian existentialism and antimodernism; the Counter-Enlightenment critical theory of the postwar Frankfurt School; the violent surrealism of Georges Bataille and, through him, the varying postmodern irrationalisms of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida; the neopragmatic conviction that "truth is an illusion that helps us cope with life"—all of these and many other radical cultural, intellectual, and political movements descend directly from Nietzsche. They are his legacy to our time.

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NIETZSCHE: A PHILOSOPHICAL BIOGRAPHY. By RÜDIGER SAFRANSKI. Translated by Shelley Frisch. *Norton. 412 pp. $29.95.*

For some—primarily those who take their intellectual bearings from outside the thoroughly Nietzscheanized humanities departments of the modern university, as well as the handful of conservative dissenters within them—there will be little in this legacy of atheistic immoderation to admire. But however we judge the often decadent productions of twentieth-century high culture, Nietzsche himself continues to merit the most serious attention, and not merely because of his considerable influence. The fact remains that Nietzsche is one of the most brilliant philosophers and prose stylists in the history of Western letters. His formidable challenge to so much that so many of us continue to hold dear simply cannot be ignored by thoughtful men and women.

But how ought we to approach the task of evaluating Nietzsche's work? The answer is far from clear. For Nietzsche is a deeply contradictory thinker, and glancing at the dozens of books devoted to his thought in the philosophy section of any good bookshop, it can seem that there are, in fact, many Nietzsches. Most scholars have assumed that his work amounts to a defense of radical right-wing politics, but many today think him more compatible with the far left. His books contain numerous misogynistic passages, but that hasn't discouraged

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feminists from claiming to find support for their program in his ideas. Some think his teaching is meant to inspire public actions, but many others have seen in his writing an aesthetic call to private cultivation and creativity. Competent scholars have declared that his work is hopelessly incoherent, while at least one leading philosopher has claimed that Nietzsche was the "last great metaphysician in the West." And then there are those who think that Nietzsche's texts can and should mean anything their readers want them to. This abundance of interpretations makes any attempt to render an informed and comprehensive judgment of his work exceedingly difficult.

Thanks to Safranski's biography, that task has now become considerably easier. As in his 1994 biography of Martin Heidegger (*Between Good and Evil*; English translation, 1998), Safranski manages to summarize his subject's ideas with admirable fluency—and without ever mistaking his own role for that of an advocate. Safranski also proves himself to be a master of what might be called philosophical narration, drawing on just the right amount of detail from Nietzsche's personal background and historical milieu to provide a context for his philosophy while rarely allowing those details to overshadow the ideas that form the core of Nietzsche's life.

The Nietzsche that emerges from Safranski's study is a man who, from his teenage years until his mental collapse at the age of forty-five, tirelessly devoted his formidable intellect to making sense of the world in terms of its intrinsic meaninglessness. The case of Nietzsche thus presents us with the peculiar spectacle of a philosopher who began his intellectual life, not from a position of openness to an elusive truth not yet grasped, but rather from an unshakable conviction that he had already found it—and that all of human experience and history had to be reconceived in its light.

Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche was born on October 15, 1844 in the small village of Röcken, Germany. His father, Pastor Karl Ludwig Nietzsche, died five years later of "softening of the brain," leaving Nietzsche to be raised (along with his sister Elisabeth) by his mother, Franziska, and two unmarried aunts. The young Nietzsche was both intellectually precocious and astonishingly self-absorbed. He wrote his first philosophical essay, "On the Origin of Evil," at the age of twelve. By thirteen, he had written his first autobiography. He would go on to write eight more over the next ten years, each of them concluding that, in Safranski's words, "his life was exemplary."

Despite Nietzsche's early penchant for self-aggrandizement—a tendency that would mark all of his written work—both he and his family believed for some time that he would follow in his father's footsteps to become a pastor. But at some point between 1859 and 1861, while Nietzsche attended an elite boarding school, he began to break decisively with his faith. Although he asserted in his 1859 autobiography that "God has guided me safely in everything as a father would his weak little child," by May 1861 he had concluded that the idea of God was, in Safranski's words, "unfathomable," because there was simply "too much intense injustice and evil in the world."

These first tentative steps away from Christianity were quickly followed by others. In an essay composed on his Easter vacation in 1862, the seventeen-year-old Nietzsche would wonder "how our view of the world might change if there were no God, immortality, Holy Spirit, or divine inspiration, and if the tenets of millennia were based on delusions." Safranski explains how this thought quickly generated a series of puzzles that would set Nietzsche's philosophical agenda for the rest of his life: "Might people have been 'led astray by a vision' for such a long time? What kinds of reality are left behind once religious phantasms have been taken away?"

Over the next few years, Nietzsche would wrestle with his suspicion that all received truths are illusory. Although he had planned to study theological and classical philology at the University of Bonn when he arrived there in the fall of 1864, he dropped his concentration in theology after a single semester. By the following summer, he would write to his sister that, although it would be easy to continue believing in the comforting tales of their youth, "the truth is not necessarily in league with the beautiful and the good." On the contrary, he wrote, the truth can be "detestable and ugly in the extreme."

From this point on, Nietzsche would devote his life to breaking from—and then reflecting on how mankind might thrive after having left behind—"the first and last things." Early in his university education, Nietzsche thought of himself as continuing the work of the philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer, whom he described as his "liberator" from dogma and tradition. As Safranski writes, Schopenhauer confirmed Nietzsche's youthful intuition that "the inner nature of the world is based not on reason and intellect but on impulses and dark urges, dynamic and senseless." "True life," Schopenhauer claimed, is pure "will," which "roars behind or underneath it." The challenge was learning how to live in light of the truth that all apparent meaning and purpose in life is in fact an illusion. At first Nietzsche was intrigued by Schopenhauer's own proposal—the self-negation of the will, culminating in quasi-Buddhistic peace and passivity—but he soon rejected it on the grounds that it amounted to an attitude of defeat in the face of "nothingness." Nietzsche longed to find a way to love and affirm life, despite its meaninglessness.

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Such concerns preoccupied his thinking as he continued his education in classical philology under the renowned scholar Friedrich Ritschl, first at Bonn, and then at the University of Leipzig. So impressed was Ritschl by his student that in 1869 he recommended Nietzsche for a professorship at the University of Basel before he had completed either his dissertation or postgraduate thesis—an honor as rare in the nineteenth century as it is today. When Nietzsche finally produced a monograph, *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872), the expectations were thus very high among his colleagues. They certainly did not anticipate that Nietzsche would completely forsake the scholarly norms of the philological profession to write a highly speculative, even revolutionary account of ancient Greek culture that was largely inspired by his own existential fixations.

All of Nietzsche's work begins from the assumption that, viewed in itself, the world is a meaningless and purposeless chaos. As he would write in his notebooks in 1888, less than a year before his mental breakdown, "For a philosopher to say, 'the good and the beautiful are one,' is infamy; if he goes on to add, 'also the true,' one ought to thrash him. Truth is ugly." In *The Birth of Tragedy* and the shorter essays he wrote in the early and mid-1870s, Nietzsche proposed that human beings "can become healthy, strong, and fruitful" only when they live within an "enveloping atmosphere" that protects them from having to face this ugly truth without mediation. The enveloping atmosphere consists of protective illusions that come to be taken as truths by those who live within its "horizon," which enables them to "endure without being destroyed." But these second-order truths—or "myths"—must not entirely conceal the meaninglessness that they cover over. Rather, the myths must grant partial access to the authentic truth. In its translucence to truth, the mythical horizon allows human beings to both face and "forget" the ugliness in just the right proportions.

The Birth of Tragedy is an interpretation of how the ancient Greeks achieved this balance between truth and untruth more perfectly than any other culture in history and why that balance eventually collapsed; it also suggests how German culture might acquire an analogous state of equilibrium in modern times. Nietzsche associates the impulses or drives that enabled the Greeks to live and thrive in the partial light of the "terror and horror of existence" with the Olympian gods of Apollo and Dionysus; he claims that in different but complementary ways they made possible the "continuous redemption" of the "eternally suffering and contradictory" character of the world.

The first of these impulses—the Apollonian—responded to the "mysterious ground of our being" by answering our "ardent longing for illusion." It used beauty and artistry, measure and proportion to conceal from the Greeks, at least partially, the "substratum of suffering and of knowledge," and left the individual half-conscious "in his tossing bark, amid the waves" of human existence, in a kind of "waking dream." According to Nietzsche, Sophocles' *Antigone*, with its stark and yet balanced conflicts between competing duties, stands as a particularly vivid example of the Apollonian in action.

But the full accomplishment of Greek tragedy cannot be grasped by conceiving it entirely in terms of Apollonian dreams. It must be complemented by the contrary Dionysian impulse, which pulled in a very different direction. In a frenzy of intoxication, which Nietzsche associates with the orgiastic violence of the ancient world's Bacchic festivals, the Dionysian at once exposed the "mysterious primordial unity" from which all things spring and produced "complete self-forgetfulness" on the part of individuals. This "mystic feeling of oneness" culminated in a transfiguring experience in which man "feels himself a god [and] . . . walks about enchanted, in ecstasy, like the gods he saw walking in his [Apollonian] dreams."

According to Nietzsche, the Greeks achieved greatness by synthesizing their Apollonian and Dionysian drives in the tragic dramas of Aeschylus and Sophocles. In the greatest of their plays, the Greeks were exposed to the ideal quantities of truth and illusion. In a play such as *Oedipus Rex*, they were granted a glimpse of the abyss, and yet that glimpse was so artfully presented in "an Apollonian world of images" that their "nausea" was transformed into "notions with which one can live."

But the tragic balance was extremely difficult to maintain. Nietzsche claims that the democratic character, heightened self-consciousness, and "cheerfulness" of Euripides' plays signaled that the tragic age of Greece was coming to an end. But the deepest cause of its demise could be found elsewhere, in a "newborn demon," whose approach to life so opposed the Dionysian element in Aeschylean tragedy that it was subsequently vanquished from the Greek stage, and henceforth from the history of the West. That demon was none other than Socrates.

The middle chapters of *The Birth of Tragedy* contain what might be the most forceful critique of Socrates since Aristophanes lampooned him in *The Clouds* during the ancient philosopher's own lifetime. Nietzsche contends that Socrates stood in profound opposition to the "drunken revelry" of tragedy, falsely teaching human beings that "using the thread of causality, [they could] penetrate the deepest abysses of being." Even worse, he taught that "to be beautiful" something must be "intelligible," and that "knowledge is a virtue." The

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Socratic "theoretical man" lives to uncover the truth at all costs, assuming that doing so will be an unambiguous benefit to mankind. While the tragedians had understood the importance of the surface of things, the Socratic philosopher, stubbornly and naively convinced of the goodness of truth, pursues it without restraint—and the results are catastrophic.

In the first formulation of an argument he will greatly refine in his later work, Nietzsche claims that the philosopher's headlong lunge toward the truth ends up exposing the "lies concealed in the essence of logic." When this happens—when the philosopher uncovers the fact that logic is a human construction imposed on the chaos of reality—logic effectively "bites its own tail" and refutes itself. In Nietzsche's view, this is exactly what has happened in the hyperlogical culture of the modern world: the theoretical optimism first defended by Socrates had reached a kind of termination in which human beings begin to sense the awful truth that its most fundamental premises are fictions. They have thus also begun to grasp (in Nietzsche's own work) the wisdom of the pre-Socratic tragedians, who understood, if only half-consciously, that mankind "needs art as a protection and a remedy" for truth.

That modern man confronts an unprecedented crisis of meaninglessness is a view that Nietzsche would hold throughout his career. What changed was his account of how it came about and his proposal for how we should respond to it. In his early work, he believes that modern man requires a new "beautiful illusion" to replace the crumbling Socratic culture of the West. This new mythology would serve the same function that the plays of Aeschylus and Sophocles did for the Greeks. When it comes to specifying where we might find a new mythology to accomplish this much needed "rebirth of tragedy," Nietzsche announces with considerable bombast that it will arise from the neopagan, mythopoetic operas of Richard Wagner.

Nietzsche had met Wagner in 1868 and quickly developed an intense friendship with the composer and his wife, Cosima von Bülow. Over the next few years, the three shared their innermost cultural and philosophical hopes with one another—so much so, in fact, that by the time of the publication of his first book, Nietzsche could write to a friend that "I have formed an alliance with Wagner. You cannot imagine how close we are now and how fully our plans mesh." Those plans, unveiled in the final third of *The Birth of Tragedy*, involved nothing less than the satiation of modern man's spiritual "hunger" by providing him with a neotragic horizon within which the "significance of life" could be "redeemed" just as it had been for the pre-Socratic Greeks.

It is hardly surprising that Nietzsche's colleagues greeted his book with a mixture of incomprehension and disdain. Expecting the philological wunderkind to produce an exercise in meticulous scholarship, they were shocked to discover that he had chosen instead to issue a rallying cry to cultural revolution. What Safranski fittingly describes as Nietzsche's academic "excommunication" began almost immediately. Over the next few years, he divided his time between convalescing from a series of illnesses, teaching a handful of students he deemed "incompetent," and writing a number of brilliant but decidedly nonacademic essays on Schopenhauer, Wagner, David Friedrich Strauss, and "The Benefits and Drawbacks of History for Life." His alienation from academic life finally culminated in his resignation from the University of Basel in 1879. He would spend the next ten years as a nomad traveling throughout Germany, Switzerland, and Italy while devoting himself almost entirely to philosophical reflection and writing.

Although Nietzsche's work continued to show signs of Wagner's influence for several years after the publication of *The Birth of Tragedy*, the two men gradually drifted apart during the 1870s. As Safranski suggests, Nietzsche eventually became disillusioned with his own early proposals to cure modern disillusionment. While Nietzsche once hoped that Wagner could inspire a renewal of meaning and purpose in modernity, by the end of the decade he had come to consider the composer a purveyor of kitsch who embodied the most decadent aspects of modern culture. It is even possible to say that Nietzsche wrote his next major work, *Human, All Too Human* (1878), in order to inure himself against the kinds of hopes that Wagner's music had inspired in him.

If Nietzsche began his earliest philosophical reflections from the assumption that "truth is ugly"—and that all meaning arises out of a creative attempt to cope with this ugliness—the post-Wagner Nietzsche was, if anything, more radical in his refusal to accept any "metaphysical solace." As before, modern man had fallen into meaninglessness, but now there was no possible redemption from it—and this we were supposed to accept as good news. In *Human, All Too Human* and *Daybreak* (1881), an almost Voltairean Nietzsche exulted in his own capacity to endure with a smile what Pascal had described as the "horror at the infinite immensity of spaces." Not until 1882's *The Joyful Science* did Nietzsche begin to develop the profundity that characterizes his mature and most justly admired work.

Like its immediate predecessors, *The Joyful Science* is a collection of numbered aphorisms ranging in length from a few words to several pages. This style, which Nietzsche employs in most of his later works, enables him to shift topics in unpredictable ways. An aphorism on politics might be followed by one on art, science, reli-

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gion, psychology, German Idealism, newspapers, ancient philosophy, Renaissance history, or modern literature. Sometimes one aphorism builds on another, producing a sustained argument or interpretation; at other times the jarring juxtaposition between them leads to deliberate disorientation. It is amidst the chaotic stream of brilliantly disjointed insights and observations that the reader of *The Joyful Science* comes upon aphorism 125, "The Madman."

Nietzsche begins this one-and-a-half-page masterpiece of modern disenchantment by describing a madman who "lit a lantern in the bright morning hours, ran to the market place, and cried incessantly: 'I seek God! I seek God!'" Then, as those in the square gawk and laugh at the lunatic with embarrassed disapproval, he cries out: "Whither is God? . . . I will tell you. *We have killed him*—you and I. All of us are his murderers. . . . God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him."

Nietzsche was hardly the first modern figure to espouse atheism. The most radical writers of the Enlightenment suspected that God was a fiction created by the human mind. G. W. F. Hegel famously declared that modernity is "Good Friday without Easter Sunday." And throughout the nineteenth century, a series of authors, from Ludwig Feuerbach and Karl Marx to Charles Darwin, claimed that religion is a human projection onto a spiritually lifeless world. Nietzsche agreed with this tradition in every respect but one. Whereas most modern atheists viewed their lack of piety as an unambiguous good—as a mark of their liberation from the dead weight of authority and tradition—Nietzsche responded to his insight into the amoral chaos at the heart of the world with considerable pathos. If in *Human, All Too Human* and *Daybreak* he flirted with the facile cheerfulness so common to his fellow atheists, beginning with aphorism 125 of *The Joyful Science*, Nietzsche showed that he now understood with greater depth that the passing of God has potentially devastating consequences for Western Civilization. This is the madman's *requiem aeternam deo*:

> But how did we do this? How could we drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving? Away from all suns? Are we not plunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there still any up or down? Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder? Is not night continually closing in on us?

If God is dead, then man has completely lost his orientation. There is no human dignity, no equality, no rights, no democracy, no liberalism, and no good and evil. In the light of Nietzsche's insight, a thinker such as Marx looks extraordinarily superficial, railing against religion on the one hand while remaining firmly attached to ideals of justice and equality on the other. He has failed to grasp the simple truth that if God is dead, then nothing at all can be taken for granted—and absolutely everything is permitted.

But how could God be dead? The idea is permeated by paradox. If God is who He claims to be, then it is obviously impossible for Him to have "bled to death under our knives," as the madman declares. (Of course Christians believe that, as the Son, God did die at our hands, but Nietzsche intends the madman's statements to apply to the triune God in His monotheistic unity.) God may come to be ignored by a world too fixated on earthly goods to notice Him, but clearly He is not vulnerable to human malice or indifference. Unless, of course, He never existed in the first place. Perhaps then it would make a kind of poetic sense to speak of God "dying" once people have ceased to believe in Him. In this case, man would not simply be responsible for killing God, but also for having given birth to Him in the first place. Much of Nietzsche's late work defends just such an interpretation, arguing that Western man is equally responsible for creating and destroying God. The most thorough statement of this view can be found in *The Genealogy of Morals* (1887), which purports to tell the hidden history of morality from its origins to its collapse in the modern age.

In the beginning, there was chaos. All of Nietzsche's books begin from this assumption. The *Genealogy* departs from those works in asserting that this primordial anarchy consisted of an unfocused, undifferentiated, and purposeless "will to power" that permeated all things. (Whether the will to power merely animates living creatures or acts as a metaphysical force that pervades all of nature remains unclarified.) The pointless, anarchistic violence that characterized the prehistoric world came to an end when certain individuals began to focus their will to power on the goal of decisively triumphing over others. When they finally succeeded, these victorious individuals, whom Nietzsche dubs "the strong," foisted the first "moral valuation" onto mankind.

In the strong (or "noble") valuation, the good is nothing other than an expression of what the members of the victorious class do and what they affirm. And what they do is triumph ruthlessly over the weak by violence. Likewise, the opposite of the good—the bad—is defined by the strong as weakness, or the inability to conquer the strong. Nietzsche illustrates the dynamics

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of the strong valuation with an infamous image of birds of prey devouring defenseless lambs. The birds of prey do not *choose* to eat the lambs; there is thus no free will involved and nothing blameworthy about their viciousness. It's simply what they do; what they do is the essence of who they are; and who they are serves as the measure of good and bad.

Once the meaning of good and bad has been established, a theory of justice grows up on its basis. Justice for the strong amounted to a simple sense of proportionality: when an individual incurs a debt, he must discharge it by repaying it and/or submitting to retributive punishment. Nietzsche implies that, for the strong, facing up to wrongdoing and accepting punishment was largely a matter of honor, so in societies governed by the noble valuation justice was usually meted out quickly and brutally.

The preconditions were now in place for the birth of the gods. In Nietzsche's view, polytheistic religions emerged out of the stories that the strong told themselves about their long-forgotten, prehistoric origins. First, they imagined that the founders of their community were just like them, only stronger—and they developed rituals of sacrifice that enabled them to express gratitude and discharge imagined debts to these founders. Then, as their community grew in power and extent over time, the founders that the strong projected onto the past became even stronger. Eventually, the founders came to be thought of as gods, who served as noble ideals for the strong to emulate as they sought to cultivate their power and cruelty.

According to Nietzsche, it was within this context of divinely sanctioned oppression that an epochal "transvaluation of values" took place. This "slave revolt in morality" began when the weak—out of what Nietzsche calls their *ressentiment* and their "spirit of revenge" against the strong—started to teach a series of radically new and ingenious ideas. To begin with, they claimed for the first time that there is such a thing as free will, so the brutal actions of the strong, far from being simply "what they do," came to be understood as the result of a choice. The weak then likewise asserted that their own failure to triumph over the strong was a result of the choice to refrain from such actions, rather than an inability to do so. For the slavish revolutionaries, all human beings are tempted by "sin" to engage in "evil," and the strong are noteworthy above all else for their decision to embrace and even encourage such behavior, while the weak define their lives by the struggle to resist it. Thus it comes to be that what was formerly considered *bad*—namely, weakness—is christened as the highest *good*, while the formerly *good*—namely, strength—is transformed into *evil*.

In this way, the slaves (obviously the Jews and their Christian descendants) fashioned a life-denying "ascetic ideal" to replace the life-affirming valuation of the strong. Along with it comes the notion of a new kind of deity—a God above all other gods, to whom each of us owes a debt—an "original sin"—so great that we are powerless to discharge it on our own, without His gratuitous gift of redeeming grace. Unlike the gods of the strong, who behaved like outsized brutes and whose cruelty served as an attainable ideal for the strong to emulate, the God of the slaves is so transcendently good that all attempts to approximate His holiness inevitably fall short. Far from serving as a healthy ideal, then, the ascetic God ends up negating the world and everything in it, including human beings, by His very existence.

The ascetic ideal that gives birth to God is thus much more complicated than the valuation that preceded it. Whereas the noble valuation grew out of and enhanced the self-affirmation of the strong, the slaves adhere to an ideal that denigrates pride and therefore seeks to diminish and humiliate the self. And yet it, like all valuations, arises from out of the self and its will to power. As Nietzsche writes in *Human, All Too Human*, "Man takes positive pleasure in violating himself with excessive demands and afterwards idolizing this tyrannically demanding something in his soul. In every ascetic morality, man worships one part of himself as a god and in doing so demonizes the other part." In the *Genealogy*, Nietzsche describes this violent "self-splitting" as an example of how "life" can turn "against life," and, in turn, actually enhance life in new and interesting ways. In seeking to attain the impossible—to become "worthy" of a God whose goodness transcends the world—the ascetic slave directs his own will against itself, and thus creates a wholly new form of cultural life founded on guilt and bad conscience. It is a culture of psychological depravity, as individuals, tutored by a new ruling class of priests, come to despise themselves, and never so much as when they begin to experience the least bit of happiness or success.

Nietzsche's account of how the ascetic ideal gives birth to God is ingenious. But no less so is his narrative of how it leads to God's death, as well as its own self-destruction. Nietzsche's narrative derives much of its shock effect from the fact that it so profoundly contradicts the dominant story of the rise of modern science, in Nietzsche's time as well as ours. While modern intellectuals typically argue that science arose in opposition to the Church, Nietzsche considers science to represent the "perfection" of the same ascetic ideal that originally gave birth to Christianity.

In Nietzsche's view, science is marked by an unwavering belief in the goodness of truth—and the conviction that one reaches this truth by negating the world in a way that is similar to, but much more radical than, the method employed by Christianity. Christianity claims,

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for example, that human life is stained by sin and then negates the former by calling on the righteous to overcome the latter. But science goes much further in its negation of the world, to deny the distinction—or at least to stress the similarities—between man and "lower" entities. Biology reduces us to the level of other organisms, chemistry tells us that we are comprised of the same elements as inanimate objects, and physics underlines the continuity between human beings and all the matter in the universe. In the light of modern science, the differentiation of the human world into kinds of things lacks a foundation in the natural world. Science thus dissolves the distinctions that make meaning possible.

Of course most professional scientists do not follow through so rigorously on the implications of their approach to understanding the world, but that is irrelevant to Nietzsche. What matters to him is that modern Western culture is permeated by an ethic of ascetic reductionism that seeks to tear down all existing cultural structures. One need not work in a laboratory to further the ascetic ideal. On the contrary, as we learn toward the end of the *Genealogy,* Nietzsche understands his own thought to represent the ultimate consummation of the ascetic ideal—the moment at which "science" unmasks itself as the perfection of the ascetic ideal, and, in turn, discovers that this ideal is an arbitrary valuation projected onto reality in order to derive a sense of purpose in the face of chaos. It is in this way that the ascetic ideal manages both to give birth to and then to kill the Christian God.

Nietzsche thus concludes the *Genealogy* as he began *The Birth of Tragedy,* by asserting that, when faced with the ugly truth of things, mankind responds by producing illusions that come to be taken as true—until they are eventually exposed for the lies that they are. The *Genealogy* adds the twist that this very process is said to be driven by the character of the lies Western man has believed in. That is, the ascetic ideal is a lie that eventually demands its own exposure as a lie. As Nietzsche writes in the penultimate aphorism of the *Genealogy*: "Unconditional honest atheism . . . is the awe-inspiring *catastrophe* of two thousand years of training in truthfulness that finally forbids itself the *lie involved in belief in God.*"

How are we to respond to the complete collapse of the moral valuation that has reigned for two millennia? Nietzsche offers no answer in the *Genealogy,* which ends as it began—with meaningless chaos. Other works are somewhat more helpful, however. The speech of the "madman" from *The Joyful Science,* for example, provides a hint. Shortly after declaring that we have killed God, the madman asks a series of rhetorical questions:

> How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers? What was holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet owned has bled to death under our knives: who will wipe this blood off of us? What water is there for us to clean ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we have to invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? *Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it?* (Emphasis added)

Here Nietzsche indicates that the death of God requires that we take His place by becoming a race of gods. The meaning of this extraordinary suggestion is elaborated most fully in *Thus Spake Zarathustra* (1883-1885), easily the most difficult book in Nietzsche's corpus.

In one of the most fascinating passages of his biography, Safranski recounts how Nietzsche first came to the idea of writing *Zarathustra* by way of a quasi-revelatory experience of inspiration near the Surlej boulder in the Upper Engadine mountains of Switzerland on August 6, 1881. There, on the shores of an alpine lake, Nietzsche felt as though he were "a mere incarnation, a mere mouthpiece, a mere medium of overpowering forces." The religious character of his experience is fitting, for the book he was inspired to write stands as Nietzsche's answer to the Bible. It tells the story of a man named Zarathustra, who, at the age of thirty, "left his home . . . and went into the mountains" for a life of complete solitude. Then, ten years later, he resolves to return to civilization, to share his incomparable wisdom with humanity.

Upon his return he discovers that, although his fellow human beings are oblivious to the fact that "God is dead," His passing has begun to have significant detrimental effects on mankind. Among the most memorable passages in *Zarathustra* is the account of the "last man," who, in God's absence, believes he has "invented happiness." This last man no longer strives for anything great, he is too cautious to stand out from the "herd," he consumes various "poisons" to ensure an "agreeable sleep" and an "agreeable death," and he looks back on all of human history with a smug sense of his own superiority. Such a man is one step away from becoming so "poor and domesticated" that he will no longer "shoot the arrow of his longing beyond man." Without a God to look up to, man is on the verge of becoming less than human.

And yet ours is not an age for despair. As Nietzsche's Zarathustra declares as he gazes in disgust at the last man, "The time has come for man to set himself a goal. The time has come for man to plant the seed of his highest hope." The death of God therefore presents, in addition to great dangers, an extraordinary opportunity.

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While we may very well become subhuman, we may also transform ourselves into something superhuman. Thus does Zarathustra describe his purpose: "I teach you the Overman." Combining the Social Darwinism so common in the late nineteenth century with his own unique brand of anthropo-theological speculation, Nietzsche's Zarathustra announces that "man is something that shall be overcome."

> What is the ape to man? A laughingstock or a painful embarrassment. And man shall be just that for the Overman: a laughingstock or a painful embarrassment. You have made your way from worm to man, and much in you is still worm. . . . Man is a rope tied between beast and Overman—a rope over an abyss. A dangerous across, a dangerous on-the-way, a dangerous looking-back, a dangerous shuddering and stopping. What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not an end.

Man, then, is poised to evolve into a god through his own efforts. But what will make possible such a monumental transformation? The answer lies in the most peculiar doctrine of Nietzsche's philosophy: the "eternal recurrence of the same," which he first (and most lucidly) presented in an allegorical aphorism of *The Joyful Science* titled "The Greatest Weight." It is worth quoting in its entirety:

> What if some day or night a demon were to steal after you into your loneliest loneliness and say to you, "This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything immeasurably small or great in your life must return to you, all in the same succession and sequence—even this spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even this moment and I myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside down again and again, and you with it, a speck of dust!" Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment when you would have answered him, "You are a god, and never have I heard anything more divine." If this thought gained possession of you, it would change you as you are, or perhaps crush you. The question in each and every thing, "Do you desire this once more and innumerable times more?" would lie upon your actions as the greatest weight. Or how well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life to *crave nothing more fervently* than this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal?

While this passage makes it sound as if the doctrine of the eternal recurrence serves as a quasi-mythical Kantian postulate—proclaiming that we should act *as if* it were true despite knowing that it is not—Safranski shows that Nietzsche experienced a kind of euphoria upon discovering what he thought was definitive scientific evidence for its reality and truth. Apparently Nietzsche believed that the finite amount of matter and energy in the universe, combined with its temporal infinity, implied (in Safranski's words) that "all possible events pertaining to both the animate and the inanimate realms have already taken place, and . . . will recur ad infinitum."

But regardless of whether Nietzsche considered the doctrine to be scientifically verifiable or merely a substitute for the neopagan Wagnerian myths he embraced in his youth, there can be no doubt that he thought of it as the key to man's absolute affirmation of himself and the world—and even (what may amount to the same thing) his own self-divination. As the allegory of the demon makes clear, Nietzsche believed that if human beings could come to incorporate the eternal recurrence into their view of the world—to view every second of their lives as a moment worthy of being repeated infinite times, rather than as a prelude to a truer or better world to come—they would, in effect, confer the dignity of the eternal onto this world. As Safranski writes, "All the ecstasy, all the bliss, all the ascensions of feeling, all the hunger for intensity previously projected into the beyond would now be concentrated in the immediate life of the here and now. The doctrine of the eternal recurrence was designed to function by preserving the powers of transcendence for immanence or, as Zarathustra proclaimed, remaining 'faithful to the earth.'"

But what about the past? Even assuming that we could come to believe in the truth of the eternal recurrence, would we not face the dilemma that, as Martin Heidegger put it, each of us is "thrown" into a world we did not create? Whereas our present and future emerge, at least to some extent, out of our choices, our past is given to us. Nevertheless, Nietzsche appears to have believed that once we had affirmed our present and future, affirmation of our past would follow in its wake. After all, if the person I am today is worth affirming for all eternity, then the person I once was must be equally worthy, since my past self made my present self possible. When I begin to think of myself in this way, I not only accept the necessity of my fate and its role in making me who I am, but I also come to love that fate

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(*amor fati*). In fact, my affirmation of my own past can expand to such an extent that I begin to act as if I could will it. And when that happens, my will comes to fill the entire meaningful universe—past, present, and future. In such a world, man has definitively taken the place of God. Or, as Nietzsche's Zarathustra puts it in a cryptic but crucially important passage:

> . . . as creator, guesser of riddles, and redeemer of accidents, I taught them to work on the future and to redeem with their creation all that has been. To redeem what is past in man and to recreate all "it was" until the will says, "Thus I willed it! Thus I shall will it"—this I called redemption and this alone I taught them to call redemption.

Nietzsche wanted nothing less than to make us totally at home in the world, and he understood that this monumental task could be accomplished only by convincing us that we possess the power to redeem it, all by ourselves, without God.

Nietzsche devoted the final years of his sanity to thinking through the conundrums generated by his antitheological ire. For some time he hoped to present a systematic summary of the views he first sketched in *Thus Spake Zarathustra*. But the book he envisioned, tentatively titled *The Will to Power: Attempt at a Revaluation of All Values*, was not to be. Although he produced a flood of aphoristic and increasingly hyperbolic books between 1886 and 1888—*Beyond Good and Evil*, *The Genealogy of Morals*, *Twilight of the Idols*, *The Antichrist*, the autobiographical *Ecce Homo*, and hundreds of pages of notebook entries that have been subsequently (and somewhat deceptively) published as *The Will to Power*—his magnum opus never materialized.

Yet we have reason to think that Nietzsche himself came to believe, in his madness, that he had attained the self-divination he longed for. In January 1889, just after his hysterical collapse in the streets of Turin at the sight of a carriage driver beating a horse, and a few weeks before being institutionalized in a psychiatric clinic, Nietzsche wrote a letter to the esteemed historian Jacob Burckhardt, in which he declared that "in the end I would much rather be a Basel professor than God; but I have not dared to carry my private egotism to the point that I would desist from the creation of the world." And then there was the letter to a friend, Peter Gast, comprised of a single sentence:

> To my maëstro Pietro:
> Sing me a new song: the world is transfigured and all the heavens are full of joy.
> The Crucified

Nietzsche went on to live eleven years in a semi-catatonic state, dying in 1900, on the threshold of a century that he had predicted would be one of world-wide wars and unprecedented violence. Ever since he slipped into psychosis, it has been a commonplace for romantic interpreters of Nietzsche's life and thought to conclude that he, like Novalis, Friedrich Hölderlin, and many other modern philosophers, poets, and artists, was driven mad by his own heroic efforts to grasp the truth in all of its horror. For these admirers, Nietzsche deserves to be considered a selfless martyr to thinking in its purist form. Aside from the fact that such an interpretation simply dismisses the theory accepted by most scholars—namely, that Nietzsche's breakdown was caused by an advanced case of syphilis—it also accepts without question that Nietzsche was right to think that the truth stands radically opposed to the beautiful and the good. Since nearly every word he ever wrote flows from this assumption, any attempt to evaluate Nietzsche's work as a whole must confront it head on.

Unfortunately, Safranski contributes little to such a confrontation. At some points he offers the banal observation that Nietzsche's books are motivated by the "will to an unceasing adventure in thinking." At others, he ventures a more creative, but no less unhelpful, suggestion that Nietzsche should have consistently advocated a "bicameral system of culture." Building on an image Nietzsche employed in *Human, All Too Human*, Safranski suggests that it is possible on Nietzschean grounds to conceive of a culture in which "one chamber [is] heated up by the passions of genius while the other [is] cooled off with principles of common sense and balanced out with collective pragmatism." Safranski believes that if Nietzsche had endorsed such a two-fold conception of truth—one for radical artist-philosophers, another for moderate practical men—he could have pursued his adventure in thinking without "abandon[ing] the idea of democracy and justice."

As appealing as Safranski's proposal might sound—enabling us to have, as it were, the best of both worlds—it has numerous problems. To begin with, as Safranski himself points out, Nietzsche would have judged the attempt to hold on to any form of democratic morality an example of the "feeble compromise [and] indecisiveness" that he associates with the nihilistic "last men." Then there is the more fundamental difficulty that in Nietzsche's thought everything flows from his conviction that *the* truth is meaningless chaos and flux. For Nietzsche, it is simply impossible for there to be two equally valid truths; there can only be the ugly truth itself and the noble lies that mask it to one degree or another. Although in places Nietzsche does suggest an aristocratic arrangement in which an elite of philosophic geniuses pursues the truth while their slaves go about

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their lives immersed in illusions, one assumes that this is not what Safranski has in mind.

But if Safranski's explicitly critical suggestions do not help us to assess Nietzsche's ideas, he does prepare a more philosophically serious reckoning with them by showing so clearly that atheistic meaninglessness is the premise, rather than the conclusion, of his thought. How can we begin to evaluate this Nietzschean antifaith? We find a compelling suggestion in the thought of Nietzsche's early nemesis, Socrates. In two of Plato's dialogues, Socrates confronts characters who espouse proto-Nietzschean views. For both Thrasymachus in the *Republic* and Callicles in the *Gorgias*, morality has no foundation in the order of things, which is utterly indifferent to human concerns, and justice is nothing other than "the rule of the stronger." The parallels to Nietzsche's view, especially as he articulates it in the *Genealogy*, are uncanny.

It is instructive that in examining the opinions of these sophistical antimoralists, Socrates does not attempt to refute them using logic or empirical evidence of one kind or another. Rather, he takes what might be called a psychological approach. He attempts to show them that they are less consistently opposed to the good than they profess themselves to be. In the case of Thrasymachus, for example, Socrates' dialectical questioning reveals a fundamental tension in his soul. On the one hand, Thrasymachus believes that "might makes right"—that the victor in a struggle for power demonstrates that he deserves his victory in the very act of winning it. But on the other hand, he admires the intelligence and cunning that enables certain individuals to triumph over others—so much so, in fact, that he finds the thought of an unintelligent man winning power to be deeply distasteful. Such a brute would not, in other words, deserve his victory. Thrasymachus, it seems, looks up to something besides mere power. Although he claims to orient his life toward nothing but force and violence, part of him believes in a higher good.

Might not Nietzsche be vulnerable to a similar self-refutation? In his case, the tension arises from his reaction to the triumph of the weak over the strong in the slave revolt. On the basis of the theory sketched in the *Genealogy*, there is no basis for opposition to their victory. As it was for Thrasymachus, the very act of victory demonstrates that the triumphant party deserves to rule. One might even say that in the act of overpowering the strong, the weak effectively *become* the strong and thus ipso facto deserving of power.

And yet, Nietzsche reacts to the overthrow of the noble valuation with anything but equanimity. Not only are his works suffused with grand schemes to bring about a rebirth of a brutal aristocratic order in the modern period, but Safranski helpfully notes that, when it came to the public policy debates of his day, Nietzsche invariably sided against the vulnerable. He rejected "shortening the length of the workday from twelve hours a day to eleven in Basel." He was "a proponent of child labor, noting with approval that Basel permitted children over the age of twelve to work up to eleven hours a day." He opposed the education of workers and thought that the only consideration in their treatment should be whether (in Nietzsche's words) their "descendants also work well for our descendants." Nietzsche was a consistent partisan of the strong against the weak in every aspect of life.

The reason why Nietzsche took such a brutal position becomes apparent in a passage of *Twilight of the Idols* (1888) in which he rails against the French Revolution and Jean-Jacques Rousseau's defense of the common man:

> What I hate [about the French Revolution] is its Rousseauean morality—the so-called "truths" of the Revolution through which it still works and attracts everything shallow and mediocre. The doctrine of equality! There is no more poisonous poison anywhere: for it seems to be preached by justice itself, whereas it really is the termination of justice. "Equal to the equal, unequal to the unequal"—that would be the true slogan of justice; and also its corollary: "Never make equal what is unequal."

What is astonishing about this passage is not so much what it says about justice; virtually every political philosopher in Western history would have agreed that justice demands "equal to the equal, unequal to the unequal." What is remarkable about the statement is that Nietzsche endorses its truth and resolves on its basis that human equality is fundamentally contrary to justice. One cannot help but conclude that Nietzsche—the man who gleefully proclaimed in a book titled *Beyond Good and Evil* that it was his goal to "sail right *over* morality"—was himself a perverse kind of moralist concerned above all about the injustice of shallowness and mediocrity. It is even possible to speculate that Nietzsche's visceral hostility to democracy, compassion, peace, equal human dignity, and perhaps even God Himself, may have been motivated by a love for a particularly one-sided, profoundly distorted vision of justice. (Our best guide to the half-hidden moral dimension of Nietzsche's thought is Peter Berkowitz's masterful study, *Nietzsche: The Ethics of an Immoralist* [1995].)

At the very least, it seems obvious that despite Nietzsche's incessant denial of any possible foundation for a higher good in the order of things, he could not help

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but presuppose that such a good exists and that it has been violated by the rise of social and political equality. The presence of a similar psychological dynamic in Thrasymachus and a number of Socrates' other interlocutors eventually led Plato to conclude that the Idea of the Good exceeds all things—even being itself—"in dignity and power." Aristotle likewise chose to begin the *Nicomachean Ethics* with the declaration that "every art and inquiry, and similarly every human action and deliberate choice, . . . aims at some good." Of course neither philosopher meant that every human action or idea truly *is* good; indeed, philosophizing consists in ascending from erroneous opinions about the good to knowledge of what it truly is. However, they did mean to suggest that, even when we choose or contemplate evil, we do so at least in part because, somewhere in our souls, we mistake it for a good. For the ancient philosophers, love of the good is coeval with the human condition.

For such a statement, as for so many others, Nietzsche would have nothing but contempt. No doubt he would describe it as yet another example of unwarranted Socratic "optimism." And perhaps it is. Nothing in the texts of the philosophers can prove that the good as they conceived it truly exists—that it is not merely a beautiful illusion we project onto the void. Yet there it is, there it always has been, and there it will remain—our lodestar and magnetic north, determining the shape of human reflection even among those who devote their lives to cutting themselves off from it.

And so we are faced with a choice. We can follow Nietzsche in refusing to take our philosophical bearings from prephilosophical intimations of the good. Or we can place our trust in those intimations, allowing the good that is reflected in common opinion and experience to serve as an indication—however tentative, ambiguous, or elusive—of what is likely to be true. Attempt to break from the good or accept that, in the end, it is the only orientation we have: those are the options. After a very long century of delusional and bloody experiments against the good, we do not lack for reasons to turn our backs on Nietzsche's truth. FT

Ruy Dias

In this world I managed to survive
a few short years, full of misery,
before the lights of day were taken from me,
much too soon, by the age of twenty-five.
Across vast seas in distant lands, I tried
to find some remedy for life. But when
the Fates say no, despite your efforts, again
and again, you end up defeated and unsatisfied.
Raised in Portugal, in the fertile lands
of Alemquer, I die a refugee,
dead from the foreign air and its foul decay,
food for the hungry fish in a brutish sea,
that crashes against these wild Abyssinian sands,
so unlike Alemquer, and so far away.

Luís de Camões (1524/25-1580)
Translated from the Portuguese by William Baer

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Books In Review

Returning to Reason Reasonably

RETURN TO REASON. By STEPHEN TOULMIN. *Harvard University Press. 243 pp. $24.95.*

***Reviewed by* Peter Berkowitz**

STEPHEN TOULMIN'S *Return to Reason* provides an occasion to reflect on the remarkable fact that our faith in reason is currently on the decline—and that our professors are taking the lead in killing it.

Of course that part of reasoning that involves the ability to calculate and create is prospering. We continue to produce an astronomical amount of data, to acquire ever greater knowledge of facts and figures, and to invent awe-inspiring machines that enable us to manipulate nature with ever greater precision and that make our lives more comfortable and secure (as well as those that menace us and threaten our species' very existence).

The part of reason in which our faith has been faltering concerns the moral life. One hears the distrust in ordinary talk. Projecting a certain humility, sophisticated people say of this action or that practice, "Who am I to judge?", by which they really mean, somewhat aggressively, "Who are you or anybody else to judge?" In the academy, the often thoughtless live-and-let-live liberal relativism of the 1970s and '80s opened the door in many disciplines to forms of thought that disparaged or denied the ability of reason to distinguish soundly between good and evil, to accurately discern moral principles, and to justly rank rival ways of life.

These days the academic attack on reasoning about the moral life comes from many quarters. In some cases it has less to do with what a discipline says than with what the discipline will not allow, or deems of too little significance, to be said. Economic analysis, for example, assumes that human beings are rational maximizers of their satisfactions. Its object of study is what people actually desire, the cost of satisfying those desires, and how institutions and rules can be reformed so as to make the satisfaction of desire more efficient. With the exception perhaps of the examination of the ground rules that every person should desire because they would make everybody better off, what people ought to desire is not generally thought of as a meaningful question within the field of economics. Or as it is sometimes said, the enterprise of economics is value-neutral.

This approach, powerful and of undoubted utility in its own realm, especially in dealing with commercial activity and large-scale social phenomena, would not be troubling were economic analysis confined to economics departments or what is conventionally thought of as the economic sphere. Over the last thirty years or so, however, political scientists and legal scholars have been increasingly drawn to explaining politics and law in economic terms, and by now economic analysis has achieved a dominant position in both disciplines. This too would not be troubling, given the impressive power of economic analysis to explain the costs of various commercial and political and legal alternatives, were it not for the aspiration of many of those who wield economic analysis to extend it to all areas of moral and political life. The implication—liberating to many, disconcerting to those who think it unreasonable to reduce human motivation to self-interest narrowly understood—is that all of human life can be explained without recourse to reasoning about justice and the good.

LIKE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, analytic philosophy, which is the bread and butter of most Anglo-American philosophy departments, refrains on principle from reasoning about the moral life. To be sure, the intense investigation of the premises and implications of all sorts of concepts to which analytic philosophers are devoted includes the investigation of moral concepts. But by and large academic philosophy confines itself to evaluating a concept's internal coherence, not its truth or falsity.

In spirit, postmodernism, which has its base in literature departments but has enthusiastic adherents throughout the humanities and also in political science and law, may appear to be the antithesis of both economic analysis and analytic philosophy. Whereas the former are devoted to that indispensable part of reasoning sometimes called rationality—the finding of general patterns in the world through empirical observation and the evaluation of the logical relation between concepts—postmodernism sets out from the assumption that all patterns are arbitrary constructions, that truth as well as logic are human inventions, and that all aspects of life are contingent and revisable. Indeed, whereas economic analysis and analytic philosophy represent a kind of hyper-rationality, postmodernism represents a kind of hyper-antirationality. But in rejecting all forms of reasoning, including reasoning about the moral life, postmodernism actually joins forces with economic analysis and analytic philosophy to shut down serious, systematic inquiry into questions about the virtues and the good.

Many political theorists have thought that proceduralism, associated above all with the name of John

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Rawls, provides a solution to the rampant disparagement or denial of the possibility of reasoning about the moral life. By searching for fair rules under which everybody in principle could agree to live, proceduralism shifts the focus from questions about virtue and substantive human goods to those about formal requirements and abstract principles, while still prescribing some practices and policies and proscribing others. In the end, though, proceduralism represents a strategy of avoidance. And an inadequate one at that. For one thing, it presupposes a morally binding equality among human beings for which it has neither argument nor explanation. For another, it insinuates that the elaboration of a fair process for reaching decisions about how our collective life ought to be arranged is all there is for reason to say about morality, once again implicitly affirming the incapacity of reason, in connection to the virtues and the human good, to say anything useful.

Toulmin, a distinguished professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California, thinks the decline of reason must be arrested and reversed. Indeed, he sees promising indications, particularly in the recent resurgence of interest in pragmatism. But before we can truly recover our bearings, we must first understand the causes of the current mess. In fact, argues Toulmin, the decline of reason is nothing new. Contemporary intellectual life is an expression of developments set in motion at the dawn of modernity. Our ideas about reason have a history, and by recounting that history Toulmin means to prepare our liberation from the clutches of the false notions that have reduced reason to rationality or, in the case of postmodernism, have sought to cast irrationality as our fate.

Although Toulmin provides a fascinating array of anecdotes, particularly about his teacher Wittgenstein, and devotes many pages to chronicling technical debates in twentieth-century academic philosophy, the overarching story line he offers is familiar to students of the history of ideas. Reason lost its balance, according to Toulmin, in the seventeenth century. For almost two millennia before that, philosophy, the disciplined exercise of human reason, had been understood to comprise "the systematic and methodical treatment of any subject." From astronomy and geometry to autobiographical essays and historical narrative and everything in between, philosophy took its subject matter as it found it, and fashioned its inquiries, as Aristotle advised in the beginning of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, in accordance with the standards of precision inherent in the subject itself. In the seventeenth century, however, with the astonishing triumphs of Newton's mathematical physics, mathematical precision came to be seen as the one and only standard of precision. Traditional speculation about human nature, about the passions, about virtue and vice, about first principles, could not meet this exacting standard, so such speculation was deemed unphilosophical and excluded from the domain of that which could be reasoned about.

Philosophy, however, tried to adapt. In particular, moral and political philosophy attempted to model themselves on geometry. The prestige obtained by the effective predictions of the natural sciences helped give birth to the human sciences, which meant the replacement of the humanities by the study of human conduct modeled on the natural sciences. As the Enlightenment unfolded, theoretical abstraction and logical deduction replaced observation of human beings in human contexts. A premium was placed on the ability to demonstrate as against the power to illuminate. Disciplines emerged, which allowed for specialization, but also consigned ethics to its own intellectual corner, as if it were a separate and distinct inquiry with no necessary or integral relation to the other disciplines. The culmination of what Toulmin calls the "dreams of rationalism" can be seen in the twenty-first century university, dominated on one side by an arid rationality and on the other by an arid postmodern rejection of rationality.



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How shall we extricate ourselves from this mess? How shall we restore reason's rightful role in guiding moral and political life? The answer, suggests Toulmin, consists first in taking the measure of our loss and then embracing and extending the rebellion led by John Dewey at the beginning of the twentieth century, in the name of pragmatism, against the "quest for certainty" in moral and political life. This means, for Toulmin, recognizing that the vast array of topics that present themselves to the inquiring mind demand different methods and different standards of precision. It means dissolving the rigid intellectual hierarchy according to which the hard sciences are more respectable than the soft social sciences and the soft social sciences are more respectable than what is left of the squishy humanities. It means appreciating the vital importance of thick cultural description, of the sort exemplified by the work of Clifford Geertz, not so as to replace the discovery of general truths, but so as to place the discovery on a more solid foundation. It means cultivating what Aristotle called *phronesis*, the practical judgment that is acquired through experience. And it means respecting rhetoric—which is not merely the art of wily speech but of persuasive speech in general—since how people speak serves both to conceal and reveal the beliefs that inform and affect their actions.

These are all useful correctives. But none have exclusively or even primarily Deweyan roots. And what is primary to Dewey's pragmatism Toulmin takes too far. Way too far.

"Dewey," Toulmin asserts, "was right to suggest that Pragmatism is not just one theory on a par with all others. Rather, it represents a change of view, which puts *theorizing* on a par with all other practical activities." This is right insofar as it fairly captures Dewey's ambition to disenchant theory and the world that theory comprehends. But Toulmin is wrong to affirm Dewey's disenchantment of theory and the world as a principal achievement supporting the return to reason. For the reduction of theory to a form of practice is itself an aggressive act of theorizing. And it is one that is false to experience and hamstrings reflection about the moral life.

The Deweyan question—"What forms of life support, and rely on, one or another variety of substantive knowledge?"—is a good one. Alas, by putting theorizing on a par with all other activities, Dewey surreptitiously imposed theoretical limits on what philosophy can ask and the kinds of answers it can offer. We need to know not only the relation between forms of life and varieties of substantive knowledge, but also which forms of life to prefer, and which enable human beings to flourish. Here Dewey's pragmatism falls silent or collapses into trite prescriptions about extending democracy to more and more areas of life. In fact, Dewey's pragmatism is too hostile to theory, too rigid in its repudiation of metaphysics, too resolute in its contempt for religion to serve as a guide in the restoration of reason. Under the guise of liberating the human mind, Deweyan pragmatism forecloses too many lines of worthy inquiry and valid human options.

What is needed today is the cultivation of something much more akin to Socratic skepticism and Millian many-sidedness, both of which take as their point of departure the variety of ways of being human, have as their object the truth about man and his nature, and in principle demand a genuine openness to opinions—including the opinion that proclaims that for all our efforts to blot out its signs and intimations, we live in an ordered and enchanted universe. To restore faith in reason we must return to it reasonably.


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The Limits of Theory

FACING UP: SCIENCE AND ITS CULTURAL ADVERSARIES. By STEVEN WEINBERG. *Harvard University Press. 283 pp. $26.*

***Reviewed by* Wolfhart Pannenberg**

WHILE HIS PROFESSIONAL WORK is primarily in elementary particle physics, Steven Weinberg became widely known to the general public with the publication of a book on cosmology, *The First Three Minutes* (1977), which presented a lucid and fascinating story of the early development of the universe with style and elegance. His new book, *Facing Up: Science and Its Cultural Adversaries*, which consists of a collection of twenty-three equally well-written essays, documents the personal commitment of the author to promoting and defending his scientific views. Weinberg captures the interest of his readers by combining balanced judgments and modest claims about current scientific theory with a passionate defense of reductionism.

While Weinberg defends reductionism, he is careful to distinguish it both from what he calls "positivism," which he understands to be a narrow empiricism, and from "petty reductionism," which seeks to reduce everything to elementary particles. The reductionism Weinberg advocates is the program of reductive explanation of physical phenomena by recourse to ever more fundamental and simple laws that are supposed to account for the unity of the universe. He shows that this was already Newton's vision and continued to be the driving force behind the great theories of the last century, those of General Relativity and the standard quantum field theory. Going further, he predicts that such reductionism will one day produce a "final" theory that can account for the unity of the universe.

Up to this point, Weinberg's defense of reductionism makes considerable sense. Yet the question remains as to whether explanation by laws provides the only or the ultimate explanation for the unity of the universe. The concept of law involves abstraction from particularities, but those particularities have to be taken into consideration when those laws are applied to the course of natural events. With regard to the history of the universe, Weinberg himself speaks of "historical contingencies" in the history of the solar system and in the development of life. He also acknowledges the idea of an "emergence" of forms of higher organization from increasingly complicated systems. But doesn't that suggest that the unity of the universe is finally a unity of history, which is different from the generality of laws? And history is always a sequence of contingent events, regardless of the laws that may prevail within the flow of those events. Perhaps, then, the modesty of the scientist might properly be applied to his larger project of subsuming the universe as a whole under a universal concept of law. Such a modest approach might have to give up the quest for the ultimate and most comprehensive description of the nature of the universe. But it would make room for some additional, philosophical reflection on the reality of nature.

ONE OF THE MOST important contributions of Weinberg's book is his ongoing argument against the "social constructionists" who question the truth claims of science. This is an issue of very general importance, far beyond the philosophy of science. With every assertive sentence, we raise truth claims that cannot be reduced to social conventions. Science is only a particularly obvious case. Weinberg acknowledges the influence of social and cultural conditions in the history of science. But these influences do not weaken the truth claims of scientific theories. The same is true of any other truth claims we raise in everyday life or in other fields of culture. The "realism" of science, which Weinberg advocates, might serve as an example and antidote against the excesses of postmodernism.

The "cultural adversaries" of science to whom Weinberg refers in his title are those social constructionists who tend to relativize the truth claims of scientific theories. But even worse than these academic theorists would be an alliance between the "antiscientific intelligentsia inside the universities" and "the enormous force of religious belief." Here, apparently, he has in mind the religious fundamentalism of the creationists. But could such an alliance pose a real threat to the cultural acceptance of science? Is not

WOLFHART PANNENBERG *is Professor Emeritus of Systematic Theology at the University of Munich and founding director of the Institute of Ecumenical Theology.*

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science pampered by the political establishment in Western societies like no other intellectual discipline? Among the general public, scientists are highly regarded, and most religious people share in that positive appreciation of science, since they do not believe that science and religion are opposed to one another.

While in the course of modern history there have been occasions when science has opposed religious teaching as well as other traditional ways of looking at the world, the most creative scientists have far more often been motivated by religious inspiration. Moreover, Christian theologians and churchmen have frequently and gratefully received the new perspectives offered by scientific discoveries. This is true even in the case of Darwinism, which was one of a number of evolutionary theories proposed in the nineteenth century, many of which arose from religious reflection. At the present moment, when the number of institutions that seek to foster dialogue between religion and science continues to grow, most religious people view science as a positive pursuit that at the deepest level harmonizes with their faith.

In fact, such a positive attitude is arguably easier to maintain at the present moment than it was in earlier centuries, since Big Bang cosmology removes the apparent contradiction between the biblical doctrine of creation and the belief in a temporal and spatial infinity of the world that had been taken for granted during two centuries of scientific exploration. Of course, the assumption of an origin of the universe at some finite point in the past does not "prove" the biblical doctrine of creation, but it is "consonant" with it, to invoke the useful term of Ernan McMullin.

THE SAME APPLIES to the idea of God as creator. Weinberg takes a skeptical position on this matter, and some of his arguments are not without plausibility. He dealt with this issue more extensively in his earlier book *Dreams of a Final Theory* (1993), in which he devoted an entire chapter to "the question of God." Even a Christian theologian can share Weinberg's reservations concerning the stronger versions of the anthropic principle and the related idea of a "designer God." The idea of a designer sounds rather anthropomorphic, and it is often presented in forms that are hardly consonant with God's infinity and eternity. In the Bible, the contingency of finite reality, of each event and even of the world as a whole, including the element of

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order within it, is far more important in expressing its dependence upon God the creator.

Weinberg has little to say on this issue, which is decisive for those who maintain the rationality of belief in a creator God. The element of design enters the picture only as an implication that follows from the act of creation and God's ongoing relation to the universe as a whole—a whole within which every part has its proper place. Of course, such a view culminates in the problems of theodicy, and here the Christian has to join Weinberg in affirming that all of our knowledge is approximation, even our theology. Not until the eschatological consummation of history will we know even as we are known by God (1 Corinthians 13:12).

A Friend of the Jews

PIUS XII AND THE HOLOCAUST: UNDERSTANDING THE CONTROVERSY. By JOSE M. SANCHEZ. *Catholic University of America Press. 197 pp. $39.95.*

POPES AND POLITICS: REFORM, RESENTMENT, AND THE HOLOCAUST. by JUSTUS GEORGE LAWLER. *Continuum. 252 pp. $24.95.*

***Reviewed by* David G. Dalin**

THE ONGOING DEBATE about Pope Pius XII (Eugenio Pacelli) and his actions (or lack of actions) in response to the Holocaust has gained intensity over the past few years. Books defending the pontiff by Ronald J. Rychlak, Pierre Blet, Margherita Marchione, and Ralph McInerny have been matched by others that seek to castigate him. Susan Zuccotti's *Under His Very Windows: The Vatican and the Holocaust in Italy* is an unremitting attack on Pius, while John Cornwell's *Hitler's Pope*, Garry Wills' *Papal Sin*, and James Carroll's *Constantine's Sword* go further—to treat Pius' supposed failings as an indication of the pathologies that permeate the Catholic Church as a whole. In the anti-papal diatribe he published in the January 21, 2002 issue of the *New Republic* ("What Would Jesus Have Done?"), Daniel Jonah Goldhagen took this strategy to a new level, seamlessly weaving together vicious attacks on the Pope and blatant anti-Catholicism (see Rychlak's reply to Goldhagen in FT, June/July 2002).

In their new books, Jose M. Sanchez and Justus George Lawler adopt a more moderate approach to Pius, seeking to understand and explain the enduring controversy surrounding him rather than to defend or defame him. In *Pius XII and the Holocaust*, Sanchez critically examines Pius' behavior during the Holocaust and compares it to the charges leveled against him by his many critics. For his part, Lawler devotes some of *Popes and Politics* to a thoughtful and nuanced critique of many of Pius' liberal critics, effectively responding to the charges of (among others) Cornwell, Wills, Carroll, and Zuccotti. The latter, in particular, comes in for devastating criticism. Having greatly admired her earlier *The Holocaust, the French, and the Jews* (1993), Lawler was surprised and disappointed to discover that, instead of providing a fair and neutral alternative to the "obviously eulogistic defenders of Pius," Zuccotti had become an "ideological denigrator" of the Pope. Indeed, Lawler effectively demonstrates how some of her allegations in *Under His Very Windows* (2001) directly contradict the arguments and documentation contained in her earlier work.

SANCHEZ'S CAREFUL and meticulously researched study provides a useful counterweight to the vicious attacks

DAVID G. DALIN *is the author or coauthor of several books, most recently* The Presidents of the United States and the Jews.

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of Cornwell and others. Rich in its historical insight and judicious in most of its interpretation and analysis, the Sanchez volume constitutes an important addition to our scholarly—as opposed to polemical—literature on the role of the papacy during the Holocaust.

In balanced and measured tones, Sanchez persuasively refutes the allegations of the critics of Pius who have accused him of moral cowardice and "silence" in the face of growing Nazi atrocities. As Sanchez's study indicates, Eugenio Pacelli publicly and privately warned of the dangers of Nazism both before and after he became pope; he denounced the deportations and persecution of Europe's Jews and was almost universally recognized, including by the Nazis themselves, as an unrelenting opponent of the National Socialist regime. Indeed, throughout the 1930s, Pacelli was widely lampooned in the Nazi press as Pius XI's "Jew-loving" cardinal. After his fair and thorough examination of the historical evidence, Sanchez concludes that Pius XII, far from being "silent," was a persistent critic of Hitler and the Nazi regime.

Critics of Pius XII have long used the Holy See's 1933 Concordat with Germany to attack him, since Pacelli himself played a major role in negotiating it during the time he served as Pius XI's Secretary of State. The critics claim that the Concordat silenced German Catholics who otherwise would have opposed Hitler and might have held him in check. But as Sanchez convincingly shows, the Concordat was in fact a largely pragmatic and morally defensible diplomatic measure to protect Catholics within Germany and to ensure the continuity and freedom of the German Catholic Church. "The Germans had proposed the Concordat," he reminds us, and for the Vatican "to have rejected it out of hand would have been prejudicial to the rights of Catholics in Germany." From the vantage point of German Jews, it was morally defensible as well, since it was signed in July 1933, well before Hitler had begun to enact any of his anti-Semitic legislation or decrees.

Moreover, contrary to what many of Pacelli's critics have alleged, the Concordat did not precipitate the collapse of Germany's Catholic Center Party. The Center Party had been founded during the pontificate of Pius IX in the nineteenth century to defend Catholics against Bismarck's campaign against them. The Pope had given it his blessing, and it had become increasingly influential in

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

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the decades that followed, serving as a vehicle for lay Catholic participation in German party politics and for the protection of Catholic political and religious interests in German public life. However, its influence had steadily declined during the last years of the Weimar Republic and, as Rychlak has shown, it was almost eliminated by the Nazis in March 1933. Then, on July 5, 1933, two weeks before the Concordat was signed, the party decided to dissolve itself voluntarily. It was thus not Pacelli and his negotiation of the Concordat that caused the party's political decline and ultimate demise. On the contrary, as even so vociferous a critic as Carroll has conceded, "even before the Concordat was formally signed, the Center Party had ceased to exist."

While the question of the Vatican's role in the demise of the party remains contested, Sanchez rightly notes that numerous respected historians—including the Germans Heinz Hurten, Ludwig Volk, and Konrad Repgen, and the American Stewart Stehlin—have marshaled considerable historical evidence in defense of the Concordat and of Pacelli's role in negotiating it. Unfortunately, their work has gone largely uncited and undiscussed by most of the Pope's most vociferous critics.

SANCHEZ AND LAWLER identify many other examples of the selective use of evidence. On the hotly debated issue of whether or not Pius played a role in sheltering Jews in German-occupied Rome, Sanchez points out that Zuccotti ignored significant evidence that the Pope issued directives to help the Jews. For instance, Monsignor John Patrick Carroll-Abbing and other Catholic priest-rescuers who worked closely with Pius in Rome have testified that he gave direct and explicit instructions to rescue and shelter Jews. The well-documented firsthand testimony of Carroll-Abbing, which Zuccotti never cites or discusses, is especially compelling. In his memoir *But for the Grace of God* (1965), Carroll-Abbing provides extensive details about Pius' rescue efforts on behalf of the Jews of Rome and elsewhere. "It does seem," Sanchez writes, "that despite the absence of written documentation, such a large-scale rescue could not have been attempted without implied papal approval."

Lawler points to even more substantial flaws in Zuccotti's work. He notes, for example, that in *Under His Very Windows* she ignores the important and well-known memoir *Christian Resistance to Anti-Semitism* by the French Jesuit theologian, priest-rescuer, and defender of Pius XII, Henri

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de Lubac. And this despite the fact that in her earlier work on *The Holocaust, The French, and the Jews*, Zuccotti noted and praised de Lubac's efforts (recounted in his memoir) to rescue and aid French Jews. These efforts, de Lubac makes clear, were directly inspired by Pius XII.

Zuccotti, it should be noted, falsely contrasts the alleged inaction of Pius XII with the work of Father Marie Benoît, the French Capuchin monk who coordinated the provision of food, shelter, and new identities for thousands of French and Italian Jews. Zuccotti's discussion of Fr. Benoît completely ignores his clear statements praising Pius for his direct encouragement and support of Benoît's rescue efforts.

Zuccotti also ignores the important personal testimony of Fr. Benoît's chief collaborator in rescuing Jews, Fernande Leboucher, who, in her book *The Incredible Mission of Father Benoît* (1969), attests to the direct support and assistance they received from Pius XII. While Zuccotti claimed that whatever assistance Pius may have given Benoît "must be regarded as exceedingly sparse," Leboucher states unequivocally that "the Vatican offered to supply whatever funds would be needed for Fr. Benoît's work. It is estimated that a total of some four million dollars was thus channeled from the Vatican to . . . Benoît's rescue organization—much of which came from the American Catholic Refugees Committee, an official Catholic collection and distribution agency whose funds were at the disposal of Pope Pius XII." Leboucher's memoir is never mentioned by Zuccotti in her apparent effort to deny Pius XII's connection to Benoît's rescue work.

And then there is the issue of Pius sheltering Jews in his summer residence at Castel Gandalfo, which Sanchez mentions briefly and which Lawler does not discuss at all. This is a crucial issue that one wishes both authors would have discussed in some detail. It has been estimated that anywhere between a few hundred and three thousand Jews found refuge at the residence and thus escaped deportation to German death camps through the Pope's direct personal intervention. Kosher food was even provided for the Jews hidden at the residence, where, as George Weigel has noted, Jewish children were born in the Pope's private apartments, which served as a temporary obstetrical ward.

Unfortunately, this is not the only oversight to be found in the studies of Sanchez and Lawler. For instance,

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Sanchez seems to uncritically accept the argument that the Pope knew beforehand about the Nazi roundup of Rome's Jews on October 16, 1943, which led to the deportation and transportation of over a thousand to Auschwitz. Zuccotti has argued that Pius deliberately failed to alert Rome's Jewish community about the Nazi plans. This charge, drawn from Robert Katz's polemical book *Black Sabbath* (1969), has been reproduced by many of Pius' recent critics, despite the fact that it is based on thirdhand information that has never been verified by historians. Katz's accusation referred to statements of German diplomat Eitel Mollhausen, who, after learning of the planned roundup, supposedly "passed it along to [Germany's Vatican Ambassador Ernst von] Weizsacker's embassy, which in turn enlightened the Vatican."

There is considerable reason to doubt this version of the story. In his memoirs, and throughout his life, Weizsacker never claimed to have alerted "the Vatican," much less Pius XII personally, about the roundup before it occurred, and no Vatican officials have ever come forth to say that they were told of the roundup beforehand, let alone that they passed on such information to the Pope. Moreover, the firsthand testimony of Princess Enza Pignatelli Aragona, who visited the Vatican and personally informed Pius of the roundup on the morning of October 16—and who has described Pius' reaction as one of shock and anger—flatly contradicts the currently accepted view.

Finally, and perhaps most regrettably, Sanchez and Lawler both fail to critically discuss and analyze the unprecedented tributes that Pius received from Jewish leaders, who, throughout the 1940s and 1950s, praised him for his role in saving Jewish lives during the Holocaust. Those tributes have been too casually dismissed by the Pope's detractors. No pope in history had been so universally acclaimed by Jewish leaders throughout the world: the renowned Nobel Prize-winning physicist Albert Einstein; Chaim Weizmann, who would become Israel's first President; Moshe Sharett, who would become Israel's first Foreign Minister and second Prime Minister; Rabbi Isaac Herzog, the Chief Rabbi of Israel—all of these figures showered Pius with praise for his actions in defense of the Jews.

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reminded that Pope Pius XII saved more Jewish lives than any other person, including Raoul Wallenberg and Oskar Schindler—men who are often, and rightly, treated as heroes for their efforts. Pius XII was by no stretch of the imagination or the historical record "Hitler's Pope." He was a true friend to the Jews when such friendship mattered most.

White Power?

The New White Nationalism in America: Its Challenge to Integration. By Carol M. Swain. *Cambridge University Press. 416 pp. $30.*

***Reviewed by* Scott McConnell**

The New White Nationalism in America: Its Challenge to Integration—a somewhat mistitled, often uneven, but extremely provocative book—marks the arrival of a bold new voice in the American race relations debate. It belongs to Carol M. Swain, a professor at Vanderbilt University Law School and a black woman with a remarkable biography: elementary school dropout, divorced welfare mother of two, an individual who spent substantial time grinding away at difficult menial jobs before climbing the academic ladder.

Raised in what she describes as "an abusive and impoverished farm household of twelve children," Swain managed to get herself into Virginia Western Community College and eventually rose through the doctoral program at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and, finally, Yale Law School. She is also a born-again Christian who was once absorbed in New Age spirituality. While such autobiographical snippets make up very little of this book, they indicate that its author is not someone who conforms to expectations and prevailing patterns of thought.

Swain devotes her early chapters to an ideological exposition of what she calls "the new white nationalists" in America before circling back to a broader discussion of affirmative action, the failures of contemporary black leadership, and general prospects for multiracial America. She thus uses the specter of white nationalism to motivate the sort of probing dialogue of race relations that President Clinton called for in the mid-1990s, before that discussion

Scott McConnell *is Executive Editor of the* American Conservative, *a biweekly that will begin publication this fall.*

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devolved into a tame and ideologically cramped exercise.

While Swain leaves no doubt that she views the prospect of a vigorous and influential white nationalist movement as a danger to the United States, she manages to write about various white racialists without the typical scare quotes and air of moral superiority. She notes, for example, that discussion of white nationalism in America has been framed by the so-called watchdog groups—the Simon Wiesenthal Center, the Anti-Defamation League, Klanwatch, and other left-leaning organizations. For them, white nationalists are simply "hate groups" populated by violent, bigoted individuals who have little to contribute to rational political discourse.

Swain challenges this assumption, even as her research illuminates her subjects' unpalatable qualities. Surely most nationalist movements are motivated in great part by reaction—as a response to a perceived cultural or political decline. New nationalisms arise as a countervailing force, against an occupier or in response to defeat or loss. White nationalism in America would thus be a reaction to relative white decline—demographic certainly, but political and cultural as well.

SWAIN (ALONG WITH AN Italian-American colleague, Russell Nieli) has conducted lengthy interviews, supplemented by extensive reading in a wide range of white nationalist sources. On one end of the spectrum, Jared Taylor and most of the contributors to his journal, *American Renaissance*, make the most intellectually respectable case. For instance, one of Taylor's contributors, physicist Michael Hart, makes it clear that he doesn't want to rule over other races or be ruled by them; rather, he seeks a kind of independence from American multiculturalism. Taylor himself, a Yale graduate raised by missionary parents in Japan, whose writings have a certain (largely closeted) following in mainstream conservative circles, argues that if other American ethnic groups organize along racial lines to press their interests, it is both legitimate and inevitable that whites will do so as well.

Beyond the *American Renaissance* circle can be found groups like Christian Identity, which have developed a theology that holds Anglo-Saxons to be "Chosen People" and one of the Lost Tribes of Biblical Israel. There is clearly not much to seriously engage with here, but such groups persist, feeding off the defensive conviction that a war against whites has already begun in the United States.

Are such people likely to become politically important in the future? This is a difficult and important question that Swain never engages satisfactorily. After all, former Klansman David Duke reached an electoral high tide in Louisiana more than a decade ago, and has since become nearly invisible. Some white extremist groups have been bankrupted by lawsuits. And any political initiative that seeks to defend the civil rights of whites against affirmative action must avoid any hint of racial appeal. White racial arguments are in thorough disrepute.

Swain's response is that the soil in which these groups grow remains extremely fertile. She points to the Internet as a viable and inexpensive mass communication tool, giving white nationalists a means of placing their arguments before more potential recruits than they have ever had before. She notes that the decline of secure jobs for the white working

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class—a result of globalization—could still provoke a political backlash, though it has yet to do so. And she stresses the persistence and even growth of racially based affirmative action. That, along with high rates of nonwhite immigration, feeds a sense of white dispossession and racial grievance.

Strangely, Swain does not address factors that have stymied white nationalism's growth. For most Americans, "whiteness" is still a fairly artificial identity; people tend to be far more conscious of religious or ethnic background. All branches of Christianity practiced in the U.S. are extremely antithetical to the race-based assertiveness the white nationalists expound.

In one notable departure from conventions of writing about race, Swain credits white nationalists for forthrightly addressing the most important racial questions, the ones most mainstream discourse assiduously evades, ignores, or misrepresents. Among these are the rapid demographic changes fueled by immigration, affirmative action preferences to new immigrants, and disproportionate black criminality.

But even when white nationalists make relevant points, they are ultimately stymied by their refusal to recognize that they share important values and interests with the tens of millions of nonwhite Americans. Since virtually all Americans recognize some common ground with their fellow countrymen, a great deal would have to change for white nationalism to become a major force in our society.

While Swain believes white extremists are in a position to exploit any deterioration in American race relations, it is, she argues, misguided liberal policies that really inspire their growth. Several of her chapters are devoted to close analysis of key racial policies. They include scathing evaluations of affirmative action and the skewed priorities of American black leaders, as well as a prediction of explosive consequences of current immigration policies.

Swain reminds us that the affirmative action policies that mandate quotas, timetables, and diversity monitors were initially developed as a means to give immediate succor to the black poor in the aftermath of the civil rights revolution. They have now developed into anything but that. Instead, they are seen either as a means to impose diversity, now construed as an end it itself, or as a method to provide black and Hispanic students with role models.

Swain has no patience with any of these rationales. It strikes her as pathetically small minded to imagine that blacks need black role models to succeed: her own, she adds with some poignancy, were white male academics who prodded her to push herself intellectually. As it is, the current system undermines both the self-esteem and the education of its purported beneficiaries. Swain asks how the personal chemistry of college sports teams would fare if teams were required to have proportionate quotas of white and Asian athletes. And she relates a bitter truth from her own experience with black students on campus—many of whom pass through college believing that affirmative action guarantees their admission to top-quality professional schools regardless of their academic performance. Such a belief may be only partially true, but it has had devastating consequences for black academic performance.

When liberal immigration policies are thrown into the mix, the American racial system is threatened with overload. Swain estimates that by the middle of the present century well over half of Americans will be entitled to racial preferences. It seems most unlikely that such a development could take place without fierce resistance by white Americans.

Swain's own recommendations are the epitome of common sense. Racial preferences for hiring and promotions should be eliminated. Affirmative action should be remodeled with an emphasis on class rather than racial background in order to benefit the poorest Americans. Racial prefer-

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ences for new immigrants should be scrapped entirely. Immigration rates should be reduced, and the laws against hiring illegal aliens (who compete with and drive down the wages of the American working poor) should be enforced. The black leadership should be challenged: its current focus on divisive issues like reparations or its obsession with eliminating statues, street names, and other symbols of the Confederacy do nothing for the black poor and only drain the reservoir of racial good will. Social policy should be refocused on aiding the working poor through such measures as income subsidies and vocational training for high school dropouts.

Six or seven years ago, shortly after the Los Angeles riots and in the wake of the O. J. Simpson trial, racial tensions in the United States seemed ready to boil over. To the surprise of many they then began to improve—or at least to stabilize, to be superseded by graver problems. Yet it is as foolish to bet against Swain's prediction of escalating racial turmoil in the American future as it is difficult to argue against her sensible proposals to head it off.

Small Wars, Big Plans

THE SAVAGE WARS OF PEACE: SMALL WARS AND THE RISE OF AMERICAN POWER. By MAX BOOT. *Basic. 428 pp. $30.*

***Reviewed by* Andrew J. Bacevich**

LESS THAN A YEAR after the attack of September 11, Americans have just about succeeded in absorbing the war on terror into their daily routine. In the home, the classroom, and the workplace, normalcy has returned. For most of us, the day said to have changed everything has changed remarkably little.

Meanwhile, acting on our behalf, a small number of military professionals wage the ongoing campaign against terror, chiefly in Central Asia but also in a growing list of subsidiary theatres now including Yemen, Georgia, Colombia, and the Philippines. Other American soldiers, in greater numbers, occupy themselves with the unfinished business of the 1990s—the legacy of interventions undertak-

ANDREW J. BACEVICH *teaches international relations at Boston University. His book* American Empire *will be published by Harvard University Press this fall.*

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makes available models and patterns of heroic action against which students may test their own actions and experience. As Jacques Maritain indicates, poetry is the secret life of each and all the arts at all the disciplines and is some sense translations of a common *poetic* insight, an intuitive source too often ignored or forgotten by the rationalistic, secular mind . . .



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en by the previous two administrations. Some keep the peace in Bosnia and Kosovo. Others patrol the skies over northern and southern Iraq and the waters of the Persian Gulf and prepare for another go at Saddam Hussein.

The institution known as the Department of Defense is today engaged in a project far more ambitious than its name implies. Standing in readiness to fight and win the odd major war only begins to describe its actual role. Every day around the world, U.S. forces undertake a panoply of activities to maintain a semblance of international order, advance important national interests, promote (albeit selectively) American values, and, through their very presence, enhance the clout and influence of the United States. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the lot of the American soldier has been—and seems likely to remain—an intensely busy one.

To which Max Boot, editorial features editor of the *Wall Street Journal*, offers the rejoinder: So what else is new?

According to Boot, a proper rendering of U.S. military history shows that American soldiers, sailors, and Marines have always been busy with such work. From the earliest days of the republic, they have waged a seemingly endless list of "small wars" in places remote from America's shores. Ranging from brief punitive raids to protracted campaigns, these conflicts pitted conventionally organized and trained U.S. regulars against insurgents, guerrillas, or bandits in the employ of some despot or warlord. Typically characterized by little fights rather than big battles—although bloody enough for all that—such conflicts seldom attracted the interest of the American people, who have (with a few exceptions) been content to avert their gaze from whatever their soldiers might be up to abroad.

For readers accustomed to thinking of U.S. military history in terms of all-out crusades fought for grand causes and high ideals, Boot offers an alternative narrative. Indeed, Boot's explicit purpose in writing *The Savage Wars of Peace* is to recover—with an eye toward reviving—the rich imperial tradition that U.S. forces accrued during the course of America's rise to world power, a tradition that he considers eminently relevant to the present day.

The result is a book as readable as it is timely. In a series of finely honed chapters, Boot recounts the exploits of plucky soldiers and intrepid seamen across two hundred years of



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American history. He brings back to life figures whose exploits in the Maghreb, the Caribbean, or the Far East once made them household names, but who are now mostly forgotten. Prominent among them are the gallant young Stephen Decatur, hero of the war against the Barbary pirates; Frederick Funston, daring captor of the Filipino nationalist Emiliano Aguinaldo; Calvin P. Titus, the young army private who won a Medal of Honor and an appointment to West Point for volunteering to scale the walls of Peking; and a clutch of colorful Marines, prominent among them Herman "Hard Head" Hanneken, Dan Daley (two-time winner of the Medal of Honor), Chesty Puller (five times awarded the Navy Cross), and "Old Gimlet Eye," the irascible and irrepressible Smedley Butler.

BUT THERE IS MORE here than rousing tales told with verve and élan. Boot shows how after a century of "butcher and bolt"—smiting the ne'er do well to teach him a lesson, but departing just as quickly—U.S. forces after 1898 began to adopt a more deliberate approach to small wars, one involving longer-term presence and more ambitious objectives. The "benevolent assimilation" of the Philippines signaled this shift in emphasis, which soon thereafter further found expression in China and throughout the Caribbean and Central America. By the late 1930s, the armed services—most notably the United States Marine Corps—had derived from these sundry experiences a coherent and well-conceived doctrine for the general conduct of small wars and imperial policing.

With the coming of World War II, however, this doctrine was largely lost to institutional memory. As a result, when U.S. forces next faced the challenge of a small war—in Southeast Asia—they misconstrued the problem. General William C. Westmoreland applied the big war methods with which he was familiar with disastrous results. Had the war's architects drawn on the hard-won lessons previously learned in places like the Philippines and Nicaragua, Boot believes, Vietnam might have had a different outcome.

As it was, the officer corps came home from that defeat highly allergic to operational untidiness and political uncertainty. Thus, when the end of the Cold War threw up any number of such situations, military leaders wrung their hands and shook their heads and reacted with a wariness that would have baffled can-do types like Smedley Butler. During a period

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of unprecedented U.S. military activism, reluctant senior officers had to be coaxed and cajoled every step of the way.

Boot, an advocate of a neo-imperial foreign policy, finds such hesitation to be both counterproductive and misplaced. When it comes to shouldering the burdens of empire, he writes, "history suggests we need not worry unduly." U.S. forces enjoyed considerable success handling such missions in the past. They can be counted on to do so in the future—indeed, the times and U.S. global interests demand that they do so. Hence the imperative of restoring and revalidating an imperial heritage that most Americans, soldiers and civilians alike, have forgotten.

Boot argues his case effectively. Yet one can endorse much of that argument while still concluding that his outlook is far too sanguine.

Boot's warts-and-all narrative raises political, moral, and strategic questions regarding the costs and consequences of small wars that undermine his concluding call for a global Pax Americana. Thus, in detailing the results of U.S. involvement in the small wars of earlier eras, Boot does not hesitate to recount their brutality. In the now all but forgotten Philippine Insurrection, for example, over four thousand American soldiers died—ten times more than all those killed during the Spanish-American War. Benevolent assimilation also took the lives of 16,000 guerrillas along with an estimated 200,000 Filipino noncombatants, who died of starvation, disease, and the occasional military atrocity. Small wars conducted in distant outposts of empire tend to be dirty wars and seldom bring out the best in mankind.

Furthermore, hardly had U.S. forces prevailed in the Philippines than President Theodore Roosevelt concluded (correctly) that the islands constituted a strategic liability. They proved to be an economic liability as well. Over the next several decades, successive administrations never did figure out how to defend them. Nor did Washington ever figure out how to make this crown jewel in the American imperial crown pay.

Did a half century of American tutelage benefit the people of the Philippines? Although the evidence here is more ambiguous, the fragility of present-day Philippine political institutions, the bizarre character of its political culture, and the notoriously poor performance of its economy make it hard to argue that the legacy of empire has been a positive one.

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Yet the Philippines qualify as a smashing success in comparison with other cases. In Haiti and the Dominican Republic, Smedley Butler and his compatriots labored for a couple of decades to imprint American-style methods and institutions on the locals. In the end, they accomplished little apart from sullying the reputation of the Marine Corps. "The only thing more unsavory than U.S. intervention," Boot observes, "was U.S. nonintervention"—a muted endorsement, at best.

Boot is probably correct that small wars of the sort that played such a large role in the U.S. military's past will also define its near-term future. Properly read, his book should temper expectations of what the United States is likely to accomplish today as it extends the benefits of liberal democracy to Afghanistan or Iraq or other precincts of the new American empire.

BRIEFLY NOTED

DARWIN'S CATHEDRAL: EVOLUTION, RELIGION, AND THE NATURE OF SOCIETY. By DAVID SLOAN WILSON. *University of Chicago Press. 260 pp. $25.*

This is a lucid and entertaining addition to the long list of recent books on what evolutionary theory can tell us about religion. Its author teaches biology and anthropology at Binghamton University and has written previously on the evolutionary significance of altruism, among other topics. His hypothesis (only a hypothesis because establishing it would require further testing) is that long-lived religions are best understood as adaptive social organisms, and that studying them as such will permit them to be understood better (more deeply, more comprehensively) than will studying them in any other way. This hypothesis suggests what Wilson calls the adaptationist program for the study of religion. The predictive part of the program studies and attempts "to explain religious groups as adaptive units purely in terms of survival and reproduction." Wilson's program thus espouses evolutionary functionalism and is methodologically naturalist. His final explanation (note the "purely") of any religion refers only to what that religion does for its adherents, and only to the mechanisms of the evolution of social organisms. This method rules out as a procedural matter explanatory (or indeed any other) appeal to a supernatural agent or agents. This program gives Wilson many opponents: anti-functionalists among theorists and historians of religion (it's no accident that among theorists of religion Wilson chooses arch-functionalist Émile Durkheim as his hero); evolutionary theorists who don't think that such theory is usefully applicable to social groups; those who think it is applicable to social groups, but conclude that religious groups are maladaptive; and theological realists, who think the whole enterprise vitiated by its procedural naturalism. All these (except the last) are wittily engaged and dispatched. By the end of the book, Wilson takes himself to have demonstrated the initial plausibility of his hypothesis, and to have laid out the program that would test it further. Is there good reason to think that (at least some) religions might usefully be considered as adaptive social organisms? Yes: Wilson shows this with abundant argument and convincing clarity, and there is no reason why religious and nonreligious people can't agree about this claim. Is there good reason to think that when a particular religion has been so studied and explained, a complete and final explanation has been given? No: this could only be true if Wilson's naturalism were true, and he offers no reason whatever for thinking it so. And then there is the familiar contradiction in which Wilson (apparently unknowingly) becomes enmeshed in the book's final chapter. That is, if Wilson's purely functionalist explanation of religion were to become widely accepted by religious people, it would then be rendered false—for the adaptive features of religions depend, on Wilson's account, upon religious people thinking it false that their religions are best understood as adaptive social organisms. Fortunately, since Wilson's final explanation of religion is in fact not final, this is a problem only for him and for those with views like his.

— Paul J. Griffiths

NATURE REBORN: THE ECOLOGICAL AND COSMIC PROMISE OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. By H. PAUL SANTMIRE. *Fortress. 154 pp. $15 paper.*

Among seriously Christian environmentalists with a biocentric bent, Lutheran pastor Paul Santmire stands out as one of the ablest and most careful students of the history of theology. Determined to make the tradition serve ecological responsibility against what he considers its wrongheaded anthropocentrism, he reexamines writers from the Bible to the twentieth century and finds that God has a story with the natural world quite apart from His way with humanity. Santmire quite proudly calls himself a "revisionist," distinguishing his course from those he calls "apologists"—that is, "defenders of the classical Christian tradition," chief among them this reviewer (I take the term as one of honor, *fidei defensor*). He begins with the now-familiar thesis that the planet is in ecological crisis due to human rapaciousness, advances his theological revisionism as essential to the cure, and ends with the dire warning that unless a program like his is adopted it will be seen soon enough that "Christian theology is ecologically bankrupt." His most serious opponents are those determined to show that faithful stewardship of God's creation is and always has been the heart

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of Christian environmentalism. The heart of Santmire's quarrel with us is that he thinks biblical theology, read correctly, allows a kind of parallel track alongside the drama of human redemption. Here the natural world has independent standing before its Maker, its own inherent value, and is to be honored "for its own sake." Or, put somewhat differently, the salvation of humanity occurs within a larger framework, a cosmological drama where the whole of creation is destined for redemption, for being made whole. Once we begin to think in this way (entailing, of course, a "paradigm shift") we are able to get beyond our narrow and destructive anthropocentrism and respect nature almost as we respect our fellow humans. Santmire can even, he says, "salute the maple tree in [his] front yard as a member of [his] own extended family." This conclusion is to a large extent made possible by a selective, even somewhat arbitrary reading of texts: Adam was not to "till" the garden as active manager, but to "serve" it; the animals in Genesis 2 are "partners" with people, not just present for our well-being; Noah's taking all the animals into the ark shows that they are meant to be our companions, even though he took only breeding pairs in what looks like smart animal husbandry—perfect ecological stewardship. By contrast, the Genesis injunction to man to have "dominion" over the other creatures does actually mean "domination"—hence it should be "retired." Also scheduled for retirement, banished from the Christian vocabulary, is "steward," despite its biblical ubiquity. It's just too managerial and not sufficiently awestruck by nature. The differences between these interpretations, and the larger disagreement they point to, are easy to state but harder to resolve. Santmire's "revisionism" is a choice, but one may doubt his claim that a Christian environmentalism depends on it. On the contrary, "apologists" point out that in many important ways, from pollution to population, the health of the planet is improving, thanks not to biocentrism or any paradigm shifts, but to smart science and adept technology, intelligent humanity exercising its dominion and stewardship.

— Thomas Sieger Derr

Wilhelm Röpke: Swiss Localist, Global Economist. By John Zmirak. *ISI. 228 pp. $14.95.*

Too often neglected or obscured by the long shadow of Ludwig von Mises, the German economist Wilhelm Röpke has enjoyed a revival in recent years. An institute bears his name, two of his best books were re-issued in the late 1990s, Liberty Fund symposiarchs have dined out handsomely on him, and politicians (ever attuned to a rising market) have ransacked his work for justification of their various Third Ways and Compassionate Conservatisms. It has even been reported, a shade improbably, that Governor Bush kept a copy of *A Humane Economy* by his bedside during the last election. For a junior economics professor forced to flee the Nazis in 1933, this represents considerable redemption. Now, in the shape of John Zmirak, he boasts a new biographer who, it is good to report, has done him proud. The two are indeed well matched. Röpke possessed a supple intelligence, a superb pen, and a keen sense of the fundamentally moral purposes served by economics. Zmirak is similarly gifted. His monograph deserves, and will surely receive, a wide and grateful readership. The Röpke boom has had several causes, chief among them a sense that all is not well in the global marketplace. Communism has collapsed, unlamented except in its last redoubts, Cuba and Cambridge. Impoverishing those it claimed to enrich, collectivism had contempt for liberty and human dignity. When it fell, civilized people rejoiced. For all that, it does not follow that a future of unbridled individualism would be much better. Getting and spending are all very well, but do we want the whole world to be turned into a vast Hong Kong? Between these extremes lies a more humane economic order: one in which, as Röpke put it, "wealth [is] widely dispersed, genuine communi-

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ties, from the family upwards, form a background of moral support for the individual, and a healthy balance [exists] between town and country, industry and agriculture." Economics, in sum, is not a dismal science but a form of soulcraft. As Zmirak writes, Röpke "centered his economics in the dignity of the human person, who lives not alone but as part of a family and a community; who thrives or suffers according to the health of those institutions; and who regulates his own economic activity according to financial and personal incentives that he—and not the State—is best equipped to interpret." Here, surely, is the heart of the appeal. Free markets are preferable to tyranny not because they enrich us but because they help to make us moral. They offer us the freedom of self-discipline. They show us the beauty of self-reliance and honorable dependence on others. This is a lesson for the ages. Röpke, one of the great economic personalists of the last century, has found in Zmirak an admirable advocate.

— Dermot Quinn

OPEN EMBRACE

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FOREWORD BY J. BUDZISZEWSKI

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THE MAKING OF A CHRISTIAN ARISTOCRACY: SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS CHANGE IN THE WESTERN ROMAN EMPIRE. By MICHELE RENEE SALZMAN. *Harvard University Press. 354 pp. $49.95.*

The nineteenth-century Italian poet Lampedusa wrote: "Unless we ourselves take a hand now, they'll foist a republic on us. If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change." That, *in nuce*, is Michele Renee Salzman's argument. By the end of the fourth century the educated bureaucratic class realized that the future lay with Christianity and that the best way to preserve what was good and true in Roman culture was to embrace the new religion. In the process, Christianity absorbed much from the aristocracy—in attitudes toward wealth, family, honor, the importance of friendship, and political power. The study of the Greek and Roman classics, staples of the literary culture, was not displaced by the Scriptures. By the end of the fourth century, becoming a Christian did not mean a radical change in an aristocrat's way of life. Yet changes there were. In worship, art, architecture, literature, communal life, language, beliefs, moral values, models of a virtuous life, views of the past, the persistence of an aristocratic culture—in all of these aspects of life, a profound and far-reaching transformation of the society was underway, and the book would have benefited from

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greater attention to at least some of them. As it is, Salzman has a hard time accounting for the rise of a distinctly Christian culture and civilization. Nonetheless, she is surely correct that conversion narratives (such as, most famously, Augustine's *Confessions*) are of little help in plotting these social changes and that Christianity was indeed influenced by the values of aristocratic culture. A subsidiary theme is the role of women in the gradual conversion of the ruling class. Salzman lays to rest the view that women were the central motivation behind such conversions. In fact, the evidence is overwhelming that men (who set the religious tone of the Roman family) were largely responsible for the spread of Christianity among the nobility.

— Robert Louis Wilken

On the Unseriousness of Human Affairs: Teaching, Writing, Playing, Believing, Lecturing, Philosophizing, Singing, Dancing. By James V. Schall, S.J. *ISI. 189 pp. $24.95.*

Over the past forty years, James V. Schall, S.J., has earned a reputation as an untimely thinker. While many social scientists in the 1970s issued apocalyptic warnings about a pending world overpopulation crisis, Schall published a book titled *Welcome Number 4,000,000,000.* And when the majority of his fellow Jesuits in the 1980s rallied behind the cause of liberation theology, he wrote *Liberation Theology in Latin America* to explain why Christianity and Marxism are fundamentally incompatible. Schall's latest book will no doubt add to this well-deserved reputation. Each of the eleven essays in *On the Unseriousness of Human Affairs* reflects upon an important, but all-too-often overlooked, fact: "It is only when we realize that human affairs stand not simply by themselves but relate us to our end—to our transcendent destiny—that we can relax about what we are, indeed, *become* what we are." Drawing on the wisdom of thinkers as diverse as St. Augustine and Leon Kass, and on the common sense of such figures as Charlie Brown and former NFL linebacker Bill Romanowski, Schall wittily argues that "unserious activities" help make human life worth living. Participation in and enjoyment of such unserious activities as writing, singing, praying, contemplating, and dancing help to bring human beings into contact with an order of reality that stands apart from the realm of human making. Over and against the excessive value that modern thought places on the practical and the useful, Schall defends the importance of leisure. Through our participation in leisurely activities, we come to delight in an order of things "that we do not make, but discover . . . to be somehow given to us." Reflecting on the mystery of teachers one never meets or on the practical uselessness of philosophy, Schall here reminds increasingly busy people that human beings are most fully human when they are engaging in such unserious and impractical activities.

— Marc Guerra

Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda. By Michael Barnett. *Cornell University Press. 215 pp. $25.*

The author, a political scientist at the University of Wisconsin, was attached to the U.S. Mission to the UN in 1993-1994. In the spring of 1994 the Hutus slaughtered more than 800,000 Tutsis in the most massive instance of genocide since World War II. Barnett's question is, Who was responsible? Of course the people who actually carried out the genocide, but what about the UN itself, and the major members of the Security Council, above all the U.S. under the Clinton Administration? Barnett explores these questions in an exquisitely, even painfully, fair-minded and balanced manner, concentrating on the bureaucratized ethic of the UN and employing Hannah Arendt's controversial understanding of "the banality of evil." In Rwanda, President Clinton would later apologize, on behalf of the U.S. and "the international community," for not having done enough to prevent the genocide. Barnett argues that, after Somalia and other misad-

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ventures with "humanitarian intervention," the U.S. played the primary role in preventing other nations from doing what they might have done. Also France, both in Rwanda and at the UN, exploited the horror for purposes of petty geopolitical advantage. But at least equal blame falls on Boutros Boutros-Ghali, then Secretary General, his successor, Kofi Annan, and other officials who put the security of the UN as an organization above the security of the people of Rwanda. This is a chilling story, thoughtfully recounted. About the only person who comes out of it with his reputation intact is General Romeo Dallaire, a Canadian, who headed up the pitifully undermanned and under-supplied UN peacekeeping force on the ground. The other players, with a few exceptions, were honorable people who, for reasons that seemed to them morally compelling at the time, were deeply complicit in unspeakable wickedness. The banality of evil indeed.

CATHOLIC AND EVANGELICAL PERSPECTIVES ON LIBERAL ARTS EDUCATION:
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THE BRIDE OF THE LAMB. By SERGIUS BULGAKOV. *Eerdmans. 531 pp. $40 paper.*

Bulgakov (1879-1944) was one of the greats among Russian Orthodox theologians who established an astonishingly productive theological community in Paris after the Bolshevik revolution. *The Bride of the Lamb* is considered by some to be his masterwork. It is an adventurous work of theological speculation on creation "out of nothing," the Church and her sacraments, and the meaning of eschatology, including an imaginatively orthodox (and Orthodox) treatment of whether all, including the evil angels, will at last be redeemed. The work is immensely learned, frequently prolix, and always intellectually provocative. On almost every subject, Bulgakov employs Western, and especially Thomistic, thought as a foil by which to illuminate the distinctiveness of Orthodoxy's accent on the cosmological and Sophialogical in the Christian construal of reality. *The Bride of the Lamb* is not always easy reading, but Orthodox readers will welcome the appearance of a master in a new translation by Boris Jakim that makes him as accessible as possible, and Western Christians should welcome a theological challenge that can enrich their own understanding of the Christian mystery.

THE ORCHARDS OF SYON. By GEOFFREY HILL. *Counterpoint. 72 pp. $24.*

Watch out when all men praise you. There is no poet of our time more praised than Geoffrey Hill. In response to this new and, it seems, contrivedly obscure eclogue, Donald Hall writes, "When in the future flustered doctoral students confuse Auden and Austen, when Larkin becomes a small figure in the shadow of Hardy, Geoffrey Hill will remain the monumental English poet of the latter twentieth century." That seems absurdly improbable. For readers who have the many hours to invest in picking at tangled verbal threads in order to decode the signs and countersigns, *The Orchards of Syon* may yield the payoff that some critics claim to have discovered. Without detracting from his earlier achievements, or those of such as Auden and Larkin, one may suggest that the present book will not be terribly helpful in explaining for future generations why Geoffrey Hill was so highly, and rightly, praised.

REDEMPTIVE CHANGE: ATONEMENT AND THE CHRISTIAN CURE OF THE SOUL. By R. R. RENO. *Trinity Press International. 267 pp. $20 paper.*

This is not a "how to" book on pastoral care, but it is a book on pastoral care. Care as in "cure," as in "redemptive change." Those in search of healing, and those charged with the task of guiding that search, are offered a wealth of reflection on how various thinkers have understood what it means to be whole. This study of the history of ideas leads also through practical experience to a Christological conclusion that undergirds a vibrant humanism that makes secular humanisms pale by comparison.

ORIGIN OF THE HUMAN SPECIES. By DENNIS BONNETTE. *Rodopi. 210 pp. $38 paper.*

The author is professor of philosophy at Niagara University, and this is a decidedly philosophical approach to current controversies over evolution, intelligent design, creationism, and other accounts of how our very odd

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species came to be. Bonnette writes from a Christian and sometimes specifically Catholic perspective, and obviously strives to be fair to those with whom he disagrees, except for the most dogmatic proponents of scientistic materialism, whom he effectively skewers. The argument will be more accessible to readers with a measure of familiarity with the pertinent philosophical and scientific questions.

War in the Shadow of Auschwitz. By John Wiernicki. *Syracuse University Press. 272 pp. $29.95.*

A contribution to the growing literature by non-Jewish survivors of the Holocaust. As a young man fighting in the Polish resistance, Wiernicki was captured by the Germans and spent almost two years in Auschwitz. Of particular interest is his account of the everyday details of bartering and bargaining in the camp, as well as the persistence of anti-Semitism and of ethnic and national rivalries in the face of unspeakable horror.

The Trouble with Democracy: A Citizen Speaks Out. By William D. Gairdner. *Stoddart. 535 pp. $35.*

Author of *The Trouble with Canada* and *The War Against the Family*, Gairdner offers a bracing critique of democracy understood as a mix of autonomous individualism and social entitlement, and expressed in terms Mary Ann Glendon has depicted as "rights talk." He is a convinced and convincing proponent of classical liberalism, which means he is today what is called a conservative, and is especially effective in urging that we recover the role of the institutions of civil society—most importantly the family—in constructing a democracy less troubling to the common good.

Religious Leaders and Faith-Based Politics: Ten Profiles. Edited by Jo Renee Formicola and Hubert Morken. *Rowman & Littlefield. 288 pp. $26.95 paper.*

The book is dedicated "To those religious leaders who refuse to be pushed to the margins and out of public life," and with ten winning profiles ranging from Rabbi Daniel Lapin to T. D. Jakes to Elder Dallin H. Oaks, it makes sure they'll remain squarely in the mix.

God and Mammon: Protestants, Money, and the Market, 1790-1860. Edited by Mark Noll. *Oxford University Press. 312 pp. $21.95 paper.*

Move over Max Weber. Yes, there was a Calvinist connection, but it had nothing on antebellum Methodists and Baptist revivalists who were exuberantly successful in making religion itself a source of capitalist enterprise. These essays also provide useful background for understanding the very entrepreneurial world of Evangelicaldom's para-church kingdoms. The book helps fill a gap in the history of thought and practice that aims at serving God through serving Mammon.

Introduction to Moral Theology. By Romanus Cessario, O.P. *Catholic University of America Press. 268 pp. $24.95 paper.*

This is the first entry in the new Catholic Moral Thought series from Catholic University of America Press, which seeks to renew moral theology in the light of the suggestions contained in the encyclical *Veritatis Splendor* (*The Splendor of Truth*). The author, professor of systematic theology at St. John's Seminary in Brighton, Massachusetts, does a splendid job of introducing the series, addressing such topics as natural law, principles of human action, the determination of the moral good, and the connection between virtues, gifts of the Holy Spirit, and the Beatitudes. Essential reading for advanced undergraduate and graduate students of theology.

Open Embrace: A Protestant Couple Rethinks Contraception. By Sam and Bethany Torode. *Eerdmans. 122 pp. $12 paper.*

We have previously commended the argument so persuasively made in this little book for sex *au naturel* (see Public Square, January 2002 and February 2002). So this is simply to let you know the book is now available, with a splendid foreword by a favorite FT author, J. Budziszewski.

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

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

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THE PUBLIC SQUARE

A Continuing Survey of Religion and Public Life

Richard John Neuhaus

Scandal Time III

So, will there be further installments of this running commentary, Scandal Time IV through XIV, ad infinitum? Maybe not. After the Dallas meeting of bishops, some believe that while the fire is not extinguished, it appears to be contained. Dallas was about many things—there were moving, even inspiring, moments, and occasional hints of something like renewal—but the meeting was chiefly about damage control. By that measure it may be judged a limited success. If that turns out to the case, it is no little achievement. Although, as we shall see, it might have been purchased at the price of things more important than damage control.

The fire that prompted the bishops to action was a conflagration of ugly publicity, a media blitz of unprecedented intensity in American religious history and with few parallels in other aspects of our national life. Back in April, during Holy Week and at the height of the firestorm, a reporter with a national paper asked me in obviously innocent puzzlement, "We did Watergate and Nixon fell, we did Enron and it fell, how come the Church is still standing?" The question reflects the touching self-importance of the media, and their not so touching ignorance of the nature of the Church. Let it be said, though, that many bishops were as terrified by the media as the media thought they should be. And maybe it is just as well that they were. Otherwise, Dallas would not have happened, and, all in all, it was necessary that Dallas happen.

It was humiliating, of course, to see the solemn assembly of bishops, archbishops, and cardinals jumping through the hoops and slithering under the bars held by the media ringmasters. Dallas was a classic instance of what social scientists call the rituals of self-denigration. Almost three hundred bishops sat in mandatory docility as they were sternly reproached by knowing psychologists, angry spokespersons for millions of presumably angrier lay people, and, above all, by those whom the bishops learned to call, with almost cringing deference, the "victim/survivors." At times the meeting took on the appearance of a self-criticism session in a Maoist reeducation camp. But it was all in the good cause of finding a way to "move on," as it is said, from an undoubted catastrophe. It would be cynical to deny that there were signs of deep remorse, contrition, and penitence. There were. Even if it was a bit much to have reporters counting how many bishops shed tears as they listened to the victim/survivors. Tears earned a gold star and welling eyes an honorable mention from the media masters of the rites of self-denigration. Like schoolboys, the bishops anxiously awaited the evening news to find out their grades.

Some bishops chafed under the reproaches and prescribed responses. It is not the way bishops are accustomed to being treated. Some still complain, although privately, that the entire crisis, the Long Lent of 2002, was manufactured by the media and motivated by anti-Catholicism. There is only some truth in that. Without the media there would have been no felt crisis. There is a generous measure of anti-Catholicism in the media, as elsewhere, but without the deeper crisis of the infidelity and negligence of bishops, the media could not have produced the public and, consequently, episcopal sense of crisis. The scandal was in the chanceries, parishes, and seminaries before it was on the front page or television news. Whatever their motivations—and their chief motivation is to attract a paying audience, followed by the winning of journalistic honors—editors and reporters served a higher purpose. It is hardly without precedent that God uses

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even their enemies to discipline His wayward people. There is Isaiah 10, for instance. "Assyria is the rod of my anger, the staff of my fury," says the Lord. And so, with Psalm 23 in mind, the bishops should say of the media assault, "Your rod and your staff, they discomfort me."

It has been said that the aim of good preaching is to afflict the comfortable and comfort the afflicted. Bishops have been anything but comfortable since the scandals went big time with the Boston exposures back in January. The day following the one-sided vote in Dallas on the "Charter for the Protection of Children and Young People" (there were only thirteen nays), the *New York Times* expressed satisfaction in an editorial titled "Seeking Atonement in Dallas." The editors opined that the action shows that "the leaders of the American Church are at last ready to confront the extraordinary moral and managerial carelessness that allowed so many abusive priests to flourish for so long at such great cost." So the bishops earned provisional absolution from the *Times*.

Of course the vote was the top front-page story for the *Times*, as for other papers. The *Times* headline—or, more precisely, subhead—is a classic. "Bishops Set Policy to Remove Priests in Sex Abuse Cases: No Vatican Reply." The Dallas vote was taken late afternoon when it was early morning in Rome. The first edition of the *Times* goes to press a little before midnight in New York. "No Vatican Reply." Presumably the Pope should have been up at two A.M., prepared with an immediate statement upon the Dallas vote. Or maybe the *Times* was upset that he was not awakened to return their reporter's phone call. Just who does he think he is? It used to be said that Rome thinks and acts in terms of centuries. Now it is thought to be news when it does not respond in a New York minute. "No Vatican Reply." File that one for ready reference when the subject turns to media delusions about how history must jump through their hoops.

The No-Mercy Route

On the other hand, there was a curious story in the *Times*, also on the front page, only two days later. Written by Laurie Goodstein, it worried that the bishops may have been too responsive, that by caving so completely to media pressure they had lost even more of the little moral authority they had left. It used to be, she writes, that the bishops could prophetically challenge popular opinion on questions such as abortion, welfare reform, capital punishment, and foreign policy, but now they are on the run. More important, by caving to demands for "one strike" and "zero tolerance" policies that will remove from ministry faithful priests who did one bad thing thirty years ago and have since had an impeccable record and are clearly no threat to anybody, Dallas may have changed the very self-understanding of the Church.

Goodstein writes: "Ultimately, [the bishops] opted for the no-mercy route despite arguments from some bishops that they should adopt an approach that acknowledges that each case is different, and that some abusers can with therapy be rehabilitated and continue to be of service. They took this step despite dreading that they must now return to their dioceses and tell seventy-year-old Father X that he will have to pack up and leave his parish in shame." Some bishops have already done that and she notes that in recent months there have been instances when parishioners have rebelled against the removal of beloved pastors. The shaming has had other consequences. "Two priests have committed suicide," she observes. "There could be more." Where there is no mercy, there is no hope. I expect Goodstein is not alone among reporters who are surprised and disappointed by the spinelessness of the bishops. After all, they as reporters were just doing their job in applying the pressure. They expected bishops of the Catholic Church to do their job, to respond as bishops. Instead, as Goodstein puts it, there is the perception that they "behaved more like Senators or CEO's engaged in damage control than as moral teachers engaged in the gospel."

At least in large part, damage control was achieved, but at an unconscionable price. Bishop Howard J. Hubbard of Albany, New York, usually thought to be solidly in the liberal camp of the episcopal conference, spoke up against "zero tolerance." He pointed out that just last year the bishops issued a statement calling for the rehabilitation of prisoners and advocating "restorative justice." "Do we advocate this biblical concept for the community at large, but not for our own priests?" he asked. The hall fell silent when the revered Avery Cardinal Dulles moved to the microphone. The proposed charter, he said, "puts a very adversarial relationship between the bishop and the priest. The priest can no longer go to his bishop in confidence with a problem that he has. He has to be very careful what he says to the bishop because the bishop can throw him out of the ministry for his entire life." The bishops listened respectfully, and rejected his counsel.

Two orthodox stalwarts, Cardinals George of Chicago and Bevilacqua of Philadelphia urged support of the charter, but with heavy hearts. Cardinal Bevilacqua said, "It hurts to say I support zero tolerance. I wish I didn't have to do that. I wish our circumstances were different. But, at the same time, in our present crisis we must place the common good of our Church first." With respect, isn't that the way of thinking that produced the crisis in the first place?

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The good of the Church was defined in terms of avoiding scandal; thus the pattern of evasion, denial, hush money, and cover-up. It was necessary, it was said, to do some shady things to avoid scandal, all of which resulted in monumental scandal. Now, morally dubious measures are necessary for the good of the Church, in order to put that scandal behind us. The result may be a greater scandal; not, to be sure, in the eyes of the media but in the understanding of those whose chief concern is for the integrity of the Church's faith and life.

The Word is Scapegoating

Now that the bishops have chosen what Goodstein aptly calls the "no-mercy route," consider the aforementioned Fr. X. In his opening address at Dallas, Bishop Wilton Gregory said that priests who had ever had even one abusive incident with a minor, even if it was many years past, should tell their bishops. Right. So that the bishop can boot them out of ministry forever. No matter that it was thirty years ago, that he had repented, that by the grace of God his life was put back in order, that he has been for decades a faithful, effective, and beloved priest. Zero tolerance! Out! How many Fr. Xs are there? Now we will almost certainly never know. And that because few will be inclined to volunteer themselves for clerical execution, and that with good reason. They may well tell themselves that they cannot in good conscience be complicit in destroying the ministry they have been given by God and the Church. The bishops have not the authority, they have not the right, to demand that as a price for the public relations advantage of making themselves look tough on sex abuse. Another name for the zero tolerance policy adopted at Dallas is scapegoating.

In setting themselves against their priests, the bishops have turned themselves into assistant district attorneys determined to prove themselves tougher than their bosses. Note what counts as an offense for which a priest is removed from ministry for life. A sexual offense, the charter says, is not "necessarily to be equated with the definitions of sexual abuse or other crimes in civil law." You think civil law is rigorous? Just wait until you see the gospel at work. Here is the definition of sexual abuse adopted by the bishops: "Sexual abuse includes contacts or interactions between a child and an adult when the child is being used as an object of sexual gratification for the adult. A child is abused whether or not this activity involves explicit force, whether or not it involves genital or physical contact, whether or not it is initiated by the child, and whether or not there is discernible harmful outcome."

There need be no fondling, no pinch, no touch, no words, no discernible harm. Indeed, it would seem that the "victim" need not even be aware that he or she was the object of abuse. The priest falls into erotic musing as an attractive sixteen-year-old passes by, and receives a measure of sexual gratification. Jesus called it committing adultery in the heart, a sin Jimmy Carter famously confessed in a *Playboy* interview many years ago. A good thing Mr. Carter did not want to be a priest. After the vote some bishops said that everything was so rushed and they did not know the definition of abuse was so loose and potentially abusive of priests. You voted for it, sir. You voted to make it mandatory, with absolutely no exceptions, that a priest be excluded forever from ministry for anything that might fall within the above definition of a sexual offense. This is not for "the good of the Church." This has nothing to do with "the protection of children and young people." This is panic, and panic results in recklessness.

This is also among the things that canon law, developed over the centuries, is designed to prevent. Astonishingly, many of the bishops are trained in canon law. Canon lawyers who were not at the epicenter of the panic in Dallas point out that, for all the tough talk, the charter adopted has no juridical force whatever. A priest who is booted under the Dallas dictates could presumably appeal for due process under canon law. In any event, it is confidently asserted, Rome will never give its approval to the charter. The problem is that Rome may take months to respond to Dallas, and meanwhile hundreds of priests may be publicly shamed and exiled from the Church's ministry. Ah, well, when you're into scapegoating, you accept that sacrifices must be made. Wasn't it John F. Kennedy, that fine Catholic, who observed that life is unfair?

Not, of course, that the bishops let themselves off entirely. In the same speech, Bishop Gregory says that any bishop who is guilty of even one offense, no matter how long ago or what his life and ministry have been since, should tell the papal nuncio so that he can report it to Rome. Right. Maybe some bishops will do that, but we will likely never know. Rome, however, is not patient with ploys such as zero tolerance, and will probably tell any such bishop to go back to work and clean up any messes he has made. Having been told by Rome to stay on, it is doubtful that bishops will step down.

But it is objected that a draconian, no mercy, zero tolerance rule is necessary to "protect the children." That is another untruth added to all the other untruths in this sordid crisis. Let us stipulate that reprehensible things have been done to children and young people. That is heartbreakingly evident to anyone equipped with common sense and a conscience. My point here is that there is not a scintilla

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of evidence that a person who did a stupidly wicked thing many years ago and is repentant and has rendered decades of faithful service without a hint of suspicion poses any threat whatever to children or anyone else. We used to call that redemption. Such a person is not to be thrown out as an abuser but welcomed as a forgiven sinner to the company of forgiven sinners that is the Church. The bishops are paying a high price for making themselves look good in the eyes of a media that is largely indifferent to the gospel that bishops are to serve. Pity the priests who are on the receiving end of this punitive policy, and their people. But the bishops, too, bear a burden. For instance, wrestling with their consciences about how to square "one strike and you're out" with the teachings of the One who spoke about forgiving seventy times seven. He did not say to the one who denied him three times, "Sorry, Peter, one strike and you're out." The morning after the Dallas vote, all the bishops celebrated Mass. I wonder how many noticed how often the words of the Mass appeal for mercy, declaring our utter dependence upon forgiveness. And if they did, I wonder if they thought about their vote the day before. I hope that at least some of them were worrying that, just maybe, they had tried to save their public relations skins at the price of betraying the gospel.

Sins Against Justice and Mercy

Among the most elementary of elementary rules in every recognized system of justice is that you cannot make laws that apply retroactively. That is precisely what the bishops did in adopting zero tolerance and draconian punishment for vaguely defined incidents not only of the present and future but also of the past. Priests who for years have been thanking God that they are forgiven, healed, and restored to faithful ministry are now told to take back their gratitude. They are instructed that the good of the Church, meaning the public image of the bishops, is not compatible with the gift of redemption. Another elementary rule of justice is the presumption of innocence. Now, it would seem, an accused priest is guilty until proven innocent. The bishops quote the words of the Pope in their April meeting: "There is no place in the priesthood or religious life for those who would harm the young." That is certainly true, but is there any credible evidence that this priest would harm the young?

The bishops do not trust themselves to make that judgment because they believe, with reason, that they are not trusted to make that judgment, especially by the media. There was much talk in Dallas about the need to restore trust in the bishops. Abandoning one's responsibility to make judgments is an odd way of restoring trust in one's ability to make judgments. The accused are to be peremptorily removed from ministry, with all the public shame attendant upon such removal. The charter considerately adds: "When the accusation has proved to be unfounded, every step possible will be taken to restore the good name of the priest or deacon." Right. The bishops had a historic opportunity to show, with the whole world watching, how Christians deal with sin and grace, mercy and justice. Sadly, the opportunity was missed. Life provides many occasions when we must deal with offenses and alleged offenses of various kinds, and then we pray that we will sin neither against mercy nor against justice. The bishops in Dallas managed to sin against both.

In an op-ed article in the *Times* before the Dallas meeting, Cardinal Dulles expressed his hope that Rome would correct mistakes the bishops might make in the "panic" of their reaction to the crisis. It is no secret that some bishops not only share his hope but count on Rome to reject or revise the policies they voted for. The cynical view, unfortunately not entirely without warrant, is that Rome will once again have to take the heat for reining in the American bishops. The bishops can then say that they tried to be tough, determined, and uncompromising, but Rome wouldn't let them. This line plays to the amusing proposition that the American bishops can and should govern the Church in America without the restraints imposed by Rome, a proposition wondrously vindicated, the jaded might observe, by the current scandals.

The bishops in Dallas called for an end to paying hush money to accusers. Hush money is the somewhat unfair term for out of court settlements that include a confidentiality agreement. In the business, medical, and other worlds, out of court settlements, with or without confidentiality agreements, are a daily routine of American life, and there is a great deal to be said for settling disputes out of court. But now the bishops say there will be no confidentiality agreements, unless the accuser insists upon it. The big losers here are the lawyers who have been "bundling" accusations. Even if they had but the flimsiest evidence, their threat of creating public scandal induced dioceses to pay big money to keep the accusations secret. The bright side, so to speak, of the bishops' public humiliation may be that the threat will no longer work. A diocese can challenge lawyers to prove their case in court. As for the scandal when the accusation is made public, if you're already covered with mud one more splattering hardly matters.

Despite elements of evasion, panic, scapegoating, and other desperate efforts to wriggle out of their bad fix, the bishops will not get off scot free. Far from it.

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They have already suffered severely, and the Church with them. They are not trusted, and they have exacerbated the distrust by making it painfully clear that they do not trust themselves to do the job that bishops are ordained to do, which is to be *episcopoi*, meaning overseers. They have set up a national, and presumably independent, body to oversee the overseers. The body is headed by Frank Keating, the Catholic governor of Oklahoma. It includes also Robert Bennett, who defended Bill Clinton in the Monica Lewinsky affair. He knows about sleaze. The board of overseers does not include his brother Bill, perhaps because Bill has publicly called on at least two-thirds of the bishops to resign their offices.

In the second installment of these scandal reflections, I mentioned that I had been told that, before all this is over, there will be bishops in jail. At the time I thought that pretty far out, but I wrote that it seemed ever more possible. Now it seems to be edging up toward probability. It appears that Governor Keating may agree. He writes in an op-ed piece that "where a bishop is found to have provable knowledge of illegal activities committed by a priest under his charge, and where that bishop knowingly covered up such activities, he should also be held legally accountable as an accessory to the crimes involved." From published accounts and from confidential reports, it would seem that quite a few bishops meet that description. Four bishops have already resigned in scandals involving homosexual activity, and a fifth, my friend James McCarthy, auxiliary bishop of New York, resigned over affairs with women. ("It's a relief to know that he's orthodox," a colleague quipped.) Two-thirds of the 194 ordinaries, or heads of dioceses, are charged in the press with having engaged in some kind of cover-up or complicity in criminal activity. But most of these do not meet the description of miscreance offered by Keating. I would not be surprised if we see more episcopal resignations in the months ahead, with bishops in the dock and a few in jail. It is not a pretty prospect.

A Story That Will Not Die

Yet Dallas was a limited success as an exercise in damage control. One way of understanding what has happened is that the media firestorm was contained. It will continue to smolder, flickering upon each new exposure of clerical abuse, and breaking momentarily into flames if a cardinal archbishop resigns or a bishop goes to jail. But, in this view, there is a natural life cycle of even big stories. The dramatic script or story line of this one has played itself out, or so some believe. It began with scandals in Louisiana in the mid-eighties; it gained momentum, reaching for national play, but then it was aborted, or at least derailed for a time, by the false charges against Cardinal Bernardin of Chicago. It returned in fury with the exposures in Boston last January, reached a crescendo around Holy Week, and resolved into closure, as they say, with the capitulation of the bishops in Dallas. That's one way of understanding the drama. For obvious reasons, most of the bishops hope it turns out that way.

I expect they will be disappointed. From the media perspective, this story is just too good to let it die. Having the Catholic Church—the oldest and most venerable, the most loved and hated, institution in the world—on the defensive is a journalist's dream. The opportunity to probe its previously secret inner workings, and to bring into disrepute its moral authority (now portrayed as hypocritical moral pretensions), is simply irresistible. Every issue in the culture wars—most of them tied in one way or another to sex, sex, and sex—is deliciously engaged. In addition, the Catholic Church—unlike other institutions, religious or otherwise—is so very "colorful," what with popes and miters, saints and incense, exorcisms and miracles, Inquisitions and Crusades, not to mention the enticingly mysterious worlds of monastic vows and the confessional seal. This story has everything—power struggles, conspiracy, holiness, corruption, victims, victimizers, and, of course, sex, sex, and sex. I do not say that all journalists are anti-Catholic. Many of them are not; some of them are deeply devoted to the Church. But all of them are journalists, and journalists love a good story. This is a great, maybe even a historic, story. It is irresistible. They will not let it die.

One angle with rich possibilities is what will be depicted as the conflict between Rome and the American bishops. Admittedly, that's an old story, but now with the different dimension of a more cautious and even compassionate Rome pitted against bishops determined to prove their toughness by casting priests into the outer darkness. That different way of staging a familiar conflict may be confusing at first and could go in unpredictable directions, but it will be greatly enlivened by the prospect of a conclave and the election of a new pope in the offing. For Americans whose view of the universal Church is a little like that famous *New Yorker* map of a world dominated by Manhattan, everything happening in Rome will be about scandals here.

The story will be given additional legs as the Dallas charter is implemented and good and beloved priests are removed from ministry. There may be hundreds of such dramas. In many cases, priests will not have to turn themselves in. Their offenses from the distant past are already in the bishop's files. These dramas are even now being enacted in the press. The depiction of

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good guy/bad guy pits faithful and popular priest against vindictive and unforgiving bishop. Parishes may rise in rebellion, and some priests will not go gently into the night of banishment. The perception of the Catholic Church might be substantively changed. No longer will the Church be understood as, in James Joyce's marvelous phrase, "Here comes everybody." It may come to be seen as a community for people who do not have some awful secret in their past. People burdened with a past may begin to seek out some other church community that, following a venerable precedent, "welcomes sinners and eats with them" (Luke 15:2).

As I say, the possible twists and turns of this story are unpredictable, but the story is not going to go away. In Dallas, following the advice of their hired public relations experts, the bishops capitulated in order to avoid further embarrassment, and the consequence will be greater embarrassment and demands for further capitulation. (Have I mentioned that many bishops are good, devoted, and honorable men? Let the record so show. Although it is rather beside the point.) The bishops assiduously avoided any mention of the H-word, and that may have been prudent. There may be oblique reference to the problem in the charter's words on seminaries and priestly formation, but the bishops knew that the H-word is a media H-bomb, and they cringed at the thought of the almost certain headline if they had used it: "Bishops Mandate Witch-hunt Against Gays." Undoubtedly, they are all keenly aware that homosexuality in the priesthood is, as Mary Eberstadt put it in her much-discussed *Weekly Standard* article, "the elephant in the sacristy." Most reporters don't want to mention it. Others almost dare the bishops to mention it and thereby detonate the charge of homophobia. But it seems the policy at present is to tiptoe around the elephant in the hope that it will go away. One may be permitted to doubt that the elephant will be so accommodating.

I have said it so often on television, radio, and in print that I begin to sound like a broken record, to myself if not to others: this crisis is about three things—fidelity, fidelity, and fidelity. The simple and irrefutable fact is that if bishops and priests had been faithful to the Church's teaching and their sacred vows, there would be no crisis. That is the fact quite totally evaded at Dallas.

Where We Have Been

Since this is probably not the last installment of "Scandal Time," it is worth recalling where we have been and then bring it back to the present. The first installment in April set forth why this really is a crisis, and why it is both false and self-defeating to blame it on the media or anti-Catholicism, or a combination of both. This is our crisis. It cannot be understood apart from the cultural milieu of the sixties when, in a confused concatenation of events, the *aggiornamento* proposed by the Second Vatican Council was hijacked to mean that the Church should conform itself to the culture, just at the time when the culture was being radically deformed. A critical turning point was the organized and public defiance by Catholic theologians and some bishops of Paul VI's encyclical on human sexuality, including contraception, *Humanae Vitae*. The failure of the bishops to respond to that defiance and to vigorously communicate the message of the encyclical constitutes the moment at which the American bishops ceased to be teachers. (Bishops are ordained to "teach, sanctify, and govern," and the first of these is to teach.) In a very real way, they stopped being bishops and became business managers and practitioners of group dynamics in an amorphous and increasingly fractious constituency, their chief job being to keep all factions on board and to avoid "divisiveness." Truth and fidelity can sometimes divide. So much for truth and fidelity.

The 1968 recognition that the Church's teaching on faith and morals could be defied with impunity ushered in a period of "wink and nudge" also with respect to sexuality, in its sundry expressions. After being hit with scandals, lawsuits, and multimillion-dollar settlements, the bishops, in the early 1990s, tried to bring the situation under control, especially in the seminaries. This met with a measure of success, and it is notable that almost all the known instances of abuse date from the seventies and eighties. When the dam of past episcopal miscreance broke in Boston last January, district attorneys began to be more assertive about the possible complicity of bishops in criminal acts, and bishops felt forced to compromise traditional and legal prerogatives related to the Church's right to govern itself. I observed that the compromising of the right of ecclesial self-governance (*libertas ecclesiae*) may have deeply troubling consequences for the future of the free exercise of religion, and not only for Catholics.

In the second installment (June/July), I noted that what was at first called a "pedophilia" crisis was now recognized by almost everyone as a crisis created by adult men having sex of various sorts with adolescent and older teenage boys. The H-word is unavoidable, although many strive mightily to avoid it or to complexify it into oblivion. I surveyed the rapidly accumulating literature in support of the significance of the homosexuality factor, and criticized those who try to change the subject by advocating the relaxation of the discipline of celibacy. I described the role of the Catholic Theological Society of America in promoting

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deviance from Catholic teaching and the trumping of the doctrinal by the therapeutic. This invited an extended reflection on Philip Rieff's classic work *The Triumph of the Therapeutic*, and its prescient analysis of what would happen if, after Vatican II, Catholic leaders replaced the spiritual with the psychological (or equated the two), turning therapy into something very much like a new religion. I concluded by saying that Dallas would be a debacle if the bishops did not address in a straightforward manner the three causes of the crisis—infidelity, infidelity, and infidelity.

Meanwhile in Milwaukee

That brought us up to the April meeting with cardinals and bishops convened by the Pope in Rome. But before getting to that, there was another development deserving of at least brief notice, the resignation of Archbishop Rembert Weakland of Milwaukee. Actually, he had resigned a little earlier at the mandatory age of seventy-five, but his resignation was swiftly accepted when it was revealed that he had paid $450,000 of archdiocesan funds to a blackmailer with whom he had an affair almost twenty years earlier, when the young creep was in his early thirties. Many conservatives indulged the sin of *Schadenfreude* (what in older moral manuals is known by the delightful phrase "morose delectation") upon Weakland's downfall, for he was the most conspicuous of the decreasing minority of unabashedly liberal bishops. It was a sleazy affair, with the newspapers publishing Weakland's long and maudlin love letter to the young man—a letter not untouched by poignant moments of contrition. Here was a man in his mid-fifties, once abbot of a prestigious monastery, then world leader of the Benedictine order, and for years head of a major archdiocese, a man of cultured achievement and exquisitely correct opinions who was long accustomed to being lionized by the liberal media, now exposed as besottedly in love with a hustler whom he begs to believe that he has no more money with which to buy him off. But, as it turned out, the archdiocese did have money. It was not an edifying spectacle.

Reacting to the exposure, Margaret Steinfels, editor of the liberal *Commonweal*, complained about a "witch-hunt" and spoke glowingly of Weakland's leadership in favored liberal causes. The public exposure of a long-past affair, and the publication of the painfully personal letter, would seem to violate journalistic boundaries, were they not unavoidably related to what is undeniably a story of legitimate public interest, namely, the Archbishop of Milwaukee was for eighteen years under the threat of blackmail, and paid off with $450,000 of archdiocesan funds. His humiliating exit was made the more humiliating by his claim that he had over the years given his income from honoraria and royalties to the archdiocese, and that amounted to more than the money paid in blackmail. It turned out that his gifts to the archdiocese were less than half the payout, but the more troubling thing is that he seemed to believe that what he had given was still his to use for his personal purposes, which suggests that he had not really given anything at all. It appears the man is terribly confused.

With embarrassed haste, the sponsors of the annual Cardinal Bernardin Award for distinguished church leadership, an award closely associated with *Commonweal*, canceled the June gala at which it was to be bestowed upon Rembert Weakland. I can honestly say that I took no satisfaction from his crashing in flames. His airs of superiority and his incessant boasting that Rome viewed him as a "maverick" could be galling at times. But he was also a man of notable talents and considerable charm, to whom everything had been given. He could have been a contender for something great. It is an unspeakable sadness. I do not give up on the hope that, after some years of penance, a chastened Rembert Weakland might write a reflective memoir, having by then discovered, please God, a measure of the wisdom that was so conspicuously absent from a brilliant career built upon prideful foundations that now, through a combination of tragedy and farce, lie in ruins.

The Most Important Thing

Turn now to the April meeting convened by the Pope. Among the many important things said by the Holy Father, I believe the most important was this: "The Catholic faithful must know that bishops and priests are totally committed to the fullness of Catholic truth on matters of sexual morality, a truth as essential to the renewal of the priesthood and the episcopate as it is to the renewal of marriage and family life." In other words, if bishops and priests do not keep their vows, how can lay people be expected to keep their vows of fidelity in marriage? In the official statements surrounding the Dallas meeting, and in the charter adopted, words of the Pope in the April meeting are frequently cited. The above statement is not mentioned once. At Dallas, fidelity was not on the agenda.

The Pope said something else in the April meeting that was conveniently ignored at Dallas: "We cannot forget the power of Christian conversion, that radical decision to turn away from sin and back to God, which reaches to the depths of a person's soul and can work extraordinary change." In the public relations game plan of responding, with the whole world watching, to relentless activists possessed by an insatiable appetite

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for vengeance (a.k.a. closure), the bishops adopted the alien vocabulary of "zero tolerance" and "one strike," a vocabulary in which there is no place for words such as conversion, repentance, soul, and redemption. A gospel response, the experts told them, would not play, and the bishops, some of them with obvious reluctance and uneasy conscience, went along with the game plan "for the good of the Church." They supinely agreed to prove they were tough by adopting a punitive policy of unforgiving vindictiveness. The Pope was wrong: we can forget the power of Christian conversion.

In all this Bishop Wilton Gregory, president of the episcopal conference, played a notable role. He had been widely viewed as a company man, a product of Bernardin's Chicago machine of church politics, who was, at least in part, elected president, it was said sotto voce, because it would look good to have a black man in that very public post. In fact, Bishop Gregory has demonstrated that he is a man capable of vigorous leadership and not devoid of courage. Prior to the Dallas meeting he several times dared to use the H-word, expressing in public the concern that the priesthood may come to be perceived as dominantly homosexual. Presiding at Dallas, he ran a tight ship, keeping the bishops on message. Regrettably, by then it had become the wrong message.

There were some fine moments, rhetorically and substantively, in his opening address at Dallas. For instance, he told the bishops:

> We are the ones, whether through ignorance or lack of vigilance, or—God forbid—with knowledge, who allowed priest abusers to remain in ministry and reassigned them to communities where they continue to abuse.
>
> We are the ones who chose not to report the criminal actions of priests to the authorities, because the law did not require this.
>
> We are the ones who worried more about the possibility of scandal than in bringing about the kind of openness that helps prevent abuse.
>
> And we are the ones who, at times, responded to victims and their families as adversaries and not as suffering members of the Church.

Bracing stuff, that. But, by the end of his address and by the end of the meeting, it was obvious that the message is, "They are the ones." Zero tolerance, one strike, boot them out of ministry. Of course the victim activists are still not satisfied, and, sadly, may never be satisfied, but the bishops have succeeded in scandalizing the faithful anew by adopting a thoroughly unbiblical, untraditional, and un-Catholic approach to sin and grace. As in Shakespeare's "strange eventful history," they end up adopting a policy that is sans repentance, sans conversion, sans forbearance, sans prudential judgment, sans forgiveness, sans almost everything one might have hoped for from bishops of the Church of Jesus Christ.

In his address, Gregory said, "We need to put aside that which could distract us and set our sights solely on the task at hand: a full and recommitted effort toward the protection of our children and young people." The protection of children and young people is an imperative beyond question or qualification, and of course anyone who poses a credible threat to them must have no place in the Church's ministry. It is not a "distraction," however, but the hard and central fact that so many children and young people have been abused because it is manifestly not the case that "bishops and priests are totally committed to the fullness of Catholic truth on matters of sexual morality." John Paul challenged the bishops to confront the hard and central fact of infidelity. The bishops at Dallas put the challenge aside, lest it distract them from the game plan.

There is no end to what might be said and should be said about the Long Lent of 2002. The books are already appearing. Most of them, to judge by what I've seen of them and their advance notices, are by authors who want to change the subject—to what's wrong with church teaching on sexuality, to celibacy, to women's ordination, to democratizing decision making, to anything but fidelity. I'm looking forward, however, to George Weigel's book occasioned by the scandals, *The Courage to be Catholic*, which should be out in a few weeks from Basic Books.

Bishop Gregory had it right in the first part of his address: the bishops are the ones. They have not covered themselves with glory. There are very good, holy, competent, courageous, and devoted bishops. Others no doubt have their lists of such bishops and I have mine. Admittedly, my list is a short one, but then virtues, especially courage, are always in short supply. And if some whom I esteem failed at Dallas, I'm certainly not going to take the position of one strike and you're off the list. We hear calls that all or most of the bishops should resign forthwith. There are at least two things wrong with that. For all their carefully choreographed image of sensitivity as good listeners, I doubt that many bishops have an open mind to the idea that they should step down. The second thing wrong with the idea is its assumption that there is a second and better team to replace what we have. There is little reason to believe that is the case. In any event, some bishops, perhaps many, will be stepping down, whether they think it a good idea or not.

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In Distressing Disguise

Mother Teresa said that in the poor we are to see Christ in distressed disguise. And so in the bishops we are to see the apostles, whose successors they are, in distressing disguise. The distressing disguise is reinforced by a culture of clericalism in which bishops and priests, and especially priests who would be bishops, tacitly assume that they are the Church which it is the purpose of the laity to keep in business. Living in a clerical cocoon, they are accustomed to a deference that most of the faithful are happy to render. Peggy Noonan, reflecting on the traditionally preeminent status of the archbishop in the life of Boston, says she has over the years watched politicians and other public figures who move in a bubble of prestige surrounded by taken for granted deference. "In my experience," she writes, "the star treatment has never improved anybody's character."

Yet we believe that this is how Our Lord has structured his Church—with bishops as successors of the apostles, with and under the successor of Peter—and we should be most reluctant to second-guess Our Lord. In short, these are the bishops we have, and there is no structural change that can make them better be the bishops that God called them to be, that they were ordained to be, and that the faithful have a right to expect them to be. Only personal conversion can do that. Respect for the bishops is probably at its lowest ebb in the history of the Church in America. Pray that their conversion may be completed.

In his memoirs of his early years, Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger writes about his village in Bavaria and how, when he was ordained priest, the people declared a festival of several days with endless processions and feasting, and he was the center of attention. It was a heady experience. Ratzinger writes that he had to tell himself again and again, "Joseph, this is not for you. This is for Christ and his Church." And so outraged and disappointed Catholics will swallow hard and continue to honor and, when put to it, even obey their bishops, all the time making clear, "This is not for you. This is for Christ and his Church." They will continue to see in their bishops the apostles whom Jesus appointed, no matter how distressing the disguise.

Do I continue to hope, as I wrote earlier, that this Long Lent will bring us to resurrection and renewal, that the time of *mea culpa* will be succeeded by *felix culpa*, the celebration of happy fault that occasioned so great a redemption? Oh yes. I do not know, mind you, but I hope, as must we all. It may be five years or fifty years from now, but I hope and I believe that the time will come when Catholics in America will look back on 2002 and thank God that He visited us with "the rod of His wrath and the staff of His anger." It will then be seen as the winter of painful purification, opening the way to a springtime of renewal. I am praying that will be the case, even as evidence accumulates that there will almost certainly have to be a "Scandal Time IV," and who knows how many after that.

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THE ADVERSARIAL COURTS

In November 1996, we published a symposium, "The End of Democracy?", on what we called "the judicial usurpation of politics," and it stirred up quite a storm. The essay by the distinguished jurist and constitutional scholar Robert H. Bork on "lawless law" was an important part of that symposium, and he returns to that subject in a comprehensive and devastating article in the *New Criterion*, titled "Adversary Jurisprudence." He employs as an epigraph an assertion by Oliver Wendell Holmes: "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by law." That is juxtaposed with a statement by the contemporary professor of law, Lino Graglia: "The nightmare of the American intellectual is that the control of public policy should fall into the hands of the American people. . . . Policymaking by the justices of the Supreme Court, intellectuals all, in the name of the Constitution, is the only way in which this can be prevented."

Bork surveys a long and depressing series of decisions—on free speech, pornography, contraception, abortion, sexual equality, etc.—in which the Supreme Court, claiming the authority of the Constitution, has taken public policy out of the hands of the people and their elected representatives. Driving such judicial usurpation of politics is not only intellectual hubris but also a curious notion of individual rights. Bork cites instances relative to the alleged "establishment" of religion. "The same radical individualism determined the result in *Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe* (2000). The school district authorized two student elections, one to decide whether invocations, messages, or statements should be delivered at home football games and a second to select a student to deliver them. The Court held the school district's policy a forbidden establishment of religion. Dislike of majority rule surfaced in Justice Stevens' opinion for the majority: '[T]his student election does nothing to protect minority views but rather places the students who hold such views at the

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mercy of the majority. School sponsorship of a religious message is impermissible because it sends the ancillary message to members of the audience who are nonadherents "that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community.'" Religious speech must have extraordinary political power. All of us have heard actual *political* speech with which we heartily disagreed without feeling any the less members of the political community. But where religion is concerned, even imaginary discomfort to a hypothetical individual overrides the reasonable desires of the community."

But the current Supreme Court, Bork writes, is relatively "balanced" in comparison with what is being taught in law schools today. The legal theories that dominate the schools take it for granted that the challenge of lawyers is to get the courts to remake society along the lines they favor. Quaint notions about what the Founders intended or what the Constitution actually says will have to go the way of antiquated ideas about representative democracy. "Perhaps there is no remedy for judicial activism, perhaps a preference for immediate victories and short-term gratification of desires is characteristic of the spirit of our times. The public does seem ready to jettison long-term safeguards and the benefits of process for the short-term satisfaction of desires. That is always and everywhere the human temptation. But it is precisely that temptation that a constitution and its judicial spokesmen are supposed to protect us against. Constitutions speak for permanent values and judges are supposed to give those values voice. Instead, representatives of our judiciary are all too often, and increasingly, exemplars of disrespect for the rule of law. That situation is inconsistent with the survival of the culture that has for so long sustained American freedom and well-being. The example of lawless courts teaches a lesson of disrespect for process to all other actors in that system, the lesson that winning outside the rules is legitimate, and that political victory is the only virtue."

But what about the people and their elected representatives? Any impulse to rebellion is effectively sedated. "A Court that in one context after another lays down general principles of emancipation commends that principle to public attention and imitation and thus affects legislative opinion. Many people assume that what is legal is also moral, and they are all too likely to believe that what has been declared unconstitutional is immoral. Resistance to judicial imperialism in the name of the Constitution itself comes to be seen as immoral."

Bork's conclusion is nothing if not straightforward: "Unless it takes its law from the original understanding of the Constitution's principles, the Court will continue to be an adversary to democratic government and to the morality of our traditional culture."

The Supreme Court and the other courts following its lead have become the adversary of democratic government and of the morality affirmed by the great majority of Americans. This is a profound violation of what the Founders understood as just government derived from the consent of the governed. In 1996 we were widely criticized for describing this state of affairs as an illegitimate regime. A regime is a mode of rule or management; in this instance a mode of misrule and mismanagement. It is contrary to our constitutional order and is therefore illegitimate. But is it the case that, after so long a time of misrule, the governed have in fact given their consent to the abrogation of the principle that just government is derived from the consent from the governed? We must fervently hope that is not the case. It is no criticism to observe that Robert Bork's "Adversary Jurisprudence" does not say much that is new. But it must be said again and again. The stakes are very high. There may not be a hope of remedy in sight, but we dare not let ourselves get used to this illegitimate regime.

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THE WISDOM OF THE ELDERS

It was that time of year again, and thousands of commencement speakers hoped that millions of graduates would remember their words better than the speakers remember what was said when they commenced. At the University of Rochester, James O. Freedman, former President of Dartmouth, held forth. "Someone once asked Woodrow Wilson when he was President of Princeton University what the function of a liberal education ought to be. And Wilson replied, 'To make a person as unlike his father as possible.'" So much for education as the transmission of a heritage. I don't know if Wilson actually said that, but, if so, it would be a kindness to his memory to forget it. A liberal education, Freedman went on to say, "ought to make a person independent of mind, skeptical of authority and received views, prepared to forge an identity for himself or herself, and capable of becoming an individual not bent upon copying other persons—even persons as persuasive and influential as one's father." There you have it: independence, skepticism, individualism, forging a unique identity—I wannabe Me! One does hope the

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students were skeptical of the authority of their commencement speaker.

At the Fashion Institute of Technology in New York City, the actor Alec Baldwin dispensed wisdom. Mr. Baldwin, it may be recalled, raised hopes when he said he would leave the country if George W. Bush became President, but then reneged on his promise. Baldwin told the students of fashion that "billions of people around the world" buy all kinds of things in order to "make a statement to the best of their ability, and within the boundaries of their own tastes and budgets, about who they are." The problem is that "most of them are not creative people. They just don't have that gene. They haven't developed that muscle. So the uncreative people of the world rely on the creative people of the world to help them." There you have it: a perfect match of creative speaker and creative graduates, locked in mutual admiration. None dare call it elitism.

Julian Bond of the NAACP did the honors at Susquehanna University, a putatively Lutheran school in Pennsylvania. He quoted someone who had escaped from the World Trade Center on September 11 who said, "If you'd seen what it was like in that stairway, you'd be proud. There was no gender, no race, no religion. It was everyone helping each other." To which Mr. Bond commented, "But away from that stairway—in America's streets—there is gender, there is race, there is religion." Mr. Bond has, over his many years, done his bit to get rid of gender and religion, even as he has made his living by race, the difference that, one might suggest, should make the least difference.

Then there was Anna Quindlen at Sarah Lawrence College. "When I quit the *New York Times* to be a full-time mother, the voices of the world said I was nuts," she declared. Think of that. From Hamburg to Bangladesh, from Stockholm to Shanghai, from Honduras to the remotest reaches of Siberia, the voices of the world joined in declaring, "Anna Quindlen is nuts!" Ms. Quindlen exhorted the students to be radical individualists, following her example. "Each of you is as different as your fingertips. Why should you march to any lockstep? Our love of lockstep is our greatest curse, the source of all that bedevils us. It is the source of homophobia, xenophobia, racism, sexism, terrorism, bigotry of every variety and hue, because it tells us there is one right way to do things, to look, to behave, to feel, when the only right way is to feel your heart hammering inside you and to listen to what its timpani is saying."

One imagines a graduate of independent mind in the audience whose timpani was telling her that Anna Quindlen is the quintessential representative of the self-flattering feminism that has turned the lives of so many women into a misery. Ms. Quindlen would, in no uncertain terms, let such a student know that that is the wrong response and she had better get back in step with folks like her who repudiate marching in lockstep. That's the logic that has always prevailed among the herd of independent minds.

In hope of relief from the deluge of commencement bullfeathers, I turned to the famously conservative novelist Tom Wolfe, who spoke at Duke University. He's interested in neuroscience and said, "Let's not kid ourselves. We're all concatenations of molecules containing DNA, hard wired into a chemical analog computer known as the human brain, which as software has a certain genetic code. And your idea that you have a soul or even a self, much less free will, is just an illusion."

There you have it: the elders offering final counsel to the successor generation, the beneficiaries of the greatest educational system in the world, the bearers of civilization's legacy across new frontiers of human aspiration and achievement. Another generation of Ralph Waldo Emerson's children, exhorted to preen themselves on their individualistic conformism, remembering always, of course, that none of it is true.

FT

While We're At It

■ Only in New York. An Orthodox rabbi is the director of the Kosher Law Enforcement Division of the New York State Department of Agriculture and Markets. His job is to make sure that food that bears the label "kosher" really is kosher. Anyone who sells "kosher" food that is not certified is committing fraud. This arrangement has worked just fine for more than a century. Now, wouldn't you know it, some "strict separationist" fanatics have brought suit, claiming that the arrangement constitutes an unconstitutional "establishment of religion." And a panel of judges on the Second United States Circuit Court of Appeals has agreed with them. If someone wants to sell "kosher" food without getting the Orthodox imprimatur, maybe he can label it "kosher lite." That is an oxymoron, of course, since being a little kosher is like being a little pregnant. The indisputable fact is that Orthodox standards serve all Jews of whatever level of religious observance, whereas allowing non-Orthodox standards would defraud those who are seriously observant. In New York and in other places with a large and varied Jewish community, it is a simple

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matter of consumer protection. The judges say the traditional arrangement constitutes an "excessive entanglement" in religion by the state. The only thing excessive in this case is the extremism of ideologues who insist that government can in no way recognize the existence and importance of religion. This is hardly the most important issue in the battle against zealots who would impose a naked public square, and I expect there may be other ways of reassuring consumers that kosher food really is kosher, but it is a particularly dumb ruling by the courts that should not go unremarked.

■ Why is so much contemporary art deliberately depraved, perverse, ugly, and determined to shock? Please be patient with me if I once again suggest that G. K. Chesterton put at least one part of the answer as well as it can be put. In *The Everlasting Man*, he discusses the decadence of Rome when, in the absence of true religion, the most creative minds indulged in a multitude of wildly conflicting mythologies "swarming like flies on a dung heap." He writes: "There comes an hour in the afternoon when the child is tired of 'pretending'; when he is weary of being a robber or a Red Indian. It is then that he torments the cat. There comes a time in the routine of an ordered civilization when the man is tired of playing at mythology and pretending that a tree is a maiden or that the moon made love to a man. The effect of this staleness is the same everywhere; it is seen in all drug-taking and dram-drinking and every form of the tendency to increase the dose. Men seek stranger sins or more startling obscenities as stimulants to their jaded sense. They seek after mad oriental religions for the same reason. They try to stab their nerves to life, if it were with the knives of the priests of Baal. They are walking in their sleep and try to wake themselves up with nightmares." There are other answers, to be sure, such as the dealers and collectors who control "the art world" and turn nightmares into cash. They are not so much jaded as cynical, capitalizing on depravity while enjoying a frisson of complicity in the artist's contempt for their safe and affluent lives. Having rejected the three transcendentals of the good, the true, and the beautiful, what is the alternative?

■ National Marriage Week is an annual observance in Britain, partially financed by the government. The organizers' request for aid was turned down this year. But the Lesbian and Gay Foundation got £48,000, and the Project for Advocacy, Counseling, and Education, which promotes lesbian and gay issues, got £46,000. The director of National Marriage Week suggests that they might have received their grant had they changed their name to National Relationship Week.

■ I am regularly asked how FT is doing. Of course, the first answer to that is the quality of what we publish, and that is for the reader to judge. But the inquiry is usually about circulation—how many people are subscribing and how many are reading the journal. My flip answer is that our combined circulation is somewhat over fifteen million, meaning ours combined with that of the *Reader's Digest*. The serious answer is that our paid circulation bounces around 30,000. It is a little under this month and by the end of the year we hope it will be a little over again. Among publications dealing seriously with ideas and religion, that is encouraging. Somewhat comparable publications and their approximate circulations are: *Christian Century* (30,000), *Commonweal* (18,000), *Crisis* (17,000), *New Oxford Review* (12,000), *Catholic World Report* (11,000), *Books & Culture* (7,000). *America*, the Jesuit weekly, has the largest circulation, at about 38,000. A significant difference is that publications such as *America*, *Christian Century*, and *Commonweal* have been around for seventy-five years or more, and a substantial part of their circulation (up to 30 percent) is in library and institutional subscriptions. FT circulation is almost entirely individual subscriptions, which means people actually paying to read it. I very much wish we had more institutional subscriptions, and anything you can do to get FT into academic, parish, or local public libraries is greatly appreciated. In addition, there are the tens of thousands of people who regularly read FT (although not the current issue) on the website, and we are glad for that, although we do wish more would subscribe. So the answer to the question, How are we doing? is that we're doing reasonably well. Although I have a certain sympathy for Samuel Gompers' one-word answer to the question of what organized labor wants: "More."

■ Rabbi David Novak has already responded in these pages (May) to Professor Jon Levenson's attack on *Dabru Emet* (Speak the Truth), a statement on how Jews should understand Christianity signed by more than two hundred Jewish scholars. (See this issue's Correspondence for further discussion.) Prof. Levenson's article appeared in *Commentary*, and the April issue of that magazine devotes thirteen pages to letters, pro and con, and Levenson's response. In his article, Levenson worried that *Dabru Emet*'s affirmation of Jewish-Christian commonalities would have the effect of increasing intermarriage and Jewish conversions to Christianity. Rabbi Charles L. Arian of the Institute for Christian & Jewish Studies in Baltimore, which sponsored the *Dabru Emet* project, writes: "But Jews are intermarrying not because they no longer feel a repugnance for Christianity but

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rather because they have ceased to believe in and practice Judaism. Many Jews make no religious affirmation beyond the view that 'Jesus was not the messiah.' Their automatic antipathy toward Christian belief causes them to assume that whatever Christianity affirms, Judaism denies. A religious identity based on nothing more than the negation of 'the other' has no staying power." Eugene Fisher of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops takes Levenson to task for misrepresenting Catholic teaching on Jews and Judaism, to which Levenson makes the crabbed response that, yes, some things have changed but Catholics and other Christians still believe that they are right and Jews are wrong about who Jesus is and what theologically follows from that. About that he is undoubtedly right. What may be missed in this whole controversy is that Levenson's chief concern would seem to be not theology but the dangers to the Jewish community posed by a more generous understanding of Christianity. He writes, "The problem, however, comes when the two religions are presented as minor variations on a common theme—equally valid denominational variants of some overarching Judeo-Christian tradition. Under such a dispensation, it is hard to imagine that in a period of increased denomination-switching, the change will be to the advantage of Judaism." That depiction of *Dabru Emet* is a gross caricature, but Levenson's fear that a more sympathetic understanding of Christianity will lead to more Jews becoming Christians may be right. His critics don't think so. In his original article, Levenson wrote: "One need hardly be an advocate of interfaith hostility to observe that two communities that feel an instinctive repugnance toward each other are unlikely to form an amalgam, whether through acculturation or intermarriage. By the same token, communities that have largely overcome their animosity and moved to mutual respect, as Jews and Christians have done to a significant extent in the United States, must look elsewhere for such reinforcements to group identity as existed under the older and more contentious arrangement." The problem is that, in his article and in his response to his critics, Levenson does not "look elsewhere," or, if he did, he found no "reinforcements to group identity" other than the interfaith hostility exemplified by his argument. I do not say that Levenson is an "advocate" of interfaith hostility, for I know he is not. He is a valued contributor to Jewish-Christian dialogue, including conversations sponsored by this journal. But his reaction to *Dabru Emet* might well lead one to the dismal conclusion that Jewish identity and commitment is somehow at odds with, if I may borrow the phrase, speaking the truth. I am sure that is not how he wants to be understood.

■ Shamelessness veering toward the hilarious seldom gets better than this. Caroline Kennedy has edited a book, *Profiles in Courage for Our Time*, playing off the title of the book that her father didn't write. The Kennedy family established the Profiles in Courage Award, and the book is composed of essays on winners of the award, such as Russell Feingold, Anna Quindlen, Michael Beschloss, Albert R. Hunt, and Bob Woodward. *Publishers Weekly* gushes that these people "share the same Kennedy spirit," which spirit is explained this way: "Unabashedly liberal and pro-government, this collection is a stirring look at people who rarely thought about what they could do for themselves, but always about what they could do for their country." One fights against choking up. *PW* pushes the puff further by including an interview with Ms. Kennedy, who says of those profiled in the book, "They helped generate this overwhelming response after September 11, of what it means to be a public servant and what it means to be an American." How can we ever repay them?

■ It's not the biggest item in the campaign to smash taboos, but the good news appears smack middle on the front page of the *New York Times*, above the fold, "Few Risks Seen to the Children of First Cousins." "In the general population, the risk that a child will be born with a serious problem like spina bifida or cystic fibrosis is 3 percent to 4 percent; to that background risk, first cousins must add another 1.7 to 2.8 percentage points, the report said." The story continues: "Although the increase represents a near doubling of the risk, the result is still not considered large enough to discourage cousins from having children, said Dr. Arno Motulsky, a professor emeritus of medicine and genome sciences at the University of Washington, and the senior author of the report. 'In terms of general risks in life it's not very high,' Dr. Motulsky said. Even at its worst, 7 percent, he said, '93 percent of the time, nothing is going to happen.'" And, it turns out, there may be a 10 percent chance of having a child with a crippling or lethal disease. But, hey, what's to worry about? Ninety percent of the time nothing is going to happen.

■ The argument of Kai Nielsen's *Naturalism and Religion* (Prometheus) is not elusive, says Anthony Kenny in the *Times Literary Supplement*. "The overall message of this book is clear and simple: naturalism good, religion bad." Kenny does not find Nielsen's argument impressive, but he has a grudging respect for the man's genial solitude: "As one puts the book down, one realizes that Nielsen occupies a rather lonely position as a philosopher. As an atheist, he leaves behind all believing Jewish, Muslim, and

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Christian philosophers, including Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor, to whom, on human and social issues, he is often close. In rejecting scientism, he leaves behind his fellow atheists Quine, Smart, Armstrong, and Mackie. In rejecting all kinds of physicalism, he leaves behind fellow non-reductionist secularists such as Rorty, Davidson, and Dennett. In his hatred for capitalism and sympathy for Marx, he leaves behind right-wing atheists such as Ayn Rand and Antony Flew. Finally, he no doubt waves good-bye to a few remaining potential allies when he proclaims himself a Quebec sovereignist."

■ Thomas Fleming, editor of *Chronicles*, a magazine published by the Rockford Institute in Illinois, keeps his conciliatory impulses under tight control: "If [only] conservatives could ever get over the idea that they are running the country, if they could wake up to the fact that their enemies are destroying everything good, decent, and true. . . . We don't have to be rude or call them names. We can tell them, ever so politely, that ours is the party of Christ and theirs is the party of Antichrist. We create; they destroy; we remember; they forget. We speak truth; they lie—all the time and about everything. . . ." What about that don't you understand?

■ So-called true statements are not about how things really are but about who is in charge. That is the doctrine influentially promulgated by the late Michel Foucault and endorsed by Jeremy Campbell in *The Liar's Tale* (Norton). Raymond Tallis, in a brilliant review of Campbell in the *Times Literary Supplement*, notes that the truth, not the so-called truth, finally did Foucault in. And, through Foucault, many others. In his restless search for sadomasochistic adventures in San Francisco, Campbell acknowledges, Foucault "did not communicate to his partners the life-or-death-dealing truth" that he was infected by AIDS. Tallis observes, "The resulting death toll, given that Foucault was wealthy enough to buy whatever he wanted, can only be surmised." That's the hard truth. Campbell is a Darwinian materialist who believes that evolution has wired us to tell lies, just as the nature of which we are part tells lies. This against the notion that there is a *logos* or created symmetry between nature and human thought. Here Tallis offers an admirably succinct summary of the history of the idea that Campbell and those of like mind are promoting: "The bewilderingly varied assaults on this optimistic idea of a fundamental attunement between the human mind and the universe are very accessibly summarized. Among many others, we encounter in rapid succession: Parmenides, who questioned the pre-established harmony between human intelligence and the intelligence inherent in the universe, on the grounds of the divorce between the superior truths revealed by reason and that revealed to sense experience; Plato, who placed truth even further out of the reach of sense experience; the sophists, for whom truth, anyway compromised by the schism between nature (*physis*) and culture (*nomos*), was less important than winning arguments; nominalists, who taught that discourse provided no window onto transcendent reality, because the language in which truth was cast was made up of arbitrary signs attached somewhat at random to things; Descartes, who inaugurated an endless quest for certainty by entertaining the thought that he might be in the grip of a dream; Hume, who concluded that, since the mind is finite and part of nature, not of some divinity, seemingly eternal truths such as the link between cause and effect must be the product of expectations, built on custom and habit, that confer a spurious feeling of necessity on what merely happens to happen; Kant, for whom the true nature of things is hidden from the mind that can know only a universe of its own making; Schopenhauer, who broke through to the noumenal realm only to find that its truths were the playdough of the will; Freud, who exempted his own works from the general subordination of knowledge and belief to the unconscious forces emanating from prehistoric wishes mangled by civilization; and so—via many others—back to the Father-of-Modernity-and-Postmodernity Nietzsche, for whom 'all our so-called consciousness is a more or less fantastic commentary on a text which is unknown, perhaps unknowable.'" But that entire history of argument, says Tallis, is fatally flawed: "All attempts to demonstrate that the truth about truth is that it is not really true fall foul of the Cretan Paradox. Campbell's is no exception: if his critique of truth were true, then it would be false. More particularly, if humans are primed to lie, why should I believe a 350-page book by one human being, Jeremy Campbell? If empirical truths really are the products of linguistic systems that are in the keeping of the powerful, and if the structuration of language prevents articulate thoughts from mirroring reality—so that the AIDS that killed Foucault and his partners was a linguistic construct put into circulation by authoritarian homophobes—why should I accept the massive historical and scientific and cultural data on which Campbell bases his case? If, as he claims, science does not provide us with mind-independent truths and is not a body of objective knowledge about the natural world, and unlikely to be so because the human mind is compromised by the blood-boltered mess of evolution that shaped it, why should we give any credence to the (scientific) theory of evolution which is a central prop

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of Campbell's thesis? And if, finally, truth dissolves into meaning, what is the truth status of the assertion that truth has dissolved into meaning?" So far as we know, writes Tallis, only human beings have come up with theories such as those espoused by Campbell and so many others. The conclusion is inescapable: "It is in us alone that 'How things are' is expressed in true statements about how things are: sentience is collectivized as knowledge and experience becomes utterance. Because we are truly knowledgeable agents, we are uncoupled from nature to a unique degree and thereby freed to engage with the material world on our own terms and under conditions more favorable than those which other beasts, more completely immersed in nature, have to endure. Humanity is the place where what is the case becomes the truth about what is the case. An account of truth should begin from these extraordinary facts about us. If we sometimes bear false witness, it is because (like no other creature) we bear true witness; more fundamentally, that we bear witness to, as well as merely witness, or suffer, or interact with, the world."

■ A new study by sociologists at Catholic University of America reports that younger priests have a "high view" of the priesthood, believing that it makes an "ontological" difference, and are "happier in their priesthood than were their predecessors in 1970." Younger priests are not much interested in the issues that exercise their older confreres, such as celibacy, women's ordination, the selection of bishops, and so forth. In sum, and in contrast to those ordained in the 1960s and 1970s, younger priests reflect higher morale, satisfaction, and commitment. But then the report has to add that there is "a movement by younger priests toward a more pre-Vatican II attitude of the priesthood." What is this with "pre-Vatican II"? Almost twenty centuries of the Church's life was lived "pre-Vatican II." There are not two churches, one pre and the other post. There is, and will continue to be until the End Time, one Church, of which the Second Vatican Council is very much part. The sociologist who wrote the report undoubtedly knows that, but he, like the older priests studied, is probably burdened with the languages and prejudices of a relatively brief and aberrant time in which it was widely forgotten.

■ A New Jersey reader points out that the Supreme Court has recently ruled that child pornography that uses virtual imagery is constitutional and, at about the same time, the Ninth Circuit ruled against anti-abortion protests. So child pornography is protected by the First Amendment but abortion protest is not. What these decisions have in common, he says, is that they are both against children and in favor of adults indulging their desires in the sexual revolution, er, regression. It does give one pause about the conventional claim that ours is a child-centered society.

■ Ah, Canada. Young Marc Hall wanted to bring his boyfriend to the prom at a Catholic high school in Ontario and the school said no. Provincial judge Robert McKinnon overruled the school, invoking Canada's Charter of Rights. "In 1867," he opined (1867 being the date of Canadian confederation), "homosexual activity was viewed both as a crime and as a sickness. Today it is viewed as neither. Canadians' understanding of human behavior and of its people has changed over the last 135 years." So it's time the Church changed its teaching as well. It is simply intolerable that a modern up-to-date country like Canada should countenance views that are not only a century out of date but actually go back thousands of years. The justice went on to note that the position of the high school, the bishop, and Rome is "not the only Catholic position," and speculated that maybe a majority of Catholics disagree with that position. The logical next step is for the government to supervise referenda among Catholics to determine what should be the Church's teaching. And if Catholics persist in being recalcitrant in disagreeing with the advanced views of "Canadians," well, obviously, the government has no choice but to support the Canadians.

■ For fifty-six years Monsignor George Higgins wrote his "Yardstick" column that appeared in Catholic papers around the country. It makes me feel like I'm just getting started. Msgr. Higgins died, age eighty-six, on May Day, which seems fitting enough, since he is the last of a noble line of "labor priests" who had a great impact on Catholic social action in the century past. In the last fifteen years, his columns regularly took issue with "the neoconservatives"—meaning mainly Michael Novak, George Weigel, and your scribe. Our chief sin was that we did not share his commitment to the absolute indispensability of labor unions. He read this journal with great care, and not always in order to disagree. Our differences marked but did not mar our friendship. He was a good companion who enjoyed a drink, good food, and the telling of stories, of which he had many. He strongly supported George Meany and then Lane Kirkland in keeping the AFL-CIO on the right side of the great conflict of the Cold War. He thought I did not appreciate as fully as I should his labors in keeping the AFL-CIO "neutral" in the abortion battles. The problem is that formal neutrality did not prevent most of the member unions from being stridently pro-abortion, a problem greatly exacerbated under the

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leadership of John Sweeney. Born in Chicago but spending almost all his ministry in Washington, Higgins came from an Irish working-class world where, it is said, a union card was issued on the day of one's baptism. He kept faith with the Church and her social doctrine, although his understanding of the latter was, in my view, more attuned to a leftward reading of the 1891 encyclical *Rerum Novarum* than to its 1991 successor *Centesimus Annus*. To his great credit, he early on recognized the significance of Vatican II for Catholic-Jewish relations and was indefatigable in cultivating that connection. He was, all in all, a liberal who kept alive the memory of a liberalism that was not in conflict with, and was in important ways inspired by, Catholic fidelity. George Gilmary Higgins. May the trumpets sound upon his reaching home.

■ It was probably a mistake to send out a press release after the Chicago meeting in April. At least that is the view of some insiders who say that an initiative tentatively called "Christian Churches Together in the U.S.A." is so very tentative that the less public attention paid the better. Except for one big difference, the lineup of participants looks pretty much like the mainline/oldline cast of characters from the moribund National Council of Churches (NCC). The one big difference is high-level Catholic participation, including William Cardinal Keeler of Baltimore and the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops ecumenical office in Washington. The one big similarity with previous NCC-related efforts is the absence of evangelical Protestantism. There are the liberal-leaning evangelical stalwarts Ronald Sider of Evangelicals for Social Action and Jim Wallis of *Sojourners*, but they would be the first to admit that they are hardly representative of the fifty million or so evangelicals in the country. If this tentative effort is to produce something new in bringing together Christian leadership in the country, it would have to include major communions such as the Southern Baptist Convention, the Assemblies of God, the Church of God in Christ, and the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod. I am assured that the initiative intends to reach out to evangelicals in a major way, but it seems that should have been done before launching the enterprise. As it is, CCTUSA (snappy acronym, that) may appear to some to be an effort to revive the old NCC with a little help from Catholic and other friends. I am told that is not the case, that this has nothing to do with the future or non-future of NCC, that there is no intention to establish a new council, that the new organization, if it comes off, will not presume to issue statements on behalf of Christianity in America, that it will not get involved in the heavy-duty theological questions of "faith and order" but will stick to discussing ways of mutual help in practical matters, that this effort is "not programmatic but relational," meaning it is just a way of enabling Christian leaders to get together from time to time to share concerns and get to know one another. Indeed, there are so many assurances about what CCTUSA is not intended to be that nobody seems to have much of an idea about what it is intended to be. The operative words are tentative, preliminary, exploratory, and so forth. Another meeting is scheduled for January. What we seem to have at present is an idea aborning, or maybe just a provisional report of pregnancy. We will keep a sympathetically skeptical eye on developments.

■ Venom delivered with strained cleverness. That pretty much describes Maureen Dowd's column in the *Times*. She's hardly an equal opportunity hater; on almost every question of consequence she's on the left. Yet she can be as spiteful about Bill Clinton as about George W. I stopped reading her regularly many months ago, although I do sometimes glance at the column to see what sparked today's tantrum. Then I stumbled across this item in a review of Richard Blow's book on the late John F. Kennedy, Jr. and his unfortunate magazine *George*. Dowd panned it after the first issue appeared, and then responded to a note of protest with this: "Don't be mad at me. I'm paid to be a baby curmudgeon, and it's no fun. I'd go back to reporting in a minute. I've subscribed and I promise only plugs from now on." That would seem to explain what has gone so sour with her column. She believes the *Times* pays her to write infantile snits, so that is what she writes. So don't write to the *Times* complaining about her silly nastiness. Write urging them to put her back on the beat. She'd be happier, and it's not beyond possibility that the *Times* might replace her with a columnist who can be read with less pain, to herself (or himself) and others.

■ "The National Council of Churches' (NCC) devotion to its decades-long tradition of pandering to dictators while condemning democracies has been faithful and predictable. From Brezhnev and Castro, to Kim Il Sung, Daniel Ortega, and Yassir Arafat, the NCC never encountered an anti-American despot undeserving of its affections." That's Mark Tooley of the Institute on Religion and Democracy commenting on a recent NCC fact-finding mission to the Middle East. I'm not sure he's entirely right. For instance, I do not recall any NCC defense of Zimbabwe despot Robert Mugabe in the last ten years or so. Of course, Mugabe may have been dropped from the most favored despots list because of his outspoken contempt for same-sex rutting. His threat to enforce a prohibition of such expressive behavior almost led to

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

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the canceling of a World Council of Churches confab in Zimbabwe a few years ago. Mugabe finally agreed not to interfere with the church leaders' free exercise of libido and the meeting went ahead. I may be wrong, however, about why Mugabe is not on the NCC's most favored despot list. After all, Castro and Kim Il Sung are also world-class homophobes. In any event, the NCC missionaries to the Middle East were received by the dictator of Syria, the king of Jordan, and by Palestinian leaders, all of whom explained why U.S.-supported Israeli aggression is the source of all the troubles in that part of the world. Of that the NCC delegation did not need to be persuaded. The report of the NCC mission reliably parroted the position of Israel's neighboring enemies while omitting any mention of, inter alia, the anti-Semitic hatred daily spewed by the Arab media, official Arab support for Palestinian suicide bombers, Muslim prohibition of Christian (and, needless to say, Jewish) religious practice, and the conspicuous absence of democracy or freedom of expression in all the countries of the region except Israel. Nothing new in that. It is, as Mr. Tooley says, part of a "long tradition." NCC general secretary Bob Edgar was particularly impressed by Syrian dictator Bashar Al Assad, calling him "articulate, clear, and thoughtful." Edgar added, "He gave insights and a sense that Christians and Muslims and Jews can live together." That happy prospect, it appears, awaits only Israel's decision to acquiesce in its own destruction. While its public credibility passed on many years ago, the institutional shell of the NCC is sustained on life-support. One cannot help but wonder how an organization that is paying its overdue telephone bills on the installment plan manages again and again to find the money for pastoral visitations in support of the world's misunderstood enemies of religious and political freedom. Of course, in a region where former President Bill Clinton can pick up $750,000 for a speaking engagement, as he recently did in Saudi Arabia, money is not an object. Whether or not they paid for this junket, if they are thinking of footing the bill for others in the future, even despots with unlimited slush funds might ask whether the NCC today has any influence worth buying.

■ What I said is that I hope that nothing I write here is caustic or nasty. I didn't say anything about appreciating the acrid talents of others. There is, for instance, James Woolcott's review of Carol Gilligan's *The Birth of Pleasure*. Ms. Gilligan, as you probably know, is the much-celebrated theorist of the male's cold and calculated reasoning that stands in sharpest contrast to the female's intuitive and nurturing "ethic of care." Her 1982 book, *In a Different Voice*, is an academic version of men are from Mars, women from Venus. The present book, she announces, "was conceived in love." Let Mr. Woolcott take it from there: "Like many a militant sentimentalist, Ms. Gilligan is serenely humorless, not realizing the absurdity of drawing parallels between herself and Anne Frank. True, Ms. Gilligan writes, I never suffered through poverty, anti-Semitism, war, or rape, 'but I did experience a shocking break in my relationship with my mother.' It came when the twelve-year-old Gilligan returned home from camp to find that her mother had asked her beloved grandfather, Popsy, to move out of the house and find his own apartment. Popsy, gone! Setting aside the grim irony that Anne Frank never got to come home from her camp (how I wish writers would quit appropriating Anne Frank for their own agendas), it's worth noting too that this pushy narcissism isn't an isolated instance. Elsewhere Ms. Gilligan has the gall to compare her professional quest to Charles Darwin's ('Adolescent girls became the Galapagos of my journey'). What's astounding is that so many benefactors are willing to fund Ms. Gilligan's fountain of soap bubbles. On each page banalities pop before your eyes. 'Maybe love is like rain,' she repeats on the last page, bringing the book full circle, like a bad folk song. There's no dark, destructive side to love in Ms. Gilligan's cosmology, no disruptive fury in her conception of nature. Her 'radical geography of love' never leaves the campus grounds. With this book Carol Gilligan crowns herself earth-goddess of the cognitive elite."

■ There is an "unlovely tendency" in certain kinds of liberalism, writes Peter Berkowitz in the *Wilson Quarterly*, to assume that people who disagree with you are simply unreasonable. The title of his essay is "John Rawls and the Liberal Faith," and the occasion is the publication of Rawls' *Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy*. Rawls' 1971 book, *A Theory of Justice*, is justly called the most influential work in political philosophy of the last century, at least among academic philosophers. Many of us who have written about Rawls' argument have noted that the people behind his famous "veil of ignorance" are a peculiar kind of people (i.e., people very much like John Rawls) and therefore can hardly serve as the normative deliberators producing universal moral principles. Berkowitz also makes that point, but focuses on the thinly disguised "faith" assumptions in Rawls' theory, such as human dignity, equality, and concern for the disadvantaged. Berkowitz ends his argument with this:

> In trying to come to grips with the foundations of liberalism, Rawls offers conflicting ideas. On the one hand, he holds that the founding moral intuitions are self-evident. On the other, he

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holds that they rest on faith. Yet if good arguments can be made on behalf of both propositions, then by definition the moral intuitions cannot be self-evident. What is evident is the doubt about how precisely to understand liberalism's moral foundations. So at minimum it is reasonable to pursue the fecund thought that Rawls' freestanding liberalism actually stands on an act of faith. Perhaps Rawls' conflicting accounts can be reconciled, as in the Declaration of Independence, through the idea that a certain faith impels us to hold as self-evident the truth that all people are by nature free and equal.

No one is saying that liberalism requires you to be religious or that religious people are more amply endowed with the liberal spirit. But for those who care about understanding liberalism, a more precise knowledge of its foundations should be welcome. And as a practical matter, for those who care about freedom and equality, knowledge of the foundations of the truths we have long held to be self-evident can contribute to our ability to cultivate the conditions under which we can keep our grip on them firm.

Berkowitz is on to something important when he says that, as in the Declaration, "a certain faith impels us to hold as self-evident the truth that all people are by nature free and equal." One does not begin with the self-evident truths and then say that they are also endorsed by the Creator, presumably because the Creator is such a reasonable chap. One rather begins with the Creator and the order of creation ("Nature and Nature's God")—in the case of the Founders, the biblical God, even if for Jefferson and a few others attenuated by Enlightenment rationalism—from which understanding certain truths are established as self-evident. That is, such self-evident truths are not understood as the discovery of free-standing reason but as affirmations entailed and made morally obliging by a prior understanding of Nature and Nature's God. Berkowitz's critique of Rawlsian liberalism is incisive, and his conclusion is suggestive. Yet he, like Rawls, is still operating with a dichotomy between "reason" and "faith" that is a vestige of an earlier rationalism that refused to see how all reason necessarily entails faith. For this problem, it seems to me, the best antidote is still Michael Polanyi's *Personal Knowledge*. But that is for another time. Suffice it to say that Peter Berkowitz's essay on Rawlsian liberalism and its restrictive notion of what counts as "public reason"—a notion that has everything to do with maintaining the naked public square—is very much worth reading.

■ Homosexual? Gay? Or a victim of Same Sex Attraction Disorder (SSAD)? The last terminology is favored by some proponents of therapy for homosexuals but, given the acronym, is not likely to catch on in wider circles. I continue to press for a clear distinction between homosexual orientation and same-sex attraction, on the one hand, and being gay, on the other. The former is something about a person, while someone who says he is gay has made a decision to define *who he is* by that something. John O'Sullivan discusses this intelligently in "Mistaken Identities," an essay appearing in the *New Criterion* some while back: "To the old question, Is there a ghost in the machine? we can now answer: No, but there is a consumer.

"The consumer selects his new identity from the vast range of moral possibilities that the modern world throws up. In its simplest form, the new identity is constructed by selecting one facet of someone's real given identity, and elevating it to the whole, or at least to a dominant part, of the personality. George Orwell forecast this process of reification in a 1948 review of Sartre's *Portrait of an Anti-Semite*.

"'The' anti-Semite, he seems to imply all through the book, is always the same kind of a person, recognizable at a glance, and, so to speak, in action the whole time. Actually one has only to use a little observation to see that anti-Semitism . . . in any but the worst cases is intermittent. But [this] would not square with Monsieur Sartre's atomized view of society. There is, he comes near to saying, no such thing as a human being, there are only different categories of men, such as 'the' worker, and 'the' bourgeois, all classifiable in much the same way as insects.

"A recent example of this kind of identity-building is the gay identity. For a gay is not simply a homosexual; he is someone who has made homosexuality the basis of an entire personality and outlook—morals, politics, and social relations. This will tend to make him, or her, hostile to societies traditionally organized to favor heterosexuality and the family, and persuade him to advocate policies that seek not tolerance but the transformation of popular or traditional attitudes toward homosexuality.

"Needless to say, this kind of response is by no means universal among homosexuals. Even today when pressures such as 'outing' seek to enforce a gay identity on all homosexuals, many of them take the view that homosexuality is just one facet of their identity—whether an advantage, or a curse, or simply a slightly awkward fact about themselves—which has little bearing on the rest of their lives outside the bedroom. Their support for sexual reform will tend to go no further than social tolerance and the repeal of punitive laws. They may find the gay identity

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mysterious, alien, too narrow to express their entire personality, and even repellent.

"Here, in a passage from Noel Coward's diary, is the response of one such homosexual (by no means a repressed one) to the gay milieu of Fire Island in New York:

> I came back last night having spent Saturday and yesterday on Fire Island. I don't think I shall ever go again. It is lovely from the point of view of beach and sun and wearing no clothes, but the atmosphere is sick-sick-sick. Never in my life have I seen such concentrated abandoned homosexuality. It is fantastic and difficult to believe. I wished really that I hadn't gone. Thousands of queer men of all shapes and sizes camping about blatantly and carrying on—in my opinion—appallingly. Then there were all the lesbians glowering at each other. Among this welter of brazen perversion wander a few "straights," with children and dogs. I have always been of the opinion that a large group of queer men was unattractive. On Fire Island it is more than unattractive, it's macabre, sinister, irritating, and somehow tragic.

"Self-conscious identity-building is very different from the earlier argument of Bill and Shirley Letwin that traditional identity can be modified by reason's deciding to emphasize some aspects of one's environment at the expense of others. The difference is subtle but important and it has immense consequences. It is the difference between piecemeal self-improvement and the wholesale reconstruction of the personality. Someone attempting piecemeal reform will usually refer to what he is doing in modest terms—'I'm trying to be more punctual.' Someone engaged in ideological reconstruction of himself will, appropriately enough, see it in dramatic, even religious terms, as becoming a different sort of human being. He will be re-making himself in accordance with some revelation, either some new principle of reason outside himself, or some inner prompting of the personality, or even both—some impulse extracted from inside himself and expanded into a universal truth about human nature. Thus a lesbian, uncomfortable with femininity, will eventually be struck by the blinding revelation that all gender roles are socially constructed."

■ Everything is ship-shape. That was the reaction of *America*, the Jesuit magazine, to the highly critical book *Passionate Uncertainty: Inside the American Jesuits* by Peter McDonough and Eugene Bianchi. The book did not occasion the slightest smidgen of self-criticism. *Commonweal*, however, is not a Jesuit magazine. It is edited by fiercely independent, albeit liberal, lay Catholics. *Commonweal*'s response to the book? Everything is ship-shape in the Society of Jesus. It is allowed that back in the 1960s and '70s, when some of those interviewed for the book were Jesuits, there may have been problems such as gays and straights sleeping around, rebellion against ecclesial authority, and flirting with Zen-inspired syncretisms. But no longer. Of course there is great diversity of talents and interests in the Society, "But what the authors of *Passionate Uncertainty* misunderstand is that this is the great strength of the Society, not its great weakness," etc., etc. Again, not the slightest smidgen of self-criticism. Which is perhaps not surprising, since the reviewer is a Jesuit and, oh yes, an associate editor of *America*. In marked contrast to this circling of the wagons is the review of *Passionate Uncertainty* by the distinguished Jesuit, Avery Cardinal Dulles (FT, April).

■ He was among the dearest of friends. We went way back, Jim Finn and I. We first met when he came to interview me at the rectory of my Brooklyn parish for his book, *Protest, Pacifism, and Politics*, a book still very much worth reading to get a sense of the mid-sixties and the protest against the war in Vietnam. We both opposed the war and also came to be critical of much opposition to the war. Jim loved a good argument, but he was not contentious. He was an irenic soul, and determined to be fair-minded above all. He was an editor of *Commonweal* for six years, and later wrote for this journal, as well as the *New Republic*, *Commentary*, and *Crisis*. From the beginning, he also served on our editorial advisory board. In the early seventies he and I launched and edited together a monthly called *Worldview*, published by the Council on Religion and International Affairs (now the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs). *Worldview* was in important ways the forerunner to FIRST THINGS. I suppose we spent thousands of hours in discussion over drinks and good food, the latter often prepared by his wife Molly, an accomplished chef and author of cookbooks, whom to know is to love. Jim was learned, literary, and possessed a capacity for criticism that was incisive but never cruel. This I think I remember most: he lived gratefully. One might say eucharistically. After dinner of an evening, we were discussing his and Molly's misadventure in Brooklyn real estate. They bought a house that required endless repairs and finally sold it at a considerable loss. "Some day we really should add up how much money we wasted on that house," remarked Molly. To which Jim said, "Why?" And that was that, and that was Jim. May choirs of angels sing him to that place of gratitude vindicated, finally and forever.

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■ One imagines the organizers saying, "Oh, it's Palm Sunday too?" A reader sends along a map published in the *Washington Post*, indicating the nineteen churches that would be affected by street closings for the first Washington, D.C., Marathon, which kicked off at 7 A.M. and ended at 1:14 P.M. You couldn't get to church on Palm Sunday? Too bad, but first things first.

■ People for the American Way (PFAW) is one of the most strident, and effective, left-liberal lobbying groups in the nation. It is regularly covered by the major news organizations, and almost always quite favorably. That is not entirely surprising, since it is also financially supported by those organizations. At its annual fundraising dinner here in April, the *New York Times*, Time, Inc., CBS, NBC, and Disney (owner of ABC) all bought tables at $500 to $600 per seat. I know that, at this late date in the game, media bias may hardly seem worth mentioning, but some readers tell me they keep clippings on the matter and they might want to add this to what are no doubt their overflowing files.

■ I have a confession to make. I've never seen Oprah Winfrey on television. I do not make the confession reluctantly, since I expect the great majority of Americans have not watched her show. According to a long article in *Christianity Today* that tends toward heavy breathing, Ms. Winfrey has an "audience of more than twenty-two million mostly female viewers, and has become a postmodern priestess—an icon of church-free spirituality." The article quotes without smirking a 1994 *Vanity Fair* claim that "Oprah Winfrey arguably has more influence on the culture than any university president, politician, or religious leader, except perhaps the Pope." The "arguably" is a nice out. *CT* says that Oprah "could be viewed as a window into American spirituality at the beginning of the twenty-first century—and into the challenges it poses for the Church." Well, yes, she could be if one were so inclined. The article notes that her program boosts a gang of New Ageish gurus and never includes an explicit altar call to make a decision for Jesus. One may agree with the article that what people are *really* looking for, if only they knew it, is "a personal relationship with Jesus Christ" without buying into the hype that Ms. Winfrey's success is an "icon" or "window into" anything especially noteworthy about American culture. I imagine at any given moment there are at least twenty-two million women in America with nothing better to do with their time and looking for a little cheering up. The men probably get it watching the sports channels. Without researching the matter by, for instance, actually watching the program, I gather that Ms. Winfrey is a particularly successful entertainer specializing in self-affirmation with intimations of the religious. That's as American as cherry pie. The combined wisdom of Chesterton and Barnum applies here. America is a nation with the soul of a church, and successful churches attract a paying crowd. You keep the crowd by sticking to generalities that require little thought and less commitment. "Spirituality," for instance, is a sure winner. Oprah Winfrey is downmarket uplift for people who are "inspired" by the Hindu insights of Deepak Chopra and then go to church on Sunday to praise Jesus. I'm not sure about that, mind you. As Will Rogers might have said, I just know what I read in *Christianity Today*.

■ Gibson Winter was a big name and big influence in oldline Protestantism. An Episcopal priest, his 1962 book *The Suburban Captivity of the Churches* inspired a generation of young clergy, including this writer, in their commitment to inner-city ministry. Gibson Winter died at age eighty-five in Chesterton, Maryland. Then there is another obituary. Most people knew him as Xavier Rynne, the pen-name he used for his reports in the *New Yorker* on the Second Vatican Council. Francis X. Murphy, a Redemptorist priest, perhaps did as much as any one person to popularize the liberal vs. conservative, "spirit" vs. "letter," understanding (or misunderstanding) of the Council over the past decades. He was a very likable fellow who, in his charming innocence, really believed that one was either his kind of liberal or a pre-Vatican II right-winger. Francis X. Murphy died at age eighty-seven in Annapolis, Maryland. May choirs of angels welcome them, after due purgatorial corrections, to the eternal convivium where such disputes are no more than the stuff of amused remembrance.

■ "I would have described an evangelical as a socially stunted wannabe—a fundamentalist with a better income, a slightly more open mind, and a less furrowed brow." That, says popular writer Philip Yancey, is how he thought in college. But then he ran into G. K. Chesterton, and it made all the difference. Evangelical Protestants usually are not big on the cult of the saints. But then there are those shrines to the likes of C. S. Lewis, Malcolm Muggeridge, and J. R. R. Tolkien at Wheaton College. (None of those worthies, it has been noted, would have been permitted to teach at Wheaton.) Chesterton has not been canonized by evangelicals, however, and I'm glad to see that Yancey is bringing him to their attention. GKC, the prophet of mirth, represents a distinctive way of being Christian in the world. "The worst moment for the atheist," he wrote, "is when he is really thankful and has no one to thank." Yancey puts it nicely: "In addition to the

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problem of pain, G. K. Chesterton seemed equally fascinated by its opposite, the problem of pleasure. He found materialism too thin to account for the sense of wonder and delight that gives an almost magical dimension to such basic human acts as sex, childbirth, play, and artistic creation." I know what he means when he speaks of going back to GKC again and again. "Whenever I feel my faith going dry again, I wander to a shelf and pick up a book by G. K. Chesterton. The adventure begins all over again." This is from Yancey's new book, *Soul Survivor.* I am not sure that GKC would have approved of the subtitle, however: *How My Faith Survived the Church.* A more Chestertonian subtitle might be *How the Church Survived My Faith.* But then, Yancey is talking about a different church.

■ Said a friend of FT who is also a friend of *Commentary*, "I see *Commentary* has declared war on you. Or is it the other way around?" I sincerely hope that neither is the case. It is true that I have, ever so delicately, expressed regret that our friends at *Commentary* have published strident attacks on Pius XII for his "silence" about the Holocaust and what I believe is a very unfortunate attack on *Dabru Emet*, a statement by Jewish scholars on how Jews should understand Christianity. And I did question an assertion of Hillel Halkin in "The Return of Anti-Semitism." He wrote in *Commentary*, "One cannot be against Israel or Zionism, as opposed to this or that Israeli policy or Zionist position, without being anti-Semitic. Israel is the state of the Jews. Zionism is the belief that Jews should have a state. To defame Israel is to defame the Jews. To wish it never existed, or would cease to exist, is to wish to destroy the Jews." I pointed out in response that, however wrongheaded we may think them to be, there are people, including Jews, who think the establishment of the State of Israel was a mistake, and some people think it would be better for Jews if they emigrated elsewhere—to the United States, for instance—where they would not be under the constant threat of annihilation. In neither instance is it true that such people "wish to destroy the Jews." After all, most Jews in the world, although supporting Israel, do not live there. To equate the Jewish people with the State of Israel, as Mr. Halkin at least implicitly does, is contrary to fact. To claim that the belief that the establishment of Israel was a mistake or that Israel is not sustainable is the same thing as "to wish to destroy the Jews" is a calumny. I concluded my reflection with this: "Hillel Halkin is certainly right in saying that, after September 11, the perceived risks in U.S. support for Israel are greatly increased. There needs to be a civil conversation about why we should be prepared to accept those risks. It is distinctly unhelpful to poison public discourse with the suggestion that those who disagree or have doubts are, in fact, simply anti-Semites." Returning to the discussion, Gabriel Schoenfeld, senior editor of *Commentary*, describes me as among the "avowed friends of the Jewish state" but deplores my comments on Halkin's article. "Such," he writes, "are the tortuous rationalizations to which the swell of worldwide anti-Semitism has led." (I note, but decline to entertain, the possibility that Mr. Schoenfeld is suggesting that anti-Semitism led me to write what I did.) My reflection, I am persuaded, was neither tortuous nor a rationalization. It was a straightforward clarification of a serious confusion in Mr. Halkin's argument. There is a worldwide swell of anti-Semitism, except for, thank God, the United States. As American support for Israel becomes ever more crucial, those of us who advocate such support should not accuse everyone who disagrees of being anti-Semitic or of wishing to destroy the Jews. To divide Americans between those who support U.S. policy toward Israel and those who wish to destroy the Jews is, I believe, false, uncivil, and counterproductive. This may be a disagreement with *Commentary.* It is certainly not a war.

■ Is there no end to the abuse? And this time by a cardinal! ABC News reports that its man Brian Ross accosted Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger on a street in Rome, demanding his comment on an alleged cover-up of a sex abuse case. Ratzinger told him to make an appointment to see him. The accompanying picture shows Ross sticking a mike into the Cardinal's face. Then this: "Ratzinger became visibly upset and actually slapped this reporter's hand." Oh, dear. How could a cardinal be annoyed by an importunate reporter? As for what was probably a tap on the hand, poor Brian Ross is lucky that the Cardinal did not have with him the ruler with which he raps the knuckles of miscreants. The report does not say whether Mr. Ross was admitted to the hospital for treatment of his injured feelings.

■ Following up on "Don't Mention the Jews" (Public Square, May), I see that Vanderbilt and a host of other colleges and universities are becoming quite explicit about wanting more Jewish students. They are candidly operating by the stereotype, reinforced by the ample evidence, that Jews tend to be smart. The national average in SAT scores, which are crucial for admission to schools, is 1020. Students connected with the very small Unitarian Universalist Association average 1209, and Jews are second with 1161. (Religious affiliation in descending order, down to 1092: Quaker, Hindu, Mennonite, Reformed Church in America, Episcopal, ELCA Lutheran, and Presbyterian [USA].) Jews are two percent of the population but 23 percent of students in Ivy League

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schools. At the University of Pennsylvania, they're over one-third. Vanderbilt and others are taking aggressive measures to recruit smarter students. The issue of stereotyping, Assistant Provost Greg Perfetto says, never crossed his mind. "It isn't that we were targeting Jewish students," says Mr. Perfetto. "If we were doing anything, we were targeting Vanderbilt. We were saying, 'How does Vanderbilt need to change to be attractive to this population?'" Being translated, they're targeting Jews. Susquehanna University, a Lutheran school in Selinsgrove, Pennsylvania, a town without a synagogue, started a Jewish Studies program, offering a minor in the field, and runs a Jewish cuisine class that offers bagels, matzo, and gefilte fish. Jews are only two percent of the student body, but this year the number of Jewish applicants has doubled, thus, in the words of the admissions director, "increasing the quality of our applicant pool." As might be expected, the liberally orthodox are made nervous by this kind of profiling and stereotyping. If it must be done, it should not be admitted. An administrator at Vanderbilt says he is not against recruiting Jews—as long as it's "done with wires invisible." The way it used to be done in the bad old days when quotas were designed to keep Jews out. In this instance the adage applies: the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce.

■ The two best-selling books last year were *The Prayer of Jabez* by Bruce Wilkinson and *Desecration*, a title in the Left Behind series by Tim LaHaye and Jerry B. Jenkins, according to *Publishers Weekly*. The former sold eight million and the latter 2.9 million copies. Speaking recently at an evangelical college, I recalled a meeting we sponsored at which Tim LaHaye was a participant. On the evening of the first day he suggested we go running the next morning, and I agreed. I did a little jogging back then, but quickly discovered that Tim was a serious runner. I told the audience, "I was soon left behind, way behind." Not everybody took that in good humor, one student pressing me on whether I was not worried about being left behind. The answer is that, when it comes to running and book sales, I'm resigned to being left behind Tim LaHaye. As for End Time scenarios, I pray I'll be ready for whatever comes, which I expect will be a great deal more mysterious, and more interesting, than what is suggested in the little I've read of the Left Behind books. (Perhaps I missed the best parts.) *Publishers Weekly* also reports that LaHaye is signing a four-book contract with Bantam Dell for an estimated $45 million. The new series will, it is said, feature an archaeology theme similar to that of the Indiana Jones films. It will also be "a little lighter theologically."

■ The headline was accurate enough: "Homosexuality in Priesthood Is Under Increasing Scrutiny." And I did say what the *New York Times* quotes me as saying. But I'm not surprised that the item puzzled some readers. The story ends this way: "Ultimately, many Catholics say, the idea that the Church will purge itself of gay priests is unlikely. There are too many homosexuals in the hierarchy, too many gifted gay men serving in a church that is starved for priests. Even a conservative like Father Neuhaus said he was not in favor of banning gay men from the priesthood. 'I think we would probably discover we would be retroactively excluding a good many canonized saints over two thousand years,' he said." The problem here is that I was making a distinction between those whom we today describe as having a homosexual orientation and those who call themselves gay, meaning that they identify themselves by the desires on which they act. The confusion is caused by the *Times*' policy of using "homosexual" and "gay" interchangeably, the latter term being preferred to the former. So is it probable that, among the thousands whom Catholics recognize as saints, some or many had a homosexual orientation? Given the commonality of wayward human passions, it seems more than probable. Saints are not saints by virtue of not being tempted, but by virtue of grace in overcoming temptation.

■ Justice Byron White has died. He was one of the two dissenters from the infamous *Roe v. Wade* decision of 1973, calling it "an exercise of raw judicial power." He allowed that the Court "perhaps has authority to do what it does today," but added that "in my view its judgment is an improvident and extravagant exercise of the power of judicial review that the Constitution extends to this Court." He noted that the majority was not able to discover anything in "the language or history of the Constitution to support the Court's judgment" and therefore had to discover a constitutional "penumbra" claimed to be somehow embedded in the "right to privacy." Since *Roe v. Wade*, an estimated forty million unborn children have been denied the right to life. The *Dred Scott* decision of 1857, declaring slaves not to be persons under the meaning of the Constitution, was also 7-2. After the most tumultuous conflict in our history, the nation looks back on that decision with shame. One day, please God, *Roe v. Wade* will also be reversed or effectively nullified. Then Byron White, who we pray rests in peace, will have his posthumous vindication.

■ You probably don't read the masthead regularly and over the years there have been few changes, but if you did read it this time, you may have noticed the absence of Stanley Hauerwas from the Editorial Board. He

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believes that his well-known commitment to pacifism is incompatible with the position of the journal as expressed in our December editorial "In a Time of War," and makes it necessary for him to discontinue his formal association. We agree on the incompatibility of positions regarding the war against terror, but disagree on the desirability of continuing our association. The decision to resign from the Editorial Board is entirely his; the disagreement is amiable; we are grateful for the assurance of his continuing friendship; and we will persist in holding many of his contributions to Christian moral thought in high regard. He may not appear on the masthead, but do not be surprised if his contributions continue to appear in these pages.

■ I've mentioned before the bishop, a certified expert on matters liturgical, who followed a Mass with stopwatch in hand and reported that for more than half the time "the people were doing nothing." To adore, to meditate, to wonder, to quietly pray is, presumably, to be doing nothing. In a 1998 address, John Paul II said: "Worshipers are not passive, for instance, when listening to the readings or the homily, or following the prayers of the celebrant, and the chants and the music of the liturgy. These are experiences of silence and stillness, but they are in their own way profoundly active. In a culture which neither favors nor fosters meditative quiet, the art of interior listening is learned only with difficulty." It is commonly said today that a liturgical practice "works" or does not "work." As someone who has presided at thousands upon thousands of liturgies, I think I know what can be meant by that expression, but too often it reveals a utilitarian or psychological mindset that is antithetical to the spirit of liturgy. Worship is the one thing in the world that is an end in itself. Thus the great Romano Guardini: "It is in this very aspect of the liturgy that its didactic aim is to be found, that of teaching the soul not to see purposes everywhere, not to be too conscious of the end it wishes to attain, not to be desirous of being over-clever and grown-up, but to understand simplicity in life. The soul must learn to waste time for the sake of God and to be prepared for the sacred game with sayings and thought and gestures, without always immediately asking 'why?' and 'wherefore?' It must learn not to be continually yearning to *do* something, to attack something, to accomplish something useful, but to play the divinely ordained game of the liturgy in liberty and beauty and holy joy before God." Anne Husted Burleigh puts the matter very nicely: "If we are to foster the awe, reverence, and adoration through which we may know the Word of Christ, then we must love, and not fear silence and stillness in the Mass and in our life. From silence comes the Word. From silence God spoke and created the world. From silence He spoke to Mary and came to dwell in her womb. From silence He sent His Holy Spirit at Pentecost to lead the Church. Meditative quiet, as the Pope laments, is neither favored nor fostered in our culture. Yet there is no getting around the simple fact that only in stillness do we learn to listen with the interior ear. Only in stillness do we calm down enough to sense the Lord's presence. Only in stillness do we find out that the Lord loves us and that we are made to love him. Silence, then, is not a den of terror; it is rather the place where we fall in love."

■ Okefenokee Swamp. I lived there a long time, at least in imagination. Now all eleven volumes of Walt Kelly's *Pogo* have been reissued (Fantagraphics, $9.95 each, paper). I still have the original books, although I noticed the other day that they're mildewed and falling apart. In addition to the irresistible Pogo, there were countless characters who filled my youthful mind and playfully muddled my vocabulary, especially Albert the Alligator. And the little rabbit who, in times of catastrophe, would show up in the lower corner of a strip with a fire hose. While others squabbled over what to do about the disaster at hand, he would say, in small letters, "I carry the hose." "I carry the hose" has been my mantra over the years when I have occasion to be impressed, as I have frequent occasion to be impressed, by how small is one's part in the larger picture. But Kelly gave Albert some of the best lines. Brad Leithauser has a whimsical review of the reissued books in the *New York Review of Books*. He writes, "Albert was certainly a cheering presence. Few things in the world have so dependably amused me, over the years, as images of Albert wearing a look of indomitable shrewdness as he prepares to plunge once more into bottomless folly." Of the achievement that was *Pogo*, he says, "It had depth, a madcap unpredictability, and restive verbal playfulness; it was, in short, the only comic strip spun through the mind of a poet." When I go back to *Pogo* today, as I infrequently do, the fun is spoiled just a bit by Kelly's strident leftism. I didn't mind that in the fifties and sixties, but then I shared his prejudices. Leithauser observes that the satirical novel belongs to a tradition of indignant conservatism—Swift, Waugh, Wodehouse, Kingsley Amis, et al.—while clever comic strips, except for the later Al Capp, creator of *Li'l Abner*, are almost always products of the left. I suppose he is right about that, and one wonders why that should be, since comics, more than novels, are presumably read by ordinary folk more given to conservatism of a populist kind. I don't think he is right, however, about Kelly's Swamp being such an

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innocent place. He writes, "Those twin mainstays of adult existence, work and sex, have no place in it. . . . Kelly's creatures belong to the world before Adam's curse has descended upon it." Work and sex there may not be, but all the other ravages of the Fall—pride, ambition, greed, anger, covetousness, envy, and sloth—are ever on ludicrous display in Okefenokee Swamp. Only Pogo himself is prelapsarian. Except, perhaps, for sloth. I wouldn't want to be fifteen again. But I would dearly love to discover *Pogo* for the first time.

■ In the pecking order of influence, it is said that the *Wall Street Journal* is edited for the people who run the world, the *New York Times* is edited for the people who think they run the world, and the *Washington Post* is edited for the people who think they should run the world. "Bishops at the Crossroads," an editorial in the *Times* a few days before the Dallas meeting, is suggestive of that paper's understanding of its reach. "We do not favor defrocking one-time offenders who have rehabilitated themselves. . . . Like the bishops, we believe in recovery and redemption. We just don't want abusers as ministers." As Tonto said to the Lone Ranger, What do you mean "We"? Perhaps the item was written by one of the Catholics on the editorial board and just slipped through. I don't think publisher Arthur Ochs Sulzberger wants what used to be called the newspaper of record to be on record as agreeing with Catholic teaching on the meaning of redemption, or that he really believes that the *Times* is part of the Catholic "we" and thus entitled to a say in who should or should not be a priest. On the other hand, if you think you're running the world . . .

■ A third or more of our subscribers teach in colleges or universities, and we've been thinking about how to turn that to the journal's advantage, and to the advantage of younger thinkers who should be reading FT. So here is what we came up with. If you teach at a college or university and have two or three students who graduated this past spring who you think would benefit from reading FT and might become long-term subscribers, please send us their names and addresses and we will send them a one-year subscription absolutely free. In the hope, of course, that they will renew on their own. And, with your permission, we will tell them that the subscription is given on your recommendation. But please, no more than three or it will bust our budget. Send names and addresses to FIRST THINGS, 156 Fifth Avenue, Suite 400, New York, New York 10010. Thank you.

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



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